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Abstract  
 
The thesis includes an introductory survey of recent relevant secondary literature and a coda 
dealing with the fantastic as a manifestation of Schiller’s ‘Spieltrieb’.  Its main body, 
however, is comprised of three substantial chapters prosecuting two interlinked arguments: 
(1) that Der Tod in Venedig and Joseph und seine Brüder are fantastic narratives and (2) that 
the fantastic in these narratives works hand in glove with Mann’s philosophical concerns.   
 
In order to demonstrate that the first of these propositions is correct chapter II is devoted to 
showing how much Der Tod in Venedig has in common with works which are acknowledged 
to be part of the fantastic genre (as defined by Todorov and refined by Brooke-Rose): ‘The 
Black Cat’, ‘The Turn of the Screw’ and ‘Der Sandmann’.  This chapter also attempts a 
hermeneutics of the fantastic by discussing each of the above mentioned stories in relation to 
morality, meaning and intention.  Attempts to dismiss the putatively supernatural elements in 
Der Tod in Venedig are considered in the light of the critical debate as to whether ‘The Turn 
of the Screw’ should be considered a ghost story or just an account of hysterical 
hallucinations.  This chapter also broaches the topic of the relationship between the 
metaphysical and the supernatural. 
 
Chapter III is an investigation of the meaning of Der Tod in Venedig in the light of Mann’s 
philosophical development.  The question of whether he is more properly to be regarded as a 
Nietzschean or Schopenhauerian is raised, as is the influence of each on Mann’s earlier (i.e. 
pre-Tod in Venedig) fiction.  It is suggested that neither of these philosophers could provide 
Mann with the sense of purpose vital to his literary creativity, and that he began casting 
around for an alternative to Nietzsche’s value-free naturalism and Schopenhauer’s value-free 
metaphysics.  Two candidates are proposed: Plato (elements of whose philosophy Mann 
adopts without irony) and Schiller (as a synthesis of Platonism and Kantianism).  Schiller’s 
interpretation of the contrast between a metaphysics of value on the one hand and a natural 
world with its own claims to respect on the other is advanced as the model for the 
‘Geist/Natur’ distinction which lies at the heart of Mann’s world-view.  Mann, it is argued, 
having begun to apprehend the deficiencies of both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer while not yet 
fully embracing the Schillerian categories he would later make his own, includes putatively 
supernatural elements in Der Tod in Venedig which can be understood both in terms of 
Schopenhauer’s ‘Wille’ and also in terms  of a Platonic empyrean, so that it seems that two 
different metaphysical systems compete for space with one another.  However, a Schillerian 
solution – involving the ‘Spieltrieb – to this apparently unsatisfactory situation is at hand. 
 
Chapter IV deals with Joseph, and it follows the analytic procedure established in the 
previous two chapters.  Firstly it demonstrates that there are good reasons to suspect the 
presence of the supernatural in this novel.  Secondly, it establishes the meaning of the 
supernatural by considering the philosophical background alluded to by the novel’s events 
and commentary.  Numerous examples of the putatively supernatural are considered, as is the 
ubiquity of something that looks like providence throughout the tetralogy, and various 
naturalistic critiques are evaluated.  The Schopenhauerian interpretation of the novel is 
discussed in the light of Mann’s 1937 essay on this philosopher, and is shown to be 
insufficient to explain the work as a whole.  The importance of ‘Geist’ is emphasized. 
Complementing the proto-Christianity which has always been acknowledged as playing a role 
in Joseph a proto-Platonism is proposed as one of the novel’s main preoccupations, and the 
metaphysic behind the supernatural in Joseph is shown to be as Platonic as it is Christian.  
However, a certain Hegelianism (which Mann understands in a dualistic fashion) at work in 
Joseph suggests that direct access to a ‘Geist’ outside of the secular world (which is what 
Joseph apparently has) lacks the validity and staying-power of a ‘Geist’ realized through 
earthly struggle.  This, the thesis suggests, is the reason that Juda rather than Joseph receives 
Jacob’s blessing. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
Göttingen and Two Currents of Mann Criticism 
 
Between the third and the fifth of September 2010 a colloquium entitled ‘Der 
Zauberer und die Phantastik. Thomas Mann und das phantastische Erzählen’ took 
place in Göttingen’s Paulinerkirche.  After an introductory session devoted to an 
explanation of what the fantastic entails – a state of ambiguity between naturalistic 
and supernatural interpretations of fictional events – various speakers over a period of 
three days reviewed some of Mann’s works with a view to making a ruling on their 
fantastic credentials.  The only one granted ‘official status’, so to speak, as genuinely 
fantastic was a very early short story entitled ‘Der Kleiderschrank’ – none of the 
major fiction was admitted to the canon.
1
  Buddenbrooks, Heinrich Detering 
conceded, perhaps included fantastic ‘Grenzfälle’,  Andreas Blödorn made it clear 
that Der Tod in Venedig should be excluded on the grounds that the only material 
which we might take to be fantastic occurs in the story’s ‘Binnengeschichte’, i.e. 
before its third-person narrator can take the stage unchallenged after Aschenbach’s 
death.  Luca Crescenzi suggested that the fantastic played no role in Der Zauberberg 
and explained that all the events in the novel are mere figments of Hans Castorp’s 
imagination and those seven years in the sanatorium but a dream hurriedly prepared 
by his subconscious in the last second or two before the ‘Donnerschlag’ of the last 
chapter heralds the return of the waking world.  Stephan Stachorski declared that, 
notwithstanding all evident signs to the contrary, Doktor Faustus ought not to be 
considered a work of the fantastic on the grounds that Mann would never have been 
so irresponsible as to suggest that the catastrophes of the Third Reich were caused by 
anything but human agency.  Consequently, the novel’s ambiguously supernatural 
                                                 
1
 This story was identified as fantastic by Marcel Brion in 1954: ‘Parmi les nouvelles de Thomas Mann 
il en est une intitulée “Le Placard” qui met en evidence le fantastique latent dans ses autres œuvres.’ 
(Brion 1955, 49) Its disorientated protagonist descends from a train in an unfamiliar north German 
town, hires a room in a pension, and discovers a naked girl in a wardrobe who night after night recites 
poetry and tells stories to him.  An explanation is at hand for these events which, while not being 
definitely supernatural, are none the less hard to account for naturalistically: ‘Wer weiß auch nur, ob 
überhaupt Albrecht van der Qualen an jenem Nachmittage wirklich erwachte und sich in die 
unbekannte Stadt begab; ob er nicht vielmehr schlafend in seinem Coupé erster Klasse verblieb und 
von dem Schnellzug Berlin-Rom mit ungeheurer Geschwindigkeit über alle Berge getragen ward?’ 
(2.1, 203) However, as we have already been informed that various doctors have given van der Qualen 
only a little while to live, we might wonder if this dream takes place at death’s threshold, or even 
beyond it. 
2 
 
elements are to be attributed to Mann’s source materials – the Faust-legends etc. – and 
are not to be attributed to the author himself.
2
   
 
There would be little purpose in engaging with all these arguments at this point, 
especially as some of them concern works scarcely touched on by this thesis.  But one 
cannot help registering surprise at a near definitive rejection of the fantastic in Der 
Tod in Venedig, Doktor Faustus etc., given that Mann’s use of the ambiguously 
supernatural is an open secret amongst some of the most important critics to have 
examined his works.  For example, Reed in The Uses of Tradition points out at the 
end of a discussion of the various types of ambiguity which are maintained 
throughout Der Tod in Venedig that Mann employs similar techniques in his later 
fictions too:  
 
There is the Naturalistic surface of the Joseph novel, showing how all that ‘really’ happened, but 
with underlying suggestions of mythical re-enactment.  And a yet more radical doubt and 
suggestiveness surround Doktor Faustus.  Are Adrian Leverkühn’s inspirations the product of 
syphilis or of a pact with the devil?  The dubiousness itself parallels the two interpretations of 
Germany’s descent into Nazism: pathological and mythical. (Reed 1996, 178) 
 
And Dierks makes a similar point in Studien zu Mythos und Psychologie bei Thomas 
Mann.  He believes that the strange goings-on in ‘Der Kleiderschrank’ are best 
explained in terms of a regression from the world of the senses into the metaphysical 
substrate which creates that world, but points out too that this early short story 
establishes Mann’s policy of never allowing such a force into his fiction without the 
support of a naturalistic alibi: 
 
Nie wird in der Folge bei Thomas Mann eine Primärwirklichkeit durchlässig, weil sich 
Individuation in eine Hinterwelt entgrenzt, ohne daß das Motiv des korrumpierenden Rausches, 
einer Intoxikation der Vernunft, erklärend und wertend dabei fehlt. (Dierks 1972, 45) 
 
One should not be misled by Reed’s use of the word ‘myth’ or Dierks’ allusion to a 
‘Hinterwelt’.  Each of them is describing a narrative technique which allows the 
coexistence of two perspectives, the one being naturalistic and the other being the 
                                                 
2
 Also present was Marianne Wünsch, author of Die fantastische Literatur der frühen Moderne (1890-
1930), one of the few books to connect Mann to the fantastic – although its treatment of him is limited 
to Joachim’s reapparition in Der Zauberberg, which is an unambiguously supernatural event.  
3 
 
opposite of naturalistic: a supernatural perspective.  It is true that their reception of 
this supernatural dimension in the stories in question is by no means effusive, and 
Reed denies the ‘radical doubt’ he attributed to Doktor Faustus when he returns to the 
novel later in his treatise.
3
  All the same, we should not lose sight of the fact that two 
leading Mann critics effectively conceded the role of the fantastic in Mann’s works 
more than thirty years ago. 
 
However, Reed’s and Dierks’ implied admission that certain of Mann’s novels and 
short stories exhibit fantastic ambiguity is not the only element which the present 
work takes over and develops, for their treatment of Mann’s problematic stance with 
regard to values and moral purpose must also be acknowledged.  Reed, for example, 
points out that Mann’s early adoption of Nietzsche’s nihilism leaves his early fiction 
bereft of a positive moral pole: ‘Its negations depend logically on the existence of 
contrary positions, and if one cannot get back to these through the implications of the 
ironic phrasing, irony is left as a rhetorical structure hanging in the air.’ (Reed 1996, 
14)  He regards this all-pervasive irony as a problem chiefly for the reader, but this 
thesis will argue that it was an even greater handicap for Mann himself, who more 
than most writers needed to set himself positive and not just negative goals, to feel a 
sense of mission.  And it will also argue that, in order to achieve such a sense of 
mission, Mann reached beyond both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer to an older 
philosophical tradition.  This is a possibility identified by Dierks who, in his treatment 
of ‘Goethe und Tolstoi’, writes of the ‘Geist’ depicted in that essay: 
 
Hier wäre Thomas Manns pathetische Vindizierung des Geistes zu orten, als ethische 
Notwendigkeit in der Immanenzwelt des Menschen, bei steter Einsicht in die Schwäche des 
Geistes.  Im Grunde ist das eher Schillers Freiheitspathos, also ein Rückgriff hinter 
Schopenhauer auf Kant.  Ein notwendiges Postulat steht gegen philosophische Einsicht,  jedoch 
genügt es Thomas Mann, die Position des Geistes als gleichberechtigt gegen die Natur 
                                                 
3
 ‘The adequate and undeniable explanation of Adrian’s fate remains, despite the “systematic 
ambiguity” of a conception which must keep the devil in play, his disease.’ (Reed 1996, 395)  This 
conforms to a pattern amongst Mann scholars, whereby the supernatural element is admitted to be 
ambiguously present only to be then dismissed as actually absent.  For example, Rolf Günter Renner, in 
an article promisingly entitled ‘Thomas Mann als fantastischer Realist’, first notes that ‘Die 
vertauschten Köpfe’ represents a challenge to naturalistic explanation, and then comes to the following 
conclusion: ‘Ohne Zweifel gehen diese äußeren Spannungen aus einer inneren hervor; sie weisen auf 
das Unbewußte, und zeigen die Erfahrungswirklichkeit als eine “verstellte Realität.” ’ (Renner 1986, 
74) 
4 
 
(‘Willen’) zu setzen.  Im Joseph-Märchen heißt es schließlich: ‘Aber das Ich ist von Gott und ist 
des Geistes, der ist frei.’ (Dierks 1972, 74) 
 
That is a view which the present work seeks to vindicate: that ‘Geist’, and the 
‘Geist/Natur’ conflict which dominate Mann’s theorizing during the First World War 
and after are indeed of Schillerian provenance and have little to do with either 
Nietzsche (for whom, as an uncompromising naturalist, ‘Geist’ is just a particular 
expression of mankind’s phenomenal make-up) or Schopenhauer (who dislikes the 
word ‘Geist’ and who typically conceives ‘Intelligenz’ to be a submissive hand-maid 
to the ‘Wille’).  And Dierks is naturally quite right to discern Kant’s thinking behind 
Schiller’s – though, as we shall demonstrate in chapter III, Schiller’s philosophy has 
other sources too. 
 
This thesis, then, is positively indebted to Reed’s and Dierks’ scholarly efforts.  Its 
central arguments: that some of Mann’s greatest works belong to the fantastic genre, 
and that the supernatural and the metaphysical are closely associated with one another 
in his fiction, are implied in the statements cited above.  But it is negatively indebted 
to them too, in that they articulate positions with which it can fruitfully disagree.  For 
it is evident that their recognition of the possible presence of the supernatural and of a 
Kant-derived metaphysic such as Schiller’s (‘Ein notwendiges Postulat steht gegen 
philosophische Einsicht’), is a reluctant concession to something they can scarcely 
tolerate.  Both are hostile to the supernatural whenever it announces itself 
unambiguously.  As we shall see in chapter II, Reed finds the return of the deceased 
Joachim Ziemssen in Der Zauberberg to be quite unacceptable, and Dierks too 
regards the episode as unworthy of serious consideration: ‘Wir können uns eine 
detaillierte Interpretation des Spiritismuskapitels “Fragwürdigstes” ersparen,’ 
mentioning merely that it is informed by both Schopenhauer and Mann’s own occult 
experiences. (Dierks 1972, 113) 
 
Reed and Dierks can be regarded as representing and fostering two important currents 
in Mann criticism.  On the one hand, there are those scholars who, like Reed, view 
Mann and his literary achievement from a ‘progressivist’ perspective. That is, they 
regard him to be an author with a sharp eye for social and political realities doing his 
best, during a period of prolonged crisis, to promote a humanitarian outlook.  They do 
5 
 
not dispute that his intellectual background was morally complex and even suspect, 
nor do they pretend that the positions he came to adopt in his maturity were reached 
without a struggle.  But so far as they are concerned that merely underlines the 
validity of those positions.  Such scholars take the values they see Mann as 
championing for granted.  Is it not axiomatic, for example, that Aschenbach’s 
inability to moderate either his obsessive self-discipline or his erotic passion is a bad 
thing, that Joseph’s provision for Egypt’s hungry is a good thing?  Accordingly, while 
critics of this persuasion regard it as their duty to identify the means by which Mann 
brings about the realization of progressive maxims in his fiction, they are by no means 
anxious to question those maxims, and still less to regard them as dependent on some 
metaphysical or religious authority.  If a humanitarian outlook is shown to derive 
from some supernatural power which ever fewer people take seriously, then will it not 
fall by the wayside when its guarantor is exposed as a sham?  No wonder they view 
with dismay anything in Der Tod in Venedig which might suggest that Aschenbach’s 
experiences are the result of other than natural processes, anything in Joseph which 
would suggest that God might be more than a figment of the collective imagination.  
 
On the other hand there are those critics who, like Dierks, see in Mann first and 
foremost the promoter of a Schopenhauerian philosophical outlook unconcerned with 
life’s ephemeral glitter except in so far as it can be shown to arise from a grisly 
metaphysical reality: the ‘Wille’.  Perhaps the best known of them is Hans Wysling 
who for more than thirty years directed the Thomas Mann Archive in Zurich, and 
whose 1990 monograph Narzissmus und illusionäre Existenzform presents Mann’s 
last novel as a thoroughgoing exercise in Schopenhauerian thinking.
4
  The most 
                                                 
4
 That Wysling brought the full force of his scholarly eminence to bear on Felix Krull has had, perhaps, 
unfortunate consequences for Mann criticism.  He begins his study with a list of reasons for choosing 
Felix Krull as a worthy subject for analysis, all of which (with the exception of the last, which invokes 
the unusually complete state of the notes for Felix Krull) have to do with the novel’s typicality.  The 
implication is that an understanding of Mann’s last novel throws an especially revealing light on the 
rest of his work.  But there are several (as we shall see, very closely related) reasons for disputing Felix 
Krull’s typicality.  Firstly, it is a work which Mann himself felt to be unsatisfactory, a work which he 
abandoned for more than thirty years and, having recommenced it, never managed to prosecute with 
any conviction.  This suggests the absence in it of ingredients present in the works he did find 
satisfactory and could prosecute with conviction.  And in fact we know that he only undertook to 
continue Felix Krull as a last resort, as a diary entry for 25
th
 November 1950 makes clear: ‘Ich kann 
nicht nichts tun.  Doch zögere ich, das alte Material wieder vorzunehmen, aus Besorgnis, es möchte 
mir nach all dem inzwischen Getanen nichts oder nicht genug mehr sagen, und ich möchte gewahr 
werden, daß mein Werk tatsächlich getan ist.’ (TB VIII, 295)  Secondly, it is a ‘Schelmenroman’ and 
as such constitutes a fictional holiday from the ethical concerns which are a preoccupation of Der 
Zauberberg, the later novels in the Joseph tetralogy, and Doktor Faustus.  That Mann saw the novel in 
6 
 
uncompromising critic of all in this respect, however, is Børge Kristiansen, whose 
view of Der Zauberberg has led Wolfgang Schneider – by no means averse in 
principle to an appreciation of the role played by Schopenhauer in Mann’s fiction – to 
register in his treatise on Mann’s fictional characterization the following protest: 
‘Wenn die philosophische Hinterabsicht des Erzählers im Verrühren des Erzählten zur 
“Ewigkeitssuppe” bestünde, hätte sich der Autor allzuviel Arbeit gemacht mit der 
distinkten Gestaltung seiner Figuren und ihrer geistigen Welt.’5 More recent critics in 
the same lineage, have been more accommodating of non-Schopenhauerian elements 
in Mann’s fiction, but regard them as boughs grafted onto a Schopenhauerian trunk.  
Always there is the tendency to see Mann not as a novelist inspired by and interested 
in Schopenhauer in the same way that he was inspired by and interested in other 
thinkers, but as the philosopher’s apprentice struggling to find adequate fictional 
expression for his master’s truth. 
 
Both of these approaches to Mann have their merits and drawbacks.  The merit of the 
progressivist perspective is that it allows us to seize the political commitment of, say, 
Der Zauberberg and the Joseph novels – novels written, as we know, with the 
dynamics of Germany’s and the world’s history in mind.  Despite his protestation that 
the partisanship of Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen should be regarded as 
‘unpolitical’ it is clear that from the outbreak of the First World War onwards Mann 
was anything but indifferent to political and social change and that he felt an 
obligation to use his influence as a writer and public figure for a greater good.  The 
progressivist critic’s assumption that the events in Mann’s fiction are of moment, that 
                                                                                                                                            
this light is apparent from a letter he wrote to Agnes Meyer in October 1947: ‘Das Komische, das 
Lachen, der Humor erscheinen mir mehr und mehr als Heil der Seele; ich dürste danach, nach den nur 
notdürftig aufgeheiterten Schrecknissen des “Faustus” und mache mich anheischig, bei düsterer 
Weltlage das Heiterste zu  erfinden.’ (Briefe III, 557)  If we limit our appreciation of Mann’s most 
achieved novels to what they have in common with Felix Krull we will overlook their moral purpose 
and meaning altogether.  Thirdly, Mann’s last novel does not participate in the evaluative dualism 
which reigns in Mann’s greatest works.  Although Felix Krull (like ‘Die vertauschten Köpfe’) alludes 
to ‘Geist’ occasionally, it does not make the philosophical concessions which would allow it to be an 
authentic alternative to ‘Natur’.   
5
 (Schneider 1999, 126)  It is only fair to add that with time Kristiansen has become more appreciative 
of Mann’s philosophical complexity.  For example he is one of the few critics to remark the importance 
of Hegel to the Joseph trilogy (a matter to which we shall return in chapter IV): ‘In der Geschichte 
Josephs, die einer Dialektik Hegelscher Observanz folgt, so daß im Laufe der Entwicklung immer 
höhere geistige und kulturelle Positionen erreicht werden, setzt sich mit der Geschichte Mut-em-enets 
Schopenhauers pessimistische Willensphilosophie durch, und vor diesem Hintergrund bleibt uns 
scheinbar nur die Feststellung übrig, daß der Joseph Roman kein einheitliches Werk ist.’ (Kristiansen 
1993, 22) We might at this point expect him to exclude the Hegelian in favour of the Schopenhauerian 
– but he surprises us by doing the very reverse.  
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they spring from a concern with the present and future, that there is something at 
stake in them is, surely, vindicated by the fact that they have always enjoyed a 
numerous readership – after all, the public at large has little appetite for 
‘Ewigkeitssuppe’.  Its drawback is that it assumes that Mann’s own moral perspective 
in Joseph, for example, can do without further validation, whereas the searching 
naturalism which prevails in key passages of that novel allows no such complacency.  
As an example, let us consider Hélène Vuillet’s analysis of Joseph and his triumph.   
 
Like many progressivist critics she assumes Freud to have influenced the tetralogy in 
a decisive manner and as a consequence takes for granted the relevance of his 
pronouncements to the effect that psychoanalysis has completed the work of 
Copernicus, Darwin etc. in demolishing man’s sense of his own worth.  Having lost 
all centrality with regard to the observable universe, having lost all distinction with 
regard to the biological world, he now receives a ‘dritte Kränkung’: (Freud 1940, 8) 
that his ‘ich’ is no longer master in its own house – what he has traditionally regarded 
as a supernatural ‘soul’ is just a cerebral activity competing for dominance with a host 
of others.  Having noted this, Vuillet adds:  
 
Mais là où les héros de la première période de la création de Mann ne parviennent pas à sortir de 
l’impasse dans laquelle les conduisaient inexorablement leurs errances labyrinthiques et leur 
subjugation dionysiaque, Joseph, pour la première fois, trouve une voie: le sujet héroique 
parvient à sculpter un destin remarquable à partir du chaos intérieur, trouve un équilibre 
existential, se met tout entier au service du bien general.  Dans ce modèle d’individuation 
positive, l’hermétisme semble offrir un modèle qui permettrait de rassembler les morceaux 
dispersés du sujet moderne.  Le roman de formation de Joseph livre donc, à qui voudrait 
l’entendre ainsi, les clés d’une formation capable (peut-être) d’aider l’individu à trouver un 
équilibre entre les forces intérieures qui déchirent son intériorité. (Vuillet 2007, 288) 
 
But it is hardly self-evident that to place oneself ‘au service du bien général’ and to 
establish an ‘équilibre entre les forces intérieures’ are good and worthwhile things to 
do in view of what Freud’s analysis implies: that there is nothing special about human 
beings which would make either their general well-being or their personal happiness a 
valid criterion of worth.  Which is to say, the value which Vuillet attributes to 
Joseph’s development and actions rests on a pre-Freudian notion of mankind’s unique 
8 
 
character and status.
6
  Nor is it a reasonable defence to say that, given the widespread 
recognition of human happiness as a worthwhile end to strive for, a theoretical 
justification of the same is redundant – for the purpose of Mann’s psychological 
analysis, in Joseph and elsewhere, is to question widely held beliefs about the 
meaning and value of human life, and to demonstrate how often these arise from 
meaningless and valueless forces.
7
  That is, value has a problematic character for 
Mann, with the result that the complexity of his novels is not confined to the imagined 
world the narrator introduces us to with its multitude of characters and relationships – 
there is in addition, and despite a great show of stylistic authority, complexity within 
the narrator too and his perspective shifts under the influence of the philosophical 
arguments he presents and allows others to present.  So while it is true that Mann is a 
politically committed writer, it is also true that the values he wishes to promote are 
always under review and are occasionally obliterated by a naturalism for which all 
value is illusory.  As we shall see, such naturalism is frequently countered by a 
supernatural and moral perspective in Mann’s fiction – but any analysis which 
overlooks or denies the validity of that perspective while simultaneously claiming 
Mann for the party of light runs the risk of superficiality. 
 
The merit of the Schopenhauerian critical tradition is that it draws our attention to a 
philosophical dimension in Mann’s works which we might otherwise miss. That 
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 Malte Herwig points out in Bildungsbürger auf Abwegen, a treatise on Mann’s relationship with the 
natural sciences, that the purpose of humanism (understood as an ethical stance) is the ‘Veredlung und 
Verherrlichung des Menschen’ and that it is ‘offensichtlich, daß eine humanistische Anthropologie im 
20. Jahrhundert sich des blinden Fortschrittsglaubens und der uneingeschränkten Verherrlichung des 
Menschen, dieses “Prothesengottes”, wie Freud ihn nannte, entschlagen mußte, wenn sie auch nur 
irgendeinen Realitätsbezug beanspruchen wollte.’ (Herwig 2004, 61-62)  If, however, the scientific 
perspective is incompatible with the exaltation (in terms either of a present evaluation or of a future 
purpose) of mankind, then where is a compatible perspective to be located?  Herwig comes to the 
conclusion that Mann adopts a dualist position: ‘Auch wenn er ein Leben lang Skeptiker blieb, gelang 
er zu einer ganzheitlicheren Einschätzung des Dualismus der menschlichen Existenz.’ (Herwig 2004, 
66) We might add that the dualism in question cannot be that envisaged by Schopenhauer.  As Louis 
Leibrich, in his fiercely anti-Schopenhauerian Thomas Mann: une rechèrche spirituelle, states: ‘la 
fonction dévolue à l’humanité par le rhéteur misanthrope (car dans son cas on peut vraiment parler de 
rhétorique) c’est de prendre conscience de l’absurdité du monde, de faire la grève de l’effort évolutif et 
de briser l’élan vital.’ (Leibrich 1974, 242)   
7
 It is important to understand how widespread this trend – the trend, that is, of taking for granted 
values which one’s own theoretical position should call into question – has become amongst certain 
scholars.  When Kenneth Hughes, for example, writes: ‘Freuds zentrale Behauptung, daß die Mächte 
des es neutralisiert werden können, indem man das Unbewußte im Lichte des Bewußten erhellt, verhalf 
Mann zu einer konkreten klinischen Grundlage, auf deren Basis er an die Fähigkeit glauben konnte, die 
Gesellschaft positiv zu verändern,’ (Hughes 1975, 19) the implication, once again, is that the forces 
Mann strove against and exploited (‘die Mächte des es’) are susceptible to and deserve rational analysis 
whereas the values implied by ‘positiv zu verändern’ can be taken as axiomatic.    
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dimension imbues the naturalistic side of Mann’s thinking with a certain metaphysical 
dignity: the compulsion of the phenomenal world is complemented and explained by 
the impulsion of the noumenal force which brings the phenomenal world into being.  
One might reasonably object that there is no moral distinction between impulsion and 
compulsion, but Schopenhauer’s vision has a grandeur with which scientific 
naturalism can scarcely compete, and the nay-saying aspect of Mann’s thinking gains 
an authority which it would otherwise lack by his allusions to this bleak metaphysic.
8
  
The drawbacks of Schopenhauerian criticism of Mann – apart from the objection we 
have seen Schneider raise: that it must consider the specifics of fiction in terms of 
character, social milieu and action as illusory and the timeless, placeless and formless 
‘Wille’ as the only reality – are numerous.  One is that it tends to obscure the view we 
might otherwise have of other philosophical influences.  Plato, in particular, fares 
badly because all too often when critics detect his influence in Mann’s fiction they 
invoke Schopenhauer’s ‘Platonic ideas’ (which actually have very little to do with 
Plato himself, as Mann well knew), with the result that the discussion returns to the 
‘Wille’ and the types of phenomena it produces.  Furthermore, the Schopenhauerian 
perspective sets an insidious trap for the critics who adopt it, one which they have not 
always succeeded in avoiding.  The trap is to think that because the behaviour of 
Mann’s fictional characters can be explained in a Schopenhauerian way (and 
Schopenhauer, concerned like all philosophers to understand the world in which we 
actually live, furnishes an explanation for everything) we should infer a 
Schopenhauerian intent on Mann’s part.9  Last but not least: if the progressivist critics 
gloss over Mann’s philosophical doubts and ruminations in their attempt to claim him 
as a progressive political and social agent, then the Schopenhauerians have difficulty 
                                                 
8
 Frederick Copleston’s unsympathetic study of Schopenhauer puts the matter thus: ‘It may be said that 
Schopenhauer clothes an essentially scientific view of the world[…]in the garments of fantastic 
metaphysic.’ (Copleston 1946, 93) 
9
 Erich Heller’s procedure in the The Ironic German alerts us to the danger.  Here is his interpretation 
of the expression which appears on Johann Buddenbrook’s face upon learning that Tony has never 
loved Grünlich, and that nothing stands in the way of extricating her and the family from a financial 
liability: ‘Seine Augen blickten erschrocken und traurig, und dennoch kniff er die Lippen zusammen, 
sodaß Mundwinkel und Wangen sich falteten, wie sie zu geschehen pflegte, wenn er ein vorteilhaftes 
Geschäft zum Abschluß gebracht hatte.’ (1.1, 238) Heller’s gloss: ‘Although it is not so hard to say 
what Johann Buddenbrook’s expression meant, this is yet admirably done: the eyes reflecting the moral 
idea, and his mouth the deep satisfaction of the will at getting its own way.’ (Heller 1958, 44) Surely 
one can describe a conflict of baser and higher motives and the mixed facial expression it produces 
without being a Schopenhauerian?  The effectiveness of Werner Frizen’s Zaubertrank der Metaphysik 
is somewhat vitiated by the same tendency to read Schopenhauer’s philosophy into Mann’s fiction and 
then to read it back out again.  See, for example, his Schopenhauerian explanation of Thamar’s role in 
Joseph der Ernährer. (Frizen 1980, 413) 
10 
 
explaining why Mann would adopt any political position at all.  Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine is pessimistic.  Not in the everyday sense of predicting that human 
endeavours are likely to come to a sticky end, but in the absolute sense of regarding 
the worst of all possible outcomes – the world we live in – as a ‘fait accompli’ beyond 
remedy.  And even if we write off Schopenhauer’s pessimism as a personality trait 
extrinsic to the substance of his philosophy, the latter cannot in any case provide a 
metaphysical basis for authentically moral behaviour.  It is easy to see how a 
philosophy which underwrites value and freedom (for example, that of Plato or Kant) 
can lead to a determined moral stance and active political engagement.  
Schopenhauer’s meaningless metaphysic, by contrast, must induce at best resignation, 
at worst permit as morally neutral the kind of behaviour which has been traditionally 
regarded as selfish, cruel and wicked. 
 
The meaninglessness and pessimism underlying Schopenhauer’s philosophy has been 
noted by many, but by no means all Mann critics. Charlotte Nolte’s Being and 
Meaning in Thomas Manns Joseph Novels is a remarkable work which anticipates the 
present one in significant respects – but its author fails to see how incongruous 
Schopenhauer’s ‘Wille’ is with the ‘meaning’ which she so rightly associates with the 
noumenal realm.  Her treatise analyses the tetralogy in Jungian terms but she devotes 
a section of her introduction to Joseph’s philosophical background.  This begins with 
the key statement: ‘The issue of being and meaning informs the novel’s philosophical 
framework, which consists of a discussion of reality and essence, of phenomena and 
noumena.’ (Nolte 1996, 13) That is a view of the matter which this thesis wholly 
endorses, as it does the importance of certain passages in the ‘Schopenhauer’ essay 
which Nolte picks out as being of particular significance.  Mann’s affirmation that 
‘Plato bedeutet durch diese wertende Unterscheidung zwischen Erscheinung und Idee, 
Empirie und Geist, Scheinwelt und Welt der Wahrheit, Zeitlichkeit und Ewigkeit ein 
ungeheures Ereignis in der Geschichte des menschlichen Geistes’10 is of capital 
importance for an understanding not only of Joseph but of Der Tod in Venedig and 
much else in Mann’s œuvre.  Given, however, that this aspect of ‘being’ and 
‘meaning’ is bound to be something of a side-issue in a treatise which lays its main 
emphasis on psychological analysis, it is hardly surprising that Nolte is content to 
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 (IX, 533) and (Nolte 1996, 15) 
11 
 
adopt the orthodox view prevailing amongst more philosophically orientated scholars 
to the effect that Mann approves Plato and Kant primarily as precursors to 
Schopenhauer.
11
   
   
Other scholars, by contrast, have noticed the incompatibility of the morally and 
politically committed stance Mann adopted with the bleak philosophical system he is 
supposed to have embraced.  One way out of this difficulty is to graft onto the 
Schopenhauerian stock elements of which Schopenhauer would certainly have 
disapproved.  For example, Hans-Dieter Heimendahl, while conceding that ‘die 
überragende Bedeutung der Philosophie Schopenhauers für Thomas Mann ist 
unbestritten’ (Heimendahl 1998, 21) devotes much of his Kritik und Verklärung to 
showing that Nietzsche’s aesthetic justification of life as described in Die Geburt der 
Tragödie serves Mann as a counterweight to Schopenhauerian pessimism:
12
  
 
Anders jedoch als bei Schopenhauer, der der Kunst die Aufgabe einer Demontage des Willens 
zum Leben zuweist, auf die seine Verneinung folgen soll, zielt Thomas Manns Ästhetizismus im 
Sinne der Geburt der Tragödie auf die Darstellung der Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, die zwar 
höchste Erkenntnis vermittelt, aber nicht zu einer Abkehr führt, sondern das Leben in seiner 
doppelten Gestalt feiert.
13
  
 
                                                 
11
 It is very much in this spirit that Nolte writes: ‘Whatever name is given to the noumenon – idea, 
thing in itself or will – and whatever marginal differences between those concepts may be, the 
philosophies of Plato, Kant and Schopenhauer have in common that they make the division into ideas 
(noumena) and phenomena.’ (Nolte 1996, 14) However, although it is quite correct to state that idea, 
thing in itself and will are all noumenal, we need only consult what Mann writes about Plato’s 
‘wertende Unterscheidung’ to see that the third of these, Schopenhauer’s ‘Wille’, is distinct from 
Plato’s ideas and Kant’s thing in itself in that it is non-evaluative.  Whereas the chief of Plato’s ideas is 
the supreme criterion of moral and aesthetic value (το καλόν) and the Kantian subject (a noumenon, a 
thing in itself) has the freedom to establish valid moral standards, Schopenhauer’s ‘Wille’ is just a 
blind, impulsive force.  In so far as meaning depends upon freedom, intentionality and an authentic 
criterion of value, it can never be identified with the ‘Wille’. 
12
 It should be noted that Nietzsche is not the only corrective to Schopenhauer proposed by 
Heimendahl: ‘Auch in seiner Konzeption der Natur in “Goethe und Tolstoi” weicht Thomas Mann von 
der des Willens bei Arthur Schopenhauer ab, bleibt aber als Schüler seines philosophischen Lehrers 
identifizierbar.  Thomas Mann verschmilzt Schopenhauers metaphysischen Willen mit Dmitri 
Mereschkowskis am Beispiel Tolstois entwickelten Vorstellung einer innerweltlichen Steigerung der 
sinnlichen Lebensdimension.’ (Heimendahl 1998, 238)  
13
 (Heimendahl 1998, 65) As Julian Young points out, the aesthetic justification of life does not make it 
a more worthwhile experience for the individual human beings who must endure it: ‘To suggest 
otherwise would be to suggest that because a concentration camp “justifies” itself it to its sadistic (or 
perhaps merely playful or mad) commandant as a pleasurable “entertainment”, so too must the inmates 
find it justified.  If Nietzsche’s account of the tragic effect is right, human beings can, with luck, be 
transported briefly out of the role of protagonist in the tragedy of life and into that of its “sole author 
and spectator”. But this does nothing to justify the life of an inmate to an inmate.  And such a 
justification indeed – Nietzsche is quite explicit – is not offered.’ (Young 1992, 52) 
12 
 
If we accept that this was indeed Mann’s position: that life could be celebrated as an 
aesthetic phenomenon while being just as full of suffering and as incapable of 
improvement as Schopenhauer said it was – that would at least explain why he did not 
renounce the practice of his art, but continued to create characters, situations, plots 
and so forth.  But even if Heimendahl is correct and Nietzsche does indeed contend 
that human beings can, as an alternative to denying the ‘Wille’, artistically repeat in 
their own person its creative impulse (Heimendahl 1998, 118) – how does that add up 
to a justification of their doing so or of a justification for life?
14
  How, to put it 
another way, could one decide between the negation and affirmation of the ‘Wille’ 
(by artistic means or otherwise) without a criterion against which negation and 
affirmation might be judged more or less wanting – a criterion which neither 
Schopenhauer nor Nietzsche include in their thinking?  The question might be 
irrelevant to a purely decorative artist, but Mann was by his own admission a critical 
writer and many of his works display a political commitment and a moral concern at 
odds with the notion that artistic creation is sufficient validation for itself and the 
world.  When it comes to a contest between aestheticism and the morality which finds 
aestheticism wanting, there can be little doubt where the mature Mann’s sympathies 
lie.  To take but one example: the Egyptians of Joseph are a thoroughly aesthetic 
people, but they are not presented as superior – quite the contrary – to the artistically 
impoverished tribe of Israel.  There is really no reason to doubt the sincerity of 
Mann’s declaration in ‘Nietzsche im Lichte unserer Erfahrung’ with regard to 
aestheticism and its relationship to both morality and life: 
 
Der zweite von Nietzsches Irrtümern ist das ganz und gar falsche Verhältnis, in das er Leben 
und Moral zu einander bringt, wenn er sie als Gegensätze behandelt.  Die Wahrheit ist, daß sie 
zusammen gehören.  Ethik ist Lebensstütze, und der moralische Mensch ein rechter 
Lebensbürger, – vielleicht etwas langweilig, aber höchst nützlich.  Der wahre Gegensatz ist der 
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 Nietzsche’s position from first to last is that life must be affirmed rather than denied.  It is the 
position which lies behind  his rejection of conventional religion and metaphysics, which undermine 
and demean life by setting it standards it cannot reach, behind his championing of the yea-saying 
‘Übermensch’, who has the resolution to embrace the admittedly horrible fate represented by the 
‘ewige Wiederkehr’, and behind the aesthetic ‘justification’ of life in Geburt der Tragödie.  Nietzsche, 
then, does not really propose art as a criterion against which life is tested and found satisfactory.  
Rather, he accepts life as the criterion against which art, with its power of aesthetic justification, is 
tested and found satisfactory.  He would have been as hostile to an art which failed to justify life as he 
was to religion and metaphysics. 
13 
 
von Ethik und Ästhetik.  Nicht die Moral, die Schönheit ist todverbunden, wie viele Dichter 
gesagt und gesungen haben, – und Nietzsche sollte es nicht wissen?
15
  
 
If, however, Nietzsche’s aestheticism is an improbable basis for Mann’s commitment 
to and engagement with life, scholars have identified other sources as possible 
Schopenhauer-complements.  In particular, Dierk Wolters’ Zwischen Metaphysik und 
Politik is remarkable both for the confidence with which it identifies the faith 
underlying the Joseph novels: ‘Die Welt ist entwicklungsfähig, wenn sie dem Geist 
die Chance läßt, die materiale Formenwelt auf ihr dahinterliegendes metaphysisches 
Prinzip zu transzendieren,’ (Wolters 1998, 113) and for the clarity with which it 
apprehends how incompatible that faith is with Schopenhauer’s doctrine: ‘Von einer 
philosophischen Warte, aus der heraus gesehen die Welt nur dann besser wird, wenn 
sie gar nicht mehr wird, muß solch ein Ansinnen natürlich absurd erscheinen.’ 
(Wolters 1998, 105) So who or what effected the change in Mann’s thinking?  
Wolters proposes a nowadays little read author by the name of Edgar Dacqué who 
‘modifiziert den sinnlosen Urgrund der Welt zu einer mystischen, nicht näher 
erklärten Religiosität.  Er fügt Schopenhauers Welterklärung damit eine 
eschatologische Ausrichtung bei und verkehrt so das negative Vorzeichen dieser 
Philosohie in sein Gegenteil.  Thomas Mann übernimmt dies.  Anstelle der blinden 
Willenswelt steht der Paradiesgedanke.’16  
 
Wolters, like Nolte, anticipates many of the present work’s arguments, especially as 
they apply to Joseph und seine Brüder.  His affirmation that the tetralogy proposes a 
critical and metaphysical alternative to the phenomenal world is correct, as is his 
identification of that metaphysical alternative with a supernatural element in our 
psychological constitution.
17
  But it is difficult to attribute all this to the influence of 
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 (IX, 696)  Strangely enough, although Heimendahl quotes extensively from ‘Nietzsche im Lichte 
unserer Erfahrung’, this passage receives no mention. 
16
 (Wolters 1998, 105) Notice the similarities between this Schopenhauer-Dacqué amalgam proposed 
by Wolters and the Schopenhauer-Mereschkowski amalgam proposed by Heimendahl.  Neither critic 
suggests any kind of intellectual route by which Schopenhauer’s ‘Wille’ could be transformed through 
contact with Dacqué or Mereschkowski into something more: a positive ‘Geist’ in Dacqué’s case, a 
positive ‘Natur’ in Mereschkowski’s.   
17
 (Wolters 1998, 93)  Wolters, however, pays little attention to the workings of a supernatural 
providence let alone to apparently supernatural apparitions such as the ‘Mann auf dem Felde’.  It is to 
be suspected that he would have used the word ‘metaphysical’ instead of ‘supernatural’, did not 
‘metaphysical’ inevitably (in the context of Mann studies as they have been traditionally pursued) call 
to mind Schopenhauer’s ‘Wille’. 
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Dacqué who, according to Wolters, offers only a vague and mystical religiosity to 
counter Schopenhauer’s powerfully argued doctrine.18  For whereas one might suspect 
that an arbitrary conversion of Schopenhauer’s doctrines into an optimistic world-
view underlies Felix Krull – a comic novel, after all, with a mischievous disregard for 
philosophical propriety – we cannot persuasively account for the dualism of the 
Joseph novels in this way.  They make allusion to something more cogent and severe 
than Dacqué’s theoretically unsupported aspirations: a ‘Reich der Strenge’ and a 
‘Geist’ which are at once the benchmark of all value and the source of all 
intelligibility.  This is not, of course, to say that Mann had no use for Dacqué at all.  
He was always on the lookout for ideas and doctrines which might help him to 
articulate his own concerns.  But the ‘Geist/Natur’ antagonism which finds its fullest 
expression in Joseph was a longstanding element of Mann’s thinking by the time he 
read Urwelt, Sage und Menschheit in 1924 and, as this thesis will attempt to show, 
better explained by reference to other thinkers closer to the mainstream of European 
philosophy. 
 
To sum up: Mann critics are by and large indifferent to the supernatural in his work or 
downright hostile to it. There are two main strands of Mann criticism: on the one hand 
a progressivist strand and on the other a philosophical strand which strongly 
emphasizes the pre-eminence of Schopenhauer amongst Mann’s theoretical sources.  
Whereas one might reasonably expect the two strands to be complementary, so that 
what is lacking in the first: a firm philosophical foundation for the values Mann 
wishes to promote, might be supplied by the second – this is not in fact the case.  
Schopenhauer’s philosophy is pessimistic and even if it were not could not underwrite 
the active moral and political engagement characteristic of Mann’s most important 
works.  Various attempts to show how Mann’s Schopenhauerian thinking might have 
been converted into something more positive by the addition of a fresh intellectual 
ingredient: Nietzsche’s aestheticism or the mysticism of Dacqué or Mereschkowski, 
are less than persuasive.  It is against this critical background that the purpose and 
strategy of the present work should be understood and judged. 
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 Dacqué’s allusiveness and imprecision is something he shares with Mereschkowski, according to 
Heimendahl: ‘Thomas Mann bewegt sich im Schatten der suggestiven Thesen Mereschkowskis, die in 
ihrer symbolisch gedachten Vagheit zu Assoziationen förmlich einladen.’ (Heimendahl 1998) 
15 
 
Prospectus 
 
This thesis will attempt to establish that Mann is a fantastic author, and that the two 
works which it subjects to extensive analysis, Der Tod in Venedig and Joseph und 
seine Brüder, not only contain potentially supernatural elements, but depend for the 
realization of their purposes on the fantastic technique.  There are good reasons for 
the selection of these two works from the numerous candidates for fantastic analysis 
in Mann’s œuvre.  That they have important elements in common has been 
acknowledged before now: Dierks, for example, considers Mut-em-enet’s 
predicament and fall to be a reworking of Aschenbach’s. (Dierks 1972, 188-206) But 
the similarities between the two works go further than this.  In both there is the 
suggested presence in the phenomenal realm of supernatural heralds from the 
noumenal realm: the sinister Hermes figures in Der Tod in Venedig, the scornful 
‘Mann auf dem Felde’ in Joseph.  In both there is the presence of more definitely 
human beings who, regardless of their level of consciousness in this respect, may be 
incarnations of Hermes: Tadzio and Joseph.  In both, the Hermes figures and 
characters perform the function of Schiller’s ‘Spieltrieb’: to achieve the triumph of 
‘Geist’ through a proper accommodation with ‘Natur’.  And each of these works 
throws light upon the other.  Having analyzed Der Tod in Venedig from the fantastic 
perspective, we will – without moving from that perspective – be able to make out the 
same devices and preoccupations when they are revisited in Joseph, and conversely, 
having analyzed Joseph, we will have a better retrospective understanding of Der Tod 
in Venedig and be able to recognize at an incipient stage devices and preoccupations 
more fully developed in the tetralogy.  In order to make the case for Der Tod in 
Venedig and Joseph as works of the fantastic, however, two subsidiary arguments 
must be prosecuted.   
 
Firstly, it will be necessary to establish the factors which identify a work as belonging 
to the genre.  Given the evident reluctance to admit Mann’s fiction to the fantastic 
canon on the part of scholars, their objections must be countered by an exposition of 
what the genre entails at a formal level.  It would also be helpful to establish that the 
presence or suggestion of the supernatural in a work of fiction is not necessarily an 
endorsement of destructive irrationalism but can be (and traditionally has been) a 
metaphysical counter to a naturalistic world-view devoid of all value.  Helpful at a 
16 
 
rhetorical level: if those critics who have a low opinion of the fantastic could be 
persuaded of its seriousness and dignity, they might be more receptive to the 
possibility of its presence in Mann’s fiction.  And helpful at a strictly argumentative 
level: if the distinction between ‘meaning’ and ‘being’ identified by Nolte reflects the 
difference between the noumenal and phenomenal realms, and if the supernatural is 
an expression of the noumenal, then the attraction exerted by the fantastic on Mann is 
readily explicable.   
 
Secondly it will be necessary to establish that Mann was (from some time before the 
First World War onwards) increasingly a philosophical dualist with an evaluative 
metaphysic.
19
 That proposition would benefit from the corroboration of a number of 
auxiliary arguments: that the significant distinction for Mann is between ‘Natur’ on 
the one hand and ‘Geist’ on the other; that ‘Natur’ is understood to include the whole 
of the phenomenal realm, but also includes on occasion the metaphysical generative 
force which brings the phenomenal realm into being (Schopenhauer’s ‘Wille’), 
whereas ‘Geist’ by contrast, represents a noumenal alternative to and critique of 
‘Natur’; that Schiller’s (and not Schopenhauer’s) theoretical framework was the chief 
model for Mann’s own in the period of his maturity.  The advantages of establishing 
all this would be numerous.   
  
To begin with, the proposed dualism would be capacious enough to accommodate all 
sorts of normally incompatible intellectual resources we know to have been important 
in the composition of Der Tod in Venedig and Joseph.  Nietzsche, Freud and 
Schopenhauer could all be admitted to the ‘Natur’ side of the ledger, whereas Schiller, 
with his Kantian inheritance, and Plato too, could be admitted to the other, the ‘Geist’ 
side of the ledger – and it would be they who held out the possibility of a noumenal 
subject and of an authentic criterion of value which, because they are by definition not 
part of the natural order, are insusceptible to naturalist analysis.  We could also justify 
the moral discrimination and political commitment which progressivist critics let by 
‘on the nod’, but without having to suppose that naturalists like Nietzsche or Freud, or 
non-evaluative metaphysicians like Schopenhauer could plausibly underwrite such a 
stance.  Nor would there be any need to suggest that Mann transformed 
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 This term will be used throughout the thesis to denote a metaphysical realm harbouring an authentic 
criterion of value, such as Plato’s το καλόν or Kant’s noumenal subject. 
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Schopenhauer’s doctrine with the help of theorizers such as Dacqué or 
Mereschkowski into something resembling a Schillerian or a Platonic framework, if 
we could safely attribute that framework to Schiller and Plato directly. 
 
That, then, is the case this thesis seeks to make.  But how is it to be made?  Several 
problems stand in the way, some to do with the fantastic, some to do with Mann’s 
philosophical orientation – problems which chapters II and III attempt to overcome.  
Chapter II deals with the fantastic.  Several studies of the genre are available, but they 
have this defect in common: whereas they understand fantastic literature to be poised 
between naturalistic and supernatural interpretations, their theoretical framework is 
only adequate for the first of these alternatives.  They take the naturalistic side of the 
fantastic in their stride and attribute ghosts, demons etc. to the psychology of 
characters inside the text, but they are far less assured in their treatment of the 
supernatural alternative, and mostly feel compelled to explain this too as the result of 
psychological factors; the difference being that in this case the factors lie outside 
rather than inside the text – for example, a psychosis suffered by the author.20 Chapter 
II, then, not only outlines the formal qualities fantastic literature must possess, but 
develops a hermeneutics of the fantastic.  It seeks to establish what is at stake in terms 
of morality, meaning and intention when the reader hesitates between a naturalistic 
and supernatural reading of a text.  It does this chiefly by an analysis of works 
acknowledged to belong to the genre (which, however, actually extends far further 
than the limited canon which writers on the topic have come to accept).  Having 
established that the fantastic is by no means a trivial branch of literature, and also that 
the supernatural does not necessarily cater to the amoral and irrational – and is, in fact 
linked to morality and spiritual dignity – the chapter then analyzes Der Tod in 
Venedig as a work of the fantastic.  A consideration of the meaning of the novella is 
postponed until the following chapter, but the formal characteristics which should win 
Mann’s novella admittance to the genre are analyzed and emphasized.  In view of the 
arguments which have been advanced by Mann critics to exclude it from the fantastic, 
considerable space is given over to combating both the ‘symbolic’ reading of the 
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 Todorov, theoretician-in-chief of the fantastic, notes the suggestive coincidences which characterize 
much fantastic fiction, and that these can be accounted for in a naturalistic sense: they are mere 
coincidence, or in a supernatural sense: a malign fate is at work.   The naturalistic explanation he takes 
for granted.  The supernatural explanation, by contrast, is not allowed to stand, but itself subjected to 
naturalistic analysis: ‘Psychoanalysis acknowledges precisely this same seamless determinism in the 
field, at least, of man’s psychic activity.’ (Todorov 1975, 161)     
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novella and the exclusively naturalistic reading.  This is greatly facilitated by an 
extended comparison of Der Tod in Venedig and ‘The Turn of the Screw’ – not just 
because the two works have a remarkable amount in common, but because the critical 
reception accorded to them has been in many respects similar. 
 
Chapter III begins with a reorientation of the reader’s understanding of Mann’s 
philosophical influences.  Taking as its cue the established critical tradition which 
regards Mann as principally a Schopenhauerian or a Nietzschean, it reconsiders what 
these philosophers actually stand for, and asks if this is consistent with Mann’s mature 
world-view.  In particular, the compatibility of Schopenhauer’s philosophy with an 
evaluative metaphysic is addressed.  The case is made that Mann’s thinking 
underwent a profound change, beginning some time before the First World War, from 
a Nietzschean and Schopenhauerian perspective to a Platonic and, above all, 
Schillerian perspective.  This development is seen in the context of the key term 
‘Geist’ and Mann’s problematic use of it. Again: given that there is considerable 
resistance to the notion that Schiller’s thinking had any but the most superficial 
impact on Mann’s, plenty of evidence is provided to support the latter’s debt to the 
former – a debt whose importance can only be revealed by looking beyond Der Tod in 
Venedig to Joseph and Das Gesetz.  Having traced the evolution of Mann’s 
philosophical views the chapter then turns to Der Tod in Venedig and establishes that 
it has precisely the elements we might expect to find in a work which looks 
backwards to Schopenhauer’s value-free dualism and forwards to Plato’s and 
Schiller’s value-imbued dualism.  The possibility that the supernatural might be an 
expression of the ‘Wille’ is examined and Arthur Machen’s ‘The Great God Pan’ is 
adduced as an example of this.  Then a countervailing possibility is examined: that the 
metaphysic expressed by the novella’s ambiguously supernatural elements might be 
Plato’s.  For, given that Tadzio is identified with both the Eros of the Symposium –
responsible, according to Diotima for leading mortals from the terrestrial and 
phenomenal realm to the celestial and noumenal – might not the plot in which 
Aschenbach finds himself embroiled serve the purpose of his salvation rather than his 
damnation?  Thus the difficulties arising from competing metaphysics are discussed, 
and Schiller’s Spieltrieb is invoked to solve them.  Der Tod in Venedig, it is shown, is 
capable of yielding a coherent meaning, but as in the case of the fantastic fiction 
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considered in Chapter II that meaning is conditional on the acceptance of the 
supernatural. 
 
Chapter II and III between them provide the theoretical support for the analysis of 
Joseph in chapter IV, which begins by making the case for the naturalistic and then 
making the case for the supernatural interpretation of the tetralogy, before coming to 
this conclusion: a novel which furnishes so much material to sustain these two points 
of view and studiously refrains from establishing one or other as definitely correct, is 
a fantastic novel.  The different techniques for maintaining supernatural ambiguity: 
the possibility of psychological distortion and improbable coincidence, are shown to 
play an important role.  The chapter goes on, with the help of Mann’s ‘Schopenhauer’ 
essay, to demonstrate that the influence which this philosopher is commonly regarded 
as having exerted on the tetralogy is quite out of proportion to its detectable presence, 
and a Platonic interpretation of the novel is developed – an interpretation which is 
supported by a wealth of evidence.  The close association of the supernatural and the 
Platonic metaphysic – with a God who is a supreme criterion of value at its head – is 
emphasized.  In the closing passages of the chapter a Hegelian notion of ‘Geist’ is 
brought to light which both complements and competes against that derived from 
Plato, and this additional perspective, while it neither undermines the novel’s fantastic 
character nor detracts from its commitment to political and social progress, does 
suggest that we regard Joseph’s achievements as being vitiated by a degree of 
historical impropriety.  The thesis concludes with a consideration of the fantastic as a 
form of ‘Spieltrieb’. 
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Chapter II: Der Tod in Venedig in the Context of Fantastic Literature 
 
The Fantastic  
 
Our chief purpose is to identify and understand the fantastic as it appears in the works 
of Thomas Mann.  Before we can turn to those works, however, we must devote some 
time to explaining what is meant by ‘fantastic’.  As a literary-critical term it was 
coined by Tzvetan Todorov, author of The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a 
Literary Genre.  In that treatise he divides the novels and stories under consideration, 
all of them more or less strange, more or less macabre, into those whose abnormality 
is revealed to be the result of natural phenomena of some kind (for example: of an 
hallucination or a coincidence), those whose abnormality is revealed to be the result 
of a supernatural intervention (for example: of a ghost or a demon), and those whose 
abnormality cannot be definitely attributed to either natural or supernatural causes, so 
that the reader hesitates between the two.  The naturally occurring abnormal Todorov 
calls the uncanny, the supernaturally occurring abnormal he calls the marvellous, and 
the twilight zone of hesitation between the two he calls the fantastic.  Todorov was by 
no means the first to recognize a class of fiction allowing us to see events in both a 
naturalistic and a supernatural light,
21
 but his tripartite taxonomy has the merit of 
clarity and will be employed throughout this work, and whenever the terms 
‘uncanny’, ‘marvellous’ and ‘fantastic’ occur they will be used in accordance with 
Todorov’s definitions.  Furthermore, Todorov’s view of the relationship between 
allegory and the supernatural: that they are mutually exclusive categories, has also 
been adopted as valid.   
 
However, given that we will attempt in this chapter to propound a hermeneutics of the 
fantastic (a project necessarily at odds with the structuralist approach Todorov 
champions)
22
 we must take our bearings from other theorists too, such as Glen 
Cavaliero whose The Supernatural in English Fiction is unusual amongst academic 
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 For example, Peter Penzoldt’s earlier treatise The Supernatural in Fiction recognizes that many 
apparently supernatural tales can be accounted for in terms of character psychology – hence his name 
for the genre: ‘psychological horror’. (Penzoldt 1952, 53-56)   
22
 Given that structuralism is concerned with ‘the abstract codes and conventions governing the social 
production of meanings’, (Baldick 1990, 245) i.e. looks for the meaningless in the apparently 
meaningful (for any meaning discovered in the ‘abstract codes and conventions’ would be susceptible 
to further structuralist analysis) it is inimical to hermeneutics.   
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works dealing with this subject, in that it makes an effort to give a non-naturalistic 
justification for the appeal of supernatural literature.  We will also attempt a defence 
of the fantastic in Der Tod in Venedig against critics who would deny its presence, a 
defence inspired by Christine Brooke-Rose’s A Rhetoric of the Unreal.  This work, 
which develops and modifies Todorov’s insights, includes a treatment of ‘The Turn of 
the Screw’ and its critical reception which provides a model for the treatment of Der 
Tod in Venedig and its critical reception which takes up the second half of this 
chapter. 
 
Todorov presents us with the possibility that the fantastic is ‘evanescent’ – in the 
sense that though many fictional works dealing with abnormal situations equivocate 
as to natural or supernatural causation, the majority, before they conclude, come down 
firmly on one side or the other.  For example, plenty of ghost stories begin by 
presenting the reader with phenomena (banging doors, cold-spots, whispering voices 
and so on) which, but for their abundance and the fact that they are often accompanied 
by a sense of apprehension on the part of one or more characters, could be considered 
purely natural, before finally being revealed as the premonitory signs of some 
indisputably supernatural presence which emerges towards the end of the narrative.  
But that is not his last word on the matter: 
 
It would be wrong to claim that the fantastic can exist only in a part of the work, for there are 
texts which sustain their ambiguity to the very end, i.e., even beyond the narrative itself.  The 
book closed, the ambiguity persists.  A remarkable example is supplied by Henry James’ tale 
‘The Turn of the Screw’ which does not permit us to determine finally whether ghosts haunt the 
old estate, or whether we are confronted by the hallucinations of a hysterical Governess 
victimized by the disturbing atmosphere which surrounds her.  In French literature, Mérimée’s 
tale ‘La Vénus d’Ille’ affords a perfect example of this ambiguity. (Todorov 1975, 43) 
 
That ‘The Turn of the Screw’ should be considered an outstanding example of the 
fantastic is no surprise.  It is indeed difficult for a twenty-first century reader to 
overlook the fact that the Governess who narrates the story, though she never seems 
in any doubt as to the reality of Bly’s ghostly revenants, betrays at every turn the sort 
of overwrought suggestibility which left unchecked might well coalesce into a 
hallucinatory psycho-drama.  But that ‘La Vénus d’Ille’ should be proposed as its 
22 
 
French counterpart is at first sight surprising.
23
  It is true that the presumed animated 
statue is never seen to come to life, but if the mere lack of direct ocular testimony on 
the narrator’s part to supernatural intervention were sufficient to lift a story out of the 
category of the marvellous and into that of the fantastic, then would not many stories 
traditionally regarded as unambiguously supernatural be better regarded as fantastic 
too?  The matter is not negligible, given that Todorov can adduce very few examples 
of the pure fantastic, and in order to increase their number includes in the genre works 
which end with a definitely natural or supernatural climax.
24
 And Brooke-Rose, 
although she is rightly emphatic (where Todorov is hesitant) that Poe’s ‘The Black 
Cat’ is a fantastic work, does not add to the stock of fantastic literature.25  There is 
good reason, however, to suggest that the fantastic is anything but a rarity, and that 
many examples of what are usually regarded as supernatural fiction belong to the 
genre.  
 
Take Sheridan Le Fanu’s story ‘An Account of Some Strange Disturbances in 
Aungier Street’, included, apparently without a second thought as to its eligibility, in 
numerous anthologies of ghost-stories.  No ghost is witnessed by the narrator of this 
tale: we are given a second-hand account of one by a friend of his, the narrator 
himself at one point is almost persuaded that he can make out something large and 
sinister in a lobby (though there is a disclaimer: ‘Now I must be frank, and confess 
that the cupboard which displayed our plates and cups stood just there, though at the 
moment I did not recollect it’); (Le Fanu 1973, 42) there is a moment when we 
anticipate that the supernatural is about to be revealed unambiguously, but the heavy 
tread which the narrator hears descending the stairs turns out to be the sound of an 
evil-looking rat hopping from one to the next.  However, all of this can be attributed 
to mere chance on the one hand and to the suggestive atmosphere of the house itself 
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 It clearly perplexes Brooke-Rose: ‘Personally, I do not feel that the possible natural explanation in 
[‘La Vénus d’Ille’] has equal weight with the supernatural one.’ (Brooke-Rose 1981, 64) 
24
 ‘If we decide to proceed by examining certain parts of the work in isolation, we discover that by 
temporarily omitting the end of the narrative we are able to include a much larger number of texts 
within the genre of the fantastic.’ (Todorov 1975, 42)   
25
 The notion that Todorov’s original definition of the fantastic excludes all but a tiny number of works 
is not challenged by Marianne Wünsch in her work on the subject: ‘Man hat zu Recht eingewandt, daß 
damit das Fantastische auf eine sehr kleine Anzahl von Texten reduziert werde; der Einwand ist 
berechtigt aber nicht sehr erheblich.’ (Wünsch 1991, 50)  Following Todorov’s example, she finds 
additional examples for the genre by loosening its definition, not by examining more closely works 
normally regarded as unambiguously supernatural.   
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on the other.  And the same can be said of numerous other ‘ghost’ stories.26  Many are 
recounted by a first person narrator (who often enough retells somebody else’s story 
without being able to vouch for it) so that we are bound to consider from the outset 
the possibility of a psychological rather than a supernatural explanation in a way that 
would be far less likely if we were reading the words of a dispassionate third-person 
narrator.  Instead of the clear alternative: ‘So-and-so saw the form of a man outlined 
against the blind’ or ‘So-and-so mistakenly thought he saw the form of a man outlined 
against the blind’, we are likely to read something much more ambiguous: ‘I thought I 
could make out the form of a man outlined against the blind’ or even ‘Jenkins always 
swore that he could make out the form of a man outlined against the blind’.  It would 
seem, then, there are many more examples of the fantastic than the few given by 
Todorov, some satisfying the genre’s criteria rather better than ‘La Vénus d’Ille’.   
 
However, we could supply a naturalistic explanation for the events recounted in ‘La 
Vénus d’Ille’ too, if we wished.  In fact the determinedly sceptical reader can produce 
a phenomenal, cause-and-effect account of any fictional work, no matter how 
unambiguous its representation of the supernatural.  The text may give us good 
grounds to assume that the apparitions represented in it are neither figments of the 
imagination nor the result of mere coincidence, but nothing can prevent those for 
whom the supernatural is a priori inadmissible – those who take naturalism as their 
heuristic principle – from making such suppositions as are necessary for the 
construction of a purely naturalistic explanation.  And as we shall see later (in our 
consideration of Freud’s reaction to ‘Der Sandmann’) the naturalistic critic is 
sometimes prepared to go beyond the text itself to achieve this.
27
 It is, then, a 
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 Two examples, both taken from an anthology of Victorian ghost stories, show how widespread is the 
evasion of the definitely supernatural in purportedly supernatural fiction.  At the end of one story, 
‘Reality or Delusion?’ the narrator ponders the question posed by the title in these terms: ‘Was it reality 
or delusion?  That is[…]did her eyes see a real, spectral Daniel Ferrar; or were they deceived by some 
imagination of the brain?  Opinions were divided.  Nothing can shake her own steadfast belief in its 
reality; to her it remains an awful certainty, true and sure as heaven.’ (Wood 1991, 129)  At the end of 
another, ‘Was it an Illusion?’ the similar question provokes a similar response: ‘Ay, indeed! that is the 
question; and it is a question which I have never yet been able to answer.  Certain things I undoubtedly 
saw – with my mind’s eye, perhaps – and as I saw them, I have described them; withholding nothing, 
adding nothing, explaining nothing.  Let those solve the mystery who can.  For myself, I but echo 
Wolstenholme’s question: Was it an illusion?’ (Edwards 1991, 255) 
27
 For example, Pentzoldt (who is fond of this sort of speculation) suggests that F. Marion Crawford’s 
‘obsession with the “living dead”, “the undead”, is but another device of his subconscious to overcome 
[its] anxieties.  Apparently Crawford feared bodily physical death above all.’  He adds that modern 
psychoanalysis suggests various motives for such a fear of death, one of which is the threat of 
castration: ‘Crawford’s fear of physical destruction may thus merely be symbolical of a deeply hidden 
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condition of the fantastic that the possible validity of supernatural explanation be 
accepted – if this were not the case the ambiguity which marks the genre could never 
be established.  But the possible validity of supernatural explanation of fictional 
events is just what many critics seem to dispute. 
 
Take ‘The Turn of the Screw’ as an example.  As Brooke-Rose demonstrates, for 
many twentieth-century commentators this is not a work of the fantastic at all: it is an 
account of a young woman’s madness, and all evidence which might suggest 
supernatural causation is to be discounted – as a kind of duty, it seems, to the 
naturalistic world-view.  So far as such sceptics are concerned, we cannot take the 
‘The Turn of the Screw’ seriously if we believe that ‘The Turn of the Screw’ takes the 
supernatural seriously.  For those of us, however, who are susceptible to the fantastic, 
who consider it a question of some moment, and not a foregone conclusion, which of 
the alternative explanations – the natural or the supernatural – of the events recounted 
in ‘The Turn of the Screw’ is the valid one, the question cannot easily be evaded: why 
are we thus susceptible?  Is it a mere matter of psychological suspense?  Which is to 
say: is the hesitation between hypotheses we experience while reading ‘The Turn of 
the Screw’ in no way different from the hesitation between hypotheses we experience 
while reading a murder mystery – when we wonder if it was the butler or Lord So-
and-so himself who did Lady Such-and-such to death?  There is, surely, an important 
distinction to make between the two kinds of suspense.  In the case of the murder 
mystery the various hypotheses all rest on the same premise: that an event in the 
natural world – the killing of a human being – must be the result of natural causation.  
We might lean towards one hypothesis or another according to personal preference or 
according to our ability to correctly parse misleadingly presented evidence, but 
nothing challenges our understanding of the world as the calculable and determined 
place we generally assume it to be – indeed, the requirement that a competently 
written murder mystery be soluble is predicated on this condition.   By contrast, the 
two hypotheses that present themselves in ‘The Turn of the Screw’ differ from those 
which vie with one another in a murder mystery in precisely this respect: that they 
rely on irreconcilable premises.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
castration anxiety.’  (Penzoldt 1952, 152) This is extremely close to what Freud has to say about ‘Der 
Sandmann’. 
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‘The Turn of the Screw’: Supernatural Morality 
 
It is at this juncture in our argument that we need to consider just what naturalism and 
its opposite entail.  A naturalistic view of human beings is scientific in the sense that 
it regards them as in principle no different from the rest of the observable universe.
 28
  
They are determined phenomena, enjoying no freedom whatsoever, and though it is a 
convention to speak of them as morally responsible for their own behaviour, the terms 
‘morality’ and ‘responsibility’ are no more relevant to human beings than they are to 
asteroids, specks of dust and honey-bees.  Not that naturalism is at odds with the 
reality of freedom and responsibility as psychological phenomena.  But there is a 
world of difference between scepticism vis-à-vis freedom, responsibility and morality, 
and scepticism vis-à-vis the belief in those things, a difference well articulated by 
Nietzsche: ‘Ich leugne also die Sittlichkeit wie ich die Alchymie leugne, das heisst, 
ich leugne ihre Voraussetzungen: nicht aber, dass es Alchymisten gegeben hat, 
welche an diese Voraussetzungen glaubten und auf sie hin handelten.’ (Nietzsche III, 
91)   
 
Naturalism, then, must reject all moral judgment of human beings as incompatible 
with the view that they are determined in their behaviour rather than free agents to be 
held responsible for their actions.
29
 And once again Nietzsche gets to the heart of the 
matter when he declares that the naturalist ‘darf nicht mehr loben, nicht tadeln, denn 
es ist ungereimt, die Natur und die Nothwendigkeit zu loben und zu tadeln.  So wie er 
das gute Kunstwerk liebt, aber nicht lobt, weil es Nichts für sich selber kann, wie er 
vor der Pflanze steht, so muss er vor den Handlungen der Menschen[...]stehen.’ 
(Nietzsche II 1988, 103)  What, though, are the principles which stand in opposition 
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 There is a good deal of congruence between the literary and philosophical conceptions of the term 
‘naturalism’.   The Oxford Concise Dictionary of Literary Terms  defines it as ‘a more deliberate kind 
of realism in novels, stories, and plays, usually involving a view of human beings as passive victims of 
natural forces and social environment.’ (Baldick 1990, 126)  Whereas, referring to Freud’s analysis of 
morality and religion, Jonathan Lear points out that an account of such things ‘can be broadly 
naturalistic or super-natural.  Either it limits itself to an account of how something should come to be 
as a phenomenon of nature; or it draws on a source transcending nature as part of the account of 
origin.’ (Lear 2005, 192-193) 
29
 It is true, of course, that few works of literary naturalism succeed in wholly eschewing  the moral 
dimension, and it is doubtful whether even the trained anthropologist and trained psychologist ever 
manage to view human beings with the same dispassionate attention to cause and effect which the 
chemist, say, can bring to his subject matter.  But all of these naturalists: naturalistic author, 
anthropologist and psychologist, aspire to a properly scientific level of disinterested observation. 
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to naturalism?  We suggest that there are two, but that these two have a necessary 
kinship and are frequently indistinguishable from one another. 
 
The first, evidently enough, is the acceptance of the reality of the supernatural 
traditionally so-called: that there are such things as ghosts, demons, gods and so on, 
and that these entities are not subject to the rules which prevail in the natural world.  
They are, however, normally understood to share some characteristics with the 
creatures of the natural world.  For example, a pagan deity, though he may challenge 
the laws of space by disappearing from one place and reappearing in another at will, 
may none the less be as time-bound and as incapable of remembering the future (say) 
as a human being.  Or a ghost, though largely insusceptible to the rigid cause-and-
effect regime understood by science, may all the same be exorcised through the 
performance of certain rituals, so that we are bound to conceive a successful exorcism 
as somehow the effect of a cause.  It seems that supernatural entities manage to belong 
to two mutually exclusive worlds, being both within and outside the phenomenal 
realm which our intellect and our senses normally confirm to us as that in which we 
exist.  How difficult this is to conceptualize can be gathered from Todorov’s own 
attempts to articulate the contrast between natural and supernatural explanation.   
 
In a world which is indeed our world, the one we know, a world without devils, sylphides, or 
vampires, there occurs an event which cannot be explained by the laws of this same familiar 
world.  The person who experiences the event must opt for one of two possible solutions: either 
he is the victim of an illusion of the senses, or a product of the imagination – and laws of the 
world then remain what they are; or else the event has indeed taken place, it is an integral part of 
reality – but then this reality is controlled by laws unknown to us.  Either the devil is an illusion, 
an imaginary being; or else he really exists, precisely like other living beings – with this 
reservation, that we encounter him infrequently. (Todorov 1975, 25)  
 
If we accept that devils, sylphides, vampires etc. are ‘an integral part of reality’, 
existing ‘precisely like other living beings’, even if there is as yet no scientific 
explanation for their apparently supernatural character, then there is no reason to 
regard them as supernatural at all.
30
  So it is not, perhaps, surprising that the 
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 Interestingly both Todorov and Brooke-Rose regard the wonders of science-fiction as marvellous – 
as belonging, that is, to the supernatural accepted.  But there is surely a crucial difference between 
presenting some exotic phenomenon as scientifically explicable (even if no persuasive explanation is 
given) and thus as consistent with the naturalistic world-view, and presenting it as essentially 
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supernatural is often presented in an indistinct and fleeting fashion: the more 
manifestly present and persistent it becomes, the less likely we are to consider it as 
challenging the fundamental laws of nature and not just a phenomenon temporarily 
beyond scientific explanation.
31
 This consideration, we suggest, is what lies behind 
the fantastic strategy employed in Le Fanu’s story and many other ghost stories: the 
less the ghost is felt definitely to intrude upon reality, the more terrifying the 
possibility of its presence becomes.  As for ‘La Vénus d’Ille’, the probable reason for 
the absence of direct ocular testimony of supernatural interference is that a blow-by-
blow account of an animated statue’s vengeance is more likely to provoke laughter 
than alarm.
32
 
 
The second principle opposed to naturalism is morality, in that the latter’s justification 
must lie beyond the natural world.  If human beings are to be elevated above the 
moral indifference which reigns in the natural world, then they must be exempt from 
that world’s necessity.  They must have a real power of choice, and not just the 
illusion of choice.
33
  Furthermore, they must have access to a real criterion of value if 
those choices are to be valid, and this, like freedom, is not to be found in the natural 
world.  If, for example, the axiom ‘it is always right to preserve human life’ is to be 
considered valid, then the qualification ‘right’ must make reference to justice itself, 
and not merely to some  product of an individual’s or a group’s psychology going by 
that name.  For why should an accident of psychology – a mere fact of the natural 
world – constitute a legitimate criterion of value for our choices in the natural 
world?
34
  How could any priority be established between the proposed criterion and 
                                                                                                                                            
inexplicable.  In Richard Matheson’s science-fiction novel I am Legend, for example, the protagonist 
discovers that the vampires who plague his earth are in fact the victims of a disease.  They are truly 
presented as being ‘an integral part of reality’ and by the same token as natural phenomena. 
31
 The article ‘naturalism’ in the Encyclopedia Britannica (Micropedia: 15th ed. 1992) makes a point 
of stating that naturalism can cope with the supernatural, but only by taking the latter term in the weak 
sense we have alluded to: ‘Although naturalism denies the existence of truly supernatural realities, it 
makes allowance for the supernatural provided that knowledge of it can be had indirectly – that is, that 
natural objects be influenced by the so-called supernatural entities in a detectable way.  In such a case, 
the supernatural itself is reduced to a natural status verifiable by science.’ 
32
 The supernatural which can be definitely attested by reliable witnesses lends itself easily to comedy.  
Wilde’s Canterville ghost is a case in point: ‘I feel bound to tell you, Mr. Otis, that the ghost has been 
seen by several living members of my family, as well as by the rector of the parish, the Rev. Augustus 
Dampier, who is a Fellow of King’s College, Cambridge.’ (Wilde 1994, 206)  
33
 This corresponds to the Kantian focus on the freedom of the subject as a condition for morality. 
34
 Of course there can be no theoretical objection to a fact of psychology serving as the basis for a 
conditional good: ‘Since you want to get to London before midnight, you should take the ten-thirty 
28 
 
the fact it must approve or censure?  Unless, of course we say that the notion of 
justice does indeed correspond to a metaphysical justice beyond the natural world.
35
 
 
Once we understand that naturalism is opposed to both the supernatural traditionally 
so-called and to morality, we can see why the supernatural and the moral often 
maintain a close alliance in supernatural fiction.  Let’s consider ‘The Turn of the 
Screw’ in this light.  For the Governess, brought up in a parsonage and exposed to a 
lifetime of religious piety, the ghosts she believes she sees are evil revenants with 
wicked plans.  The view of naturalist critics is that the ghosts are hallucinations and 
quite possibly the product of a morbid sense of sinfulness.  By their account, the tale 
is amoral: the significance the Governess sees in her experiences are the product of 
insignificant facts of psychology.
36
  By contrast if the Governess is right about the 
ghosts’ presence, then both the belief in the supernatural and in the moral are 
vindicated at a stroke – for in this case we cannot fall back on the naturalist view that 
what is conventionally called evil is just the predetermined result of certain social and 
psychological conditions because the ghosts are not part of the natural world and not 
subject to its necessity.  Furthermore, to accept the Governess’s account of the ghosts 
(as both really present and evil) is to accept that human beings can be conversant with 
more than the natural, cause-and-effect world, and thus be themselves not wholly of 
that world: that they too may participate in the freedom indispensable to morality.  So 
that in this case at least, the supernatural challenge to naturalism is also a moral 
challenge to naturalism.  And whereas most fiction is a cavalier mixture of naturalism 
and morality (in the sense that while such fiction makes no formal concessions to the 
supernatural, its characters are granted a moral dimension excluded by the naturalistic 
perspective), a fantastic work like ‘The Turn of the Screw’ polarizes these two 
elements as in principle incompatible.  We can accept a supernatural explanation 
                                                                                                                                            
train’ etc.  But this says nothing about whether the desire itself is good or not, and consequently 
nothing about its validity as a criterion. 
35
 This corresponds to the Platonic focus on the necessity of criteria of value as a condition for 
morality. 
36
 The matter has been eloquently formulated by Thomas J. Bontly in an article on James’ tale: 
‘Ghosts are inevitably creatures of some metaphysical significance, and just as the reality and 
theological ambiguity of the ghost in Hamlet indicates something important about Shakespeare’s 
universe, so the reality or unreality of the ghosts at Bly must be a crucial factor in our determination 
of The Turn of the Screw’s ultimate meaning.[…]The psychoanalytic interpretation, consequently, 
implies more than it might seem at first.  For if the Governess is mad and the ghosts hallucinatory 
we have a world in which evil is an illusion, an irrelevant value judgment, the externalization of 
inner psychological forces which are, in themselves, neither good nor evil but empirical facts.’ 
(Bontly 1969, 721-722) 
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which is consistent with a moral outlook, or we can accept the naturalist explanation 
which shows up the moral and supernatural together as delusional, but we cannot have 
both.  The answer to the question, then, as to why we consider the supernatural 
alternative advanced against the naturalist one by this novella to be more than a 
literary hoax for the sceptical critic to see through, the reason why, despite their 
terrifying challenge to our understanding, we are susceptible to the notion that the 
ghosts are more than mere hallucinations, is that we have a stake, insofar as we are 
putatively free, putatively moral subjects, in their reality. 
 
Now it is important not to be too dogmatic about this: not every fictional ghost or 
demon postulates an evaluative metaphysic, for some stories present us with a 
supernatural lacking any moral dimension at all.
37
  The eponymous demon in Guy de 
Maupassant’s ‘Le Horla’, for example, is neither wicked nor benevolent nor pitiable, 
but merely destructive, and but for the fact that its invisibility makes it harder to 
anticipate and capture is frightening in the way that a tiger on the loose is frightening.  
Other stories present us with a supernatural which closely corresponds to a 
metaphysical realm, but a metaphysical realm without moral implications.  This is 
true of the stories of Arthur Machen, one of which, ‘The Great God Pan’, we shall 
consider in the next chapter.  But it is a fact that large numbers of fictional ghosts etc. 
do have a strong association with morality.  Not just in the sense that being free of the 
necessity of the natural world they can with propriety be morally evaluated, but also 
in the sense that they are often the agents or victims of righteousness.  There are 
countless stories of the spirits of men returning to haunt and terrorize those who 
persecuted them in life, or to right wrongs, or to do an eternal penance for the wicked 
acts that they, the ghosts themselves, perpetrated during their mortal lives.  M. R. 
James’ famous story ‘Oh, Whistle, and I’ll Come to You, My Lad’ is typical of the 
genre in both respects.  Its protagonist – a scientific sceptic who cannot bear even talk 
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 Apart from any other considerations the etymologies of the words ‘supernatural’ and ‘metaphysical’ 
should alert us to their probable association.   Spatial metaphors aside (‘super’, μετά), both words 
mean: that which lies outside the natural (i.e. phenomenal) world. It is the connection made by 
Cavaliero in his treatment of pagan religious ‘mystery’ which, he says, is ‘a metaphysical term.  
Metaphysics, the intellectual exploration of the spiritual, the intangible, and the unseen, is a study 
necessarily discredited by the presuppositions of linguistic philosophy and scientific materialism.’  And 
he hits upon a possible cause for the continuing popularity of supernatural fiction when he writes that 
modern civilization is ‘unprecedented in having no theological basis for its undertakings, and in 
consigning the religious and metaphysical understanding of mystery to the category of superstition.’ 
(Cavaliero 1995, 16) 
30 
 
of the supernatural – removes a whistle, on which the words ‘Thief – blow, and you 
will weep’ are written in Latin, from the ruins of a church and, blowing on it 
regardless, encounters something that drives him to the point of insanity.
38
 The 
terrible challenge to ordinary reasoning, and the morality which naturalism has no 
place for are both in full evidence in this story, never more so than when Parkins, the 
protagonist, noticing a mysterious stranger follow in his steps along the coast at dusk, 
suddenly recalls a passage from Bunyan:  
 
‘Now I saw in my dream that Christian had gone but a very little way when he saw a foul fiend 
coming over the field to meet him.’ ‘What should I do now,’ he thought, ‘if I looked back and 
caught sight of a black figure standing sharply defined against the yellow sky, and saw that it 
had horns and wings’? (M.R. James 1987, 63) 
 
‘Oh, Whistle, and I’ll Come to You, My Lad’ presents a more concerted challenge to 
naturalistic interpretation than many stories of the purported supernatural (like the Le 
Fanu story discussed above) attempt.  How, without the benefit of blatant 
misinterpretation, is the naturalist critic to explain away the supernatural in such a 
story?  It is told by a third person narrator who maintains an attitude of detachment 
from the protagonist throughout, it does not limit itself to an account of events which 
might be due to chance alone (though these abound) or of experiences which might be 
nothing more than the product of the protagonist’s psychology (though these also 
abound); instead, at the end of the story the supernatural fleetingly but indubitably 
manifests itself.  In other words, it is hard to detect any naturalistic intention on the 
author’s part, and one of his purposes seems to be the humiliation of the naturalistic 
world-view as represented by the protagonist.  At this point the critic who believes the 
story worthy of his analysis but at the same time wishes to exclude from that analysis 
any hint of respect for the supernatural is likely to go outside the story itself and 
psycho-analyze its author or, indeed, the whole human race. 
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 As a matter of fact his slightly tetchy impatience for the mere possibility of the supernatural brings to 
mind that of the various naturalistic critics of ‘The Turn of the Screw’. 
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‘Der Sandmann’: Supernatural Meaning   
 
It is precisely this procedure which E. T. A. Hoffmann’s ‘Der Sandmann’ has 
undergone, for it is famous – above and beyond any merit it might boast in its own 
right – as being the object of an analysis by Freud himself,39 who decides in his essay 
‘Das Unheimliche’ that the support within the story for a supernatural interpretation of 
its own strange events is far too strong to permit the feasibility of a naturalist 
explanation at a textual level. 
 
Eine ‘intellektuelle Unsicherheit’ kommt hier nicht mehr in Frage:
40
 wir wissen jetzt, daß uns 
nicht die Phantasiegebilde eines Wahnsinnigen vorgeführt werden sollen, hinter denen wir in 
rationalistischer Überlegenheit den nüchternen Sachverhalt erkennen mögen, und – der 
Eindruck des Unheimlichen hat sich durch diese Aufklärung nicht im mindesten verringert.  
Eine intellektuelle Unsicherheit leistet uns also nichts für das Verständnis dieser unheimlichen 
Wirkung. (Freud 1940, 242-243) 
 
He then goes on to psycho-analyze both the author’s motivation for writing and our 
motivation for responding to this story, tracing its unsettling effect back to the 
infantile fear of having one’s eyes damaged, which in turn is the expression of an 
even deeper anxiety – that of castration.  However, there is in fact no need for Freud 
to give up so easily on the story as a fantastic work, or to discount the indications the 
text itself furnishes that a psychological explanation is at hand for the bizarre goings-
on it recounts.  For the events which definitely defy naturalism, which cannot, that is, 
be attributed to Nathanael’s strange psychological state on the one hand or to 
coincidence on the other – the events which lead Freud to discount any natural 
explanation inherent in the text – do not belong to the ‘sandman’ part of the story but 
to the interpolated ‘Olympia’ episode.  And the humorous, ironic tone which Freud 
himself notes, (Freud 1940, 238) and the fact that ordinary psychological 
considerations are suppressed for its duration, might lead us to suppose that the 
Olympia interlude belongs to a different mode of narration altogether from that which 
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 Discussions of Hoffmann’s story as an example of the fantastic usually include a consideration of 
Freud’s analysis of the work, and the latter often provides the intellectual context for the former.  This 
is true of Irène Bessière’s Le récit fantastique (Bessière 1974, 229-232) and also of the various 
treatments of ‘Der Sandmann’ in Dimensionen des Phantastischen, a collection of essays dealing with 
Hoffmann’s fiction and which includes a valuable analysis of Freud’s theorizing in ‘Das Unheimliche’ 
by Louis Vax. (Vax 1998, 40-41)  
40
 This is Todorov’s fantastic by another name. 
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prevails in the rest of the tale: namely to allegory, which because it ‘is not to be taken 
literally’ (Todorov 1975, 32) allows the fantastic no purchase.41   
 
Allegory is defined for the purposes of this thesis as a work of fiction in which a 
given concept takes precedence over the narrative and dictates terms to it, rather than 
arising from the narrative and abiding by its rules.  It would include not only many 
allegories so-called, but works as diverse as Aesop’s fables and Plato’s philosophical 
myths.  In the case of the ‘Olympia’ episode it is the romantic tendency to love-
blindness which allegory realizes: that men and women are prepared to devote 
themselves to quite unworthy love-objects while attributing to those objects qualities 
that the dispassionate observer cannot discern.  Of course, the notion that Nathanael 
might actually fall in love with an unconscious clockwork automaton lacking even the 
power to converse, and then defend ‘her’ to his friends (who are also taken in – they 
may not believe her to be the remarkable woman Nathanael does, but they fail to 
recognize that she is a mechanical doll) as an exceptional human being, exceeds all 
probability, but this does not mean that the reader should look for a supernatural 
explanation to account for such bizarre goings-on.  Rather, he is to interpret these 
deviations from the conventions of naturalism as arising from that deference of 
narrative to concept which is, to repeat, one of the hallmarks of allegory.  Once we 
leave Nathanael’s infatuation with Olympia aside and concentrate on his experiences 
of Coppelius/Coppola, we discover an abundance of evidence for a natural, 
psychological explanation of the protagonist’s apparently supernatural travails.  
However, we should not relinquish our discussion of allegory before seizing the 
occasion it offers to accost the subject of meaning. 
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 The treatment of allegory which follows owes a good deal to Todorov’s discussion of the same topic 
in the ‘poetry and allegory’ chapter of his book.  His key formulation is: ‘Allegory implies the 
existence of at least two meanings for the same words; according to some critics, the first meaning 
must disappear, while others require that the two be present together.  Secondly, this double meaning is 
indicated in the work in an explicit fashion: it does not proceed from the reader’s interpretation 
(whether arbitrary or not).’  (Todorov 1975, 63)  This, though close to the mark, is not quite a bullseye: 
the hallmark of allegory is not that one meaning (i.e. some prior concept) causes the other (i.e. the 
fictional account) to disappear – if that were the case then, evidently enough, the duality necessary to 
allegory would no longer obtain.  Nor is the hallmark of allegory the unforced consistency of a fictional 
account with some concept which might be derived from it.  If that were so then any fictional account 
capable of yielding a concept would count as allegory, and such is not the case.  For example, ‘X was 
reprimanded by his boss for clocking on with a hangover’ can yield the didactic concept: ‘over-
indulgence leads to unpleasant consequences’, but is none the less not an allegory.  What is required – 
and this is one of the explicit indications which Todorov alludes to (the other being humour) – is that 
the controlling concept should divert the fictional account from the bounds of naturalism. 
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If we were to ask someone to tell us the meaning of a work of fiction, what sort of 
reply might we legitimately expect to receive?  Clearly a satisfactory answer could 
not be a proposition exclusively concerned with fictional data: ‘this happened, that 
happened and as a result something else happened.’  We do not, that is, understand a 
story’s meaning to be equivalent to the events it relates, or even to events not directly 
related but which we might deduce from those which are.
42
  If, however, we are not 
demanding an account of fictional data when we ask the meaning of a story, what is it 
we wish to know? The question is best answered in the context of allegory, for where 
allegory is concerned both the focus of the question ‘what does this work mean?’ and 
the validity or otherwise of a particular answer are unusually easy to discern.  The 
meaning of the Olympia interlude in ‘Der Sandmann’ is that amorous passion renders 
us blind to the real nature of the object of our passion.  That is not a proposition about 
facts, explicit or implicit in the story, but nor is it merely a universal proposition with 
which the story happens to conform – if that were so, then we might take the 
proposition ‘human beings communicate by language’ to be the interlude’s allegorical 
meaning.  ‘Amorous passion renders us blind to the real nature of the object of our 
passion’ by contrast is an evaluative concept – one which can without difficulty be 
converted into an imperative.  In this case that imperative would be: ‘Don’t let 
amorous passion blind you to the real nature of its object!’  Allegorical meanings 
imply an ‘ought’ of some kind.     
 
However, the answer to the question of meaning cannot be answered with comparable 
certainty when the work or episode in question is not the product of a pre-determined 
didactic policy on the author’s part. Which is not to say, of course, that non-
allegorical works are meaningless.  On the contrary – irrespective of whether they are 
entirely imagined, the fruit of lived experience, or a reworking of some other literary 
work – they are presented to us as full of meaning, but a meaning arising unforced 
from our consideration of the narrative rather than being thrust upon both the 
narrative and us.  It would be mistaken, however, to claim that, in view of Napoleon’s 
doomed march on Moscow, the meaning of War and Peace is ‘pride goes before a 
fall’ because, although such an evaluative concept can legitimately be derived from 
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 Thus the meaning of ‘The Turn of the Screw’ is not given in the statement that ‘the Governess, in 
thrall to sexual psychosis, is the victim of hallucinations.’  That is a possible factual explanation of the 
goings-on at Bly, but it does not address the question of meaning. 
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the text, it is only one of a myriad of possible evaluative concepts which can also 
legitimately be derived from the text – concepts which, sometimes in harmony with 
one another, sometimes in conflict with one another, constitute the novel’s stock of 
meaning.  So that, in the absence of clear authorial intention to guide us, the proposed 
meaning of a sprawling nineteenth century realist novel cannot be summed up in a 
phrase and indeed cannot be definitively summed up at all.  But we must not lose sight 
of the fact that the question ‘what does this work mean’ is as much a request for an 
evaluative answer when asked with reference to War and Peace as it is when asked 
with reference to the ‘Olympia’ episode.   
 
Evaluative statements, however, can be of two kinds: statements of relative evaluation 
and statements of authentic evaluation – which can be converted into hypothetical and 
categorical imperatives respectively.  For example, the meaning which we gave as a 
possible interpretation of War and Peace: ‘pride goes before a fall’, tells us nothing 
about whether a fall is a good thing or not.  It merely tells us that, should we wish to 
avoid one, we must guard against the pride which makes it more likely.  Another 
possible meaning of War and Peace, by contrast, might be ‘it is unjust to infringe the 
rights of a sovereign people’, which is a different matter.  ‘It is unjust to infringe the 
rights of a sovereign people’ refers a possible act (the infringement of the rights of a 
sovereign people) not to some other possible fact (for example: an unhappy outcome 
for the transgressor) but rather to an authentic criterion of value (justice). Both of 
these two meanings are compatible with War and Peace which, although it is a realist 
novel concerned, amongst other things, with notions of historical inevitability, never 
altogether eschews the moral perspective so at odds with that of naturalism.  The 
result is that its conditional meanings gain sustenance by their association with its 
authentic meanings, and the ‘pride’ of ‘pride goes before a fall’ can be regarded as 
wicked and not merely inexpedient.   From which it will be seen that our attempt to 
address the question of meaning has brought us back to the question of morality, for 
the evaluative perspective from which we can detect authentic morality within a text 
is the same perspective from which we can infer authentic evaluative concepts (which 
are themselves moral precepts) from the text.  That perspective is necessarily not a 
naturalistic one.  Naturalism can admit the possibility of belief in morality and of 
conditional meaning but just as it does not admit the postulates of authentic morality, 
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so it does not admit the postulates of authentic meaning.  It views morality as amoral 
and meaning as meaningless. 
 
Now, in contrast with the ‘Olympia’ interlude, the ‘sandman’ episodes of ‘Der 
Sandmann’ are not allegorical – their meaning cannot be located in some single 
instructive concept imposed on the narrative to the detriment of the latter’s 
plausibility.  Rather, different characters within the story suggest different ways of 
interpreting its events.   
 
Nur dann, wenn Nathanael bewies, daß Coppelius das böse Prinzip sei, was ihn in dem 
Augenblick erfasst habe, als er hinter dem Vorhange lauschte, und daß dieser widerwärtige 
Dämon auf entsetzliche Weise ihr Liebesglück stören werde, da wurde Klara sehr Ernst und 
sprach: ‘Ja, Nathanael!  du hast recht, Coppelius ist ein böses, feindliches Prinzip, er kann 
Entsetzliches wirken wie eine teuflische Macht, die sichtbarlich in das Leben trat, aber nur dann, 
wenn du ihn nicht aus Sinn und Gedanken verbannst.  Solange du an ihn glaubst, ist er auch und 
wirkt, nur dein Glaube ist seine Macht.’ (Hoffmann 1946, 155) 
 
Nathanael believes that Coppelius is evil itself: ‘das böse Prinzip’, a ‘widerwärtige 
Dämon’ and so on.  He believes, that is, both in the reality of the moral dimension and 
in the traditionally conceived supernatural.  Klara, on the other hand, gives a 
naturalistic – psychological – explanation of Coppelius: he is a brain-child of 
Nathanael’s, regardless of any coincidental resemblance he might have with a real-life 
person of the same name.  So what she is proposing is, in fact, a meaningless 
interpretation of Nathanael’s experiences: the development of a psychosis, after all, is 
an event in nature, and to accept Klara’s argument is to put facts – ‘this happened, that 
happened and as a result something else happened’ – at the centre of his story.  And 
we have already noted that an account of facts is an inadequate answer to the question 
‘what does the story mean’.43 A non-fantastic work might, as we have seen, give rise 
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 One might regard the matter in the terms employed by Socrates (Plato’s Socrates of course) to 
express his dissatisfaction with Anaxagoras.  According to his reputation the latter had made 
‘intelligence’, νοῦς, the creative and regulative principle in the universe and so the young Socrates 
had assumed that his philosophical predecessor would explain the world’s set-up as fully satisfying 
a criterion of value.  ‘I thought that when he gave the reason for each of these things individually, 
and for them all collectively, he would explain in detail what was best for each individual thing and 
what was good for them all together.’ (Plato (trans. Griffith) 1987, 186) But a perusal of 
Anaxagoras’ actual works revealed the explanations he advanced as being value-free and Socrates 
felt bitterly disappointed to discover a naturalistic, cause-and-effect account which could never 
answer the question to which he, Socrates, had sought an answer: not, in truth, ‘how do things come 
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to many meanings, but at the heart of fantastic works like ‘Der Sandmann’ or ‘The 
Turn of the Screw’ there lies the stark choice between a supernatural meaning and a 
naturalistic lack of meaning.  Once again: because naturalism is value free, it is in no 
position to suggest meanings beyond those relating to criteria whose own value is 
forever pending, and must confine itself to statements about the phenomenal world.  
By contrast, the supernatural which is not part of, or not wholly part of, the 
phenomenal world, certainly does lend itself to a meaningful interpretation of a work 
– though it cannot, obviously, ever furnish a cogent account of it in terms of cause-
and-effect just because it defies cause-and-effect.  So that on the one hand, there is 
Nathanael’s judgment of his predicament: he is the victim of evil forces beyond 
mankind’s full comprehension; on the other, there is Klara’s: he is mentally deranged.  
Without wishing to put the matter in too paradoxical a way, the underlying thrust of a 
fantastic story, if we accept the supernatural, is not that some particular thing is 
meaningful, but that meaning is possible; conversely, to reject the supernatural in a 
fantastic story is to dispute not only the meaning attributed by this or that character to 
particular events in it, but to dispute meaning altogether. 
 
‘The Black Cat’: Supernatural Intention 
 
We mentioned earlier that naturalist critics, in so far as they limit their case to the text 
itself, explain the apparently supernatural in terms of character psychology on the one 
hand and in terms of coincidence on the other.  In both ‘The Turn of the Screw’ and 
‘Der Sandmann’ the psychological element is to the fore because both works are 
related or partially related by first person narrators whose veracity we have reason to 
doubt.  But there is another way to create the ambiguity typical of the fantastic, a way 
to which we have alluded but not yet directed our full attention: coincidence.  
Consider Edgar Allan Poe’s short story ‘The Black Cat’, which Todorov tentatively 
                                                                                                                                            
to be’ but ‘wherein lies their value?’  The only way, according to Socrates, to explain meaningfully, 
to explain worth and not just existence, is to bring into play a metaphysics of value.  ‘I can no 
longer understand or recognize all those other clever reasons.  If somebody tells me the reason 
something is beautiful is because it is brightly coloured, or because of its shape, or anything of that 
sort, I have no time for all that.  I get confused by all those other things.  In my simple, 
unsophisticated, possibly naïve way I cling to the fact that the only thing making it beautiful is that 
beautiful I’ve just mentioned – its presence or communion, or whatever exactly the connection is.  
It isn’t something I’m prepared to be dogmatic about.  All I know is, it is the beautiful which makes 
all beautiful things beautiful.’ (Plato (trans. Griffith) 1987, 189) (Wherever Griffiths translates 
‘beautiful’ Plato gives a grammatical variation of καλός.) 
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and
 
Brooke-Rose emphatically claims for the fantastic.
44
  It is told in the first person, 
but not, as happens in the case of ‘Der Sandmann’ and ‘The Turn of the Screw’, by a 
protagonist making bold claims for the supernatural, but instead by one who concedes 
at the outset that a naturalist explanation might after all be found for the mysterious 
conspiracy that seems to beset him.
45
  So why are both Todorov and Brooke-Rose 
prepared to accept it as fantastic at all?  The answer is that the multiplication of 
coincidences makes a naturalistic explanation so far-fetched that we find ourselves 
tempted to countenance an apparently more probable though scientifically impossible 
one.  After Pluto, the narrator’s one-eyed black cat is hanged, what appears to be his 
silhouette appears on the wall of a partially burned house.  Then another, partially 
blinded, cat appears – in all respects identical to Pluto except that it has an 
emblematic gallows on its chest.  This second cat is instrumental in bringing to justice 
the murdering protagonist after he accidentally walls it up alive with his wife’s 
cadaver.  Thus we are tempted to see some kind of intention behind these events, and 
to regard the gallows-mark on the cat’s chest as a premonition and not some random 
trick of pigmentation.  But we can only feel this temptation if we are in some way 
susceptible to it – and our susceptibility is bound up, as we have seen, with our sense 
of morality and our hunger for meaning.  A genuinely naturalistic critic, concentrating 
solely on phenomenal explanation and indifferent to morality and meaning, would 
conclude that the story does nothing more than relate a number of quite unrelated 
facts – some of them unfortunate for the narrator, others having nothing to do with his 
miserable end. 
 
But our attribution of these events to supernatural intention in ‘The Black Cat’ does 
not imply a direct supernatural intervention of the kind the ghosts are supposed to 
perpetrate in ‘The Turn of the Screw’ or Coppelius in ‘Der Sandmann’.  Such an 
intervention might have taken place.  The ‘strong’ supernatural hypothesis to explain 
the story’s events would be that the black cat itself – to whom the narrator’s 
imprecation: ‘But may God shield and deliver me from the fangs of the Arch-Fiend’ 
(Poe 1984, 596) may be taken to refer – has returned from the grave as an avenging 
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 (Todorov 1975, 48) (Brooke-Rose 1981, 117) 
45
 ‘Hereafter, perhaps, some intellect may be found which will reduce my phantasm to the common-
place – some intellect more calm, more logical, and far less excitable then my own, which will 
perceive, in the circumstances I detail with awe, nothing more than an ordinary succession of very 
natural causes and effect.’ (Poe 1984, 597) 
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demon.  But there is a ‘weak’ supernatural hypothesis too: that one could trace back 
all of the story’s strange events (the silhouette on the wall, for example, which the 
narrator does his best to explain in a matter-of-fact way) to a natural cause and still be 
unable to shake off the suspicion that a supernatural intention might be at work behind 
them.  So that the real perpetrator would be not the black cat – which, by this 
reckoning, would be two domestic animals innocent of all ill intent – but a destiny 
(sometimes referred to in its more benevolent aspect as ‘providence’) which never 
shows its hand.  It would seem that the considerations which lead us to accept in our 
own lives the notion that some things are ‘meant’ to happen, though no supernatural 
intervention can be discovered, make us equally susceptible to the same notion in 
fiction.   
 
What are those considerations?  Why should we feel tempted to attribute to the non-
human world an intention unknown to science, and whose workings no amount of 
investigation could uncover?  And what, anyway, is meant by ‘intention’?  Evidently 
both naturalists and non-naturalists agree on the human capacity to act in accordance 
with a consciously conceived programme of behaviour.  But there is a crucial 
difference in their outlook.  The naturalist does not concede that human beings 
exercise real autonomy in the conception and fulfilment of their purposes.  He does 
not, of course, deny that they believe their behaviour arises out of intentions for which 
they must take responsibility, but he would insist that such a belief is mistaken.  A 
human action is simply the perceptible extremity of a chain of cause-and-effect which 
can be identified with intention for a link or two, perhaps, but finds no ultimate origin 
in the moment when that intention was conceived.  It can be traced back through and 
beyond it.  By a naturalistic account, intention is revealed to be just another example 
of the necessity which governs the whole natural world – its only distinguishing mark 
being a consciousness which, in so far as it is an object for scientific analysis at all, is 
likewise a matter of cause and effect.  The non-naturalist, by contrast, is in a position 
to insist that human beings bear the ultimate responsibility for their actions, that their 
intentions are their own, and also that consciousness can do more than accompany 
causation, and is indeed capable of originating intentions on its own account.  It is the 
autonomy of consciousness we implicitly invoke whenever we talk about 
‘conscientious behaviour’. 
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We can now see the kinship between intention, morality and meaning.  In each case, 
the term in question can be taken in a relative sense, so that what looks like morality, 
meaning and intention turns out to be but a manifestation of the amoral, the 
meaningless, the unintentional.  Or it can be taken in an authentic sense, with the 
implication that human beings because they are free to determine their own purposes 
can perform actions susceptible to moral judgment and live meaningful lives.  These 
two perspectives cannot easily be reconciled, so that we normally find ourselves 
alternating between them.  However, there have been some impressive philosophical 
attempts to bring them into some sort of synthesis, and one in particular can help 
throw light on stories such as ‘The Black Cat’ with their invocation of a fatality 
whose presence can be suspected but never detected.   
 
Man, according to Kant, has no experience of himself as subject but nonetheless 
draws the conclusion that all the inner phenomena which he can detect (emotions, 
memories etc.) must correspond to something non-phenomenal – and that this 
something, his non-phenomenal self, is free from the necessity which holds the 
phenomenal world together.  It is no good, of course, looking for this subject amongst 
phenomena: these relate only to one another and cannot reveal the noumenon which 
we are bound to think of as giving rise to them.  If, for example, we wish scientifically 
to investigate an allegedly wicked or meritorious action on the part of a human being, 
a chain of events in the phenomenal world is all we can hope to find.  But having 
gone so far as to hypothesize something in ourselves subsisting beyond the world of 
necessity and yet somehow affecting it, there is nothing to stop us making the same 
assumption with regard to the non-human world, and of attributing to it the same 
capacity for genuinely meaningful behaviour, especially when certain chronologically 
and topographically associated phenomena (like those which confront us in ‘The 
Black Cat’) would seem so apt to bear an intentional interpretation. 
 
Dergleichen Schluß muß der nachdenkende Mensch von allen Dingen, die ihm vorkommen 
mögen, fallen; vermutlich ist er auch im gemeinsten Verstande anzutreffen, der, wie bekannt, 
sehr geneigt ist, hinter den Gegenständen der Sinne noch immer etwas Unsichtbares, für sich 
selbst Tätiges zu erwarten, es aber wiederum dadurch verdirbt, daß er dieses Unsichtbare sich 
bald wiederum versinnlicht, d. i. zum Gegenstande der Anschauung machen will, und dadurch 
also nicht um einen Grad klüger wird. (Kant IV, 87) 
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What Kant here describes with reference to the noumenal in human beings holds good 
for the noumenal in the non-human world too.  In the former case we speak of a soul 
while being careful, if we heed Kant’s strictures, to refrain from conflating it with the 
phenomenal causes which are all that present themselves to the ‘Verstand’.  In the 
latter case we speak of ‘destiny’.  This too is not understood to be a force which 
perceptibly intervenes to change the course of events, but rather to work hand-in-
glove with events – and no more visibly present, indeed, than the hand inside the 
glove.  And we can see that the fantastic which relies on the coincidence of events to 
suggest a world of intention and meaning, such as we find in ‘The Black Cat’, accords 
perfectly both with this conception of destiny and with Kant’s admonitions.  The 
‘invisible intentional something’ never steps forth from behind a phenomenal tapestry 
every one of whose meshes seems wholly dependent on those around it. 
 
That there might be a supernatural perspective on the events in ‘The Black Cat’ is 
suggested not only by the coincidences referred to above and the narrator’s own 
qualms about them, but also by the evident morality which pervades the story.  We 
have seen that the traditional ghost story frequently associates a metaphysical realm of 
good and evil with the conventional supernatural: that ghosts return to avenge or do 
penance for wrongs, and that the challenge to naturalism is also very often a 
reinstatement of the morality which naturalism disputes.  And, but for the absence of 
any indisputably supernatural manifestation, ‘The Black Cat’ is faithful to this model.  
Indeed, Poe places great emphasis on the moral character of human beings, who, 
despite their apparent thraldom to the laws which govern the phenomenal world, are 
somehow free to originate and take responsibility for their acts.  The narrator is, by 
his own account, an alcoholic, but whereas a naturalist account might present drink as 
determining his behaviour, he refuses to accept that it mitigates his guilt in any way, 
and he attributes instead his execution-by-hanging of Pluto to perversity: to the desire, 
that is, to do evil for its own sake. ‘It was this unfathomable longing of the soul to vex 
itself, to offer violence to its own nature – to do wrong for the wrong’s sake only – 
that urged me to continue and finally to consummate the injury I had inflicted upon 
the unoffending brute.’ (Poe 1984, 599) So in this case the ‘intentional something’ 
that never shows its face but still manages to bring a murderer to the gallows would 
seem to be a just providence. 
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To sum up: the three stories which have provided the main focus of this discussion are 
acknowledged classics of the fantastic but they by no means exhaust the genre – as we 
have seen there are plenty of ghost-stories which make a point of leaving the door to 
naturalistic explanation ajar.  It may well be that writers such as Le Fanu accidentally 
hit upon the fantastic technique as just a further development of a policy present in 
virtually all effective ghost stories: the reduction of evidently supernatural elements to 
the barest minimum.  If Le Fanu goes one step further and introduces explicit and 
implicit disclaimers into his story, then not, we suggest, with the intention of seriously 
undermining its supernatural content, but rather with the intention of preserving that 
content from the sort of rational scrutiny which anything described as definitely 
present invites.  What ‘The Turn of the Screw’, ‘Der Sandmann’ and ‘The Black Cat’ 
all do to different degrees is increase the tension between belief and doubt (which for 
Le Fanu was but a precautionary inoculation against more determined scepticism) to a 
crisis, at the same time alerting us to the loss in terms of morality, meaning, 
intentionality which an absolute rejection of the supernatural entails.  Chapters III and 
IV will seek to demonstrate that the fantastic was employed by Mann as a very 
suitable vehicle for his deepest philosophical preoccupations – having to do with just 
such morality, meaning, intentionality – and that it is, in consequence, an appropriate 
perspective from which to view certain of his works.  But before we can tackle the 
interplay of Mann’s philosophical progress with his increasingly conscious and 
assured mastery of the fantastic we must demonstrate how much at a formal level Der 
Tod in Venedig has in common with the works we have so far discussed.  We cannot 
legitimately attempt to discover the purpose served by the fantastic in Mann’s novella 
until we have demonstrated its presence. 
 
The Supernatural Reading of Der Tod in Venedig 
 
The critic who wishes to propose Der Tod in Venedig as a work of the fantastic can 
find himself in an embarrassing position, because any fair description of it is bound to 
prompt the question: ‘How could it be other than a work of the fantastic?’  
Accordingly, we will not long detain the reader with a prima facie case which really 
makes itself, before going on to refute some of the presuppositions which have led 
critics away from a full apprehension of the presence and the function of fantastic 
elements – the possibly supernatural – in this work. And we will end this chapter with 
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an appreciation of a certain refinement of the fantastic technique which elevates 
Mann’s novella to one of the most accomplished exercises in this genre.    
 
The fantastic, as we have seen, requires that the reader hesitate between a supernatural 
and a natural interpretation of the events recounted in a short story, novel etc.  And we 
remember that there are two literary procedures which can be deployed to bring this 
hesitation about: on the one hand, that of first person narration with all the lack of 
reliability it entails; and on the other hand, that of the multiplication of coincidences 
to the point where they seem beyond mere coincidence.  Der Tod in Venedig is not, 
unlike ‘The Turn of the Screw’, narrated in the first person, although the question of 
the extent of the third-person narrator’s independence, in terms of thought and 
opinion, from the protagonist whose adventures he describes, is an interesting one 
which will have important consequences for our reception of the novella.  By contrast, 
there can be no doubt that the story is full of emphatic coincidences of a kind 
calculated to tempt us to conclude that they should be attributed to some sort of 
intentionality rather than to blind chance.  And in addition to the general impression 
that Aschenbach’s experiences in Munich and Venice relate to a world of significance 
and not just to the world of experience, there is a more definite supernatural 
hypothesis to be considered: that he is haunted and brought to his doom by entities 
capable of moving back and forth between natural and supernatural worlds. 
 
We are, of course, referring to the various strange figures which confront Aschenbach 
during his last few weeks of life.  The importance of their foreboding appearances is a 
commonplace of Mann scholarship, but it is our purpose to reconsider them in the 
context of the fantastic.  Right at the beginning of the novella Aschenbach is silently 
challenged by a man he spies standing on the steps of a chapel overlooking the 
Ungererstrasse in Munich: a pale-skinned, red-haired, freckled man with a snub-nose 
and all the accoutrements of the seasoned traveller. 
 
Erhobenen Hauptes, so daß an seinem hager dem losen Sporthemd entwachsenden Halse der 
Adamsapfel stark und nackt hervortrat, blickte er mit farblosen, rotbewimperten Augen, 
zwischen denen, sonderbar genug zu seiner kurz aufgeworfenen Nase passend, zwei senkrechte, 
energische Furchen standen, scharf spähend ins Weite.  So – und vielleicht trug sein erhöhter 
und erhöhender Standort zu diesem Eindruck bei – hatte seine Haltung etwas herrisch 
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Überschauendes, Kühnes oder selbst Wildes; denn sei es, dass es sich um eine dauernde 
physiognomische Entstellung handelte: seine Lippen schienen zu kurz, sie waren völlig von den 
Zähnen zurückgezogen, dergestalt, dass diese, bis zum Zahnfleisch bloßgelegt, weiß und lang 
dazwischen hervorbleckten. (2.1, 503) 
 
Now this stranger’s appearance and demeanour (he stares Aschenbach out of 
countenance when he catches the latter looking at him) are certainly very odd.  
Without definitely confirming a supernatural hypothesis regarding his character, 
origin and intentions, the description of him is none the less an unsettling one.  He is 
suddenly present on the steps of a chapel scrutinized by Aschenbach, who has none 
the less failed to detect his arrival and must supply with a supposition: ‘the stranger 
must have just emerged from the chapel interior,’ a fact he ought to have been able to 
observe. (2.1, 502)  From the first then, then, there is an air of mystery about the 
figure, and it is only deepened by his rather macabre appearance.  With his drawn-
back lips and protuberant teeth, his pale but red-freckled skin, his staring eyes with 
the deep grooves between them, he rather resembles Poe’s Red Death in the story of 
the same name.
46
  
 
In the course of Der Tod in Venedig Aschenbach encounters other disturbing 
apparitions, some of them strikingly similar to the first one.  Having arrived at the 
Piazza San Marco he hires a gondola to bring him to the steam-ship station from 
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 As a matter of fact Der Tod in Venedig shows the influence of ‘The Masque of the Red Death’.  The 
association of the disturbing figures (we have the impression it is really one figure under different 
guises, of course)  which cross Aschenbach’s path before the backdrop of a cholera epidemic, reflects 
the association between Poe’s personified Red Death and the disease of the same name raging outside 
Prince Prospero’s fortified monastery.  The incursion of the red-headed leader of the singing troupe – 
who reeks of the smell of carbolic disinfectant – into the Lido, an apparently safe redoubt of wealth and 
privilege, reflects the irruption of the supernatural Red Death amongst the guests at Prospero’s ball.  
And certain of Mann’s phrases echo those of Poe.  Of his fictional plague Poe writes, ‘The Red Death 
had long devastated the country.  No pestilence had ever been so fatal, or so hideous.  Blood was its 
Avatar and its seal – the redness and the horror of blood.  There were sharp pains and sudden dizziness, 
and then profuse bleeding at the pores, with dissolution[…]. And the whole seizure, progress and 
termination of the disease were the incidents of half an hour.’ (Poe 1984, 485)  Whereas of the cholera 
Mann writes, ‘Seit mehreren Jahren schon hatte die indische Cholera eine verstärkte Neigung zur 
Ausbreitung und Wanderung an den Tag gelegt[...]Binnen wenigen Stunden verdorrte der Kranke und 
erstickte am pechartig zähe gewordenen Blut unter Krämpfen und heiseren Klagen.’ (2.1, 578)  Nor is 
Der Tod in Venedig the only one of Mann’s works to reveal the influence of Poe.  That ‘The Fall of the 
House of Usher’ is one of the thematic models for Buddenbrooks should be obvious to anyone who 
reads the two works, each of which recounts the exhaustion of a family’s vitality, coupled with an 
increase in its artistic sensitivity, until final extinction and ruin intervene: Poe’s short story is expressly 
referred to in Mann’s novel.  And the early story ‘Der Wille zum Glück’ (in which the protagonist, a 
mortally ill shadow of a man, hangs on to a semblance of life until he has managed to savour the 
happiness of love – whereupon he dies) is a variation on Poe’s ‘The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar’.   
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which he will take board for the Lido.  The gondolier who accepts him as a passenger, 
however, sets out directly for the Lido across the lagoon with his fare and gruffly 
refuses to yield to Aschenbach’s repeated demands that he return to Venice.  He is 
described in these terms:  
 
Es war ein Mann von ungefälliger, ja brutaler Physiognomie[…]Seine Gesichtsbildung, sein 
blonder, lockiger Schnurrbart unter der kurz aufgeworfenen Nase ließen ihn durchaus nicht 
italienischen Schlages erscheinen.[…]Ein paarmal zog er vor Anstrengung die Lippen zurück 
und entblößte seine weißen Zähne.  Die rötlichen Brauen gerunzelt, blickte er über den Gast 
hinweg. (2.1, 524-5) 
 
Evidently this is not exactly the same person seen on the chapel steps, but just as 
evidently the two have plenty in common in terms of appearance and demeanour.  
And the gondolier is a peculiar enough figure on his own account: his gruff, 
threatening manner, in particular, is difficult to understand in one reliant for his 
livelihood on the customer’s good-will.  Once, however, the gondola does arrive 
safely at the Lido the gondolier in fear, apparently, that the authorities on the island 
are about to prosecute him for practising his trade without a license makes off before 
Aschenbach – who has to go in search of change – can pay him.  His disappearance, 
like the appearance of the man on the chapel steps, is not inexplicable in naturalistic 
terms, and indeed a naturalistic explanation for it is given.  But the very fact that the 
story dwells on the matter (of no moment to the plot of Der Tod in Venedig at all) 
suggests another significance: that the gondolier does not take money because money 
was never his object, and that the debt to which he has made sinister allusion (‘Sie 
werden bezahlen’) must be paid in some other fashion.47  
 
Towards the end of the novel a third such figure appears: the leader of a troupe of 
street-singers.  And in this case, the terms used to describe him do not limit 
themselves to a general similarity to those used to describe the man on the chapel 
steps.  They are for whole phrases together the same. 
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 The gondolier is not the only one of his characters to signal his mysteriousness by refusing payment 
for wayfaring services: the ‘Mann auf dem Felde’ who leads Joseph and the Ismaeliten to Egypt 
disappears after bringing them to their goal. ‘Genug, als man sich zufällig nach ihm umsah, war er 
nicht mehr vorhanden, wohl aber das Kamel mit der Glocke, auf dem er geritten, und seinen Lohn hatte 
der Mann beim Alten nicht eingehoben.’ (IV, 711) 
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Dem weichen Kragen des Sporthemdes, das er zu übrigens städtischer Kleidung trug, entwuchs 
sein hagerer Hals mit auffallend groß und nackt wirkendem Adamsapfel.  Sein bleiches, 
stumpfnäsiges Gesicht, aus dessen bartlosen Zügen schwer auf sein Alter zu schließen war, 
schien durchpflügt von Grimassen und Laster, und sonderbar wollten zum Grinsen seines 
beweglichen Mundes die beiden Furchen passen, die trotzig, herrisch, fast wild zwischen seinen 
rötlichen Brauen standen. (2.1, 573) 
 
Now, if we bear in mind such stories as ‘Der Sandmann’ and ‘The Black Cat’, we can 
recognize that Mann is here employing an established fantastic technique – a variant 
on the coincidence theme, whereby what appears to be very nearly the same person or 
animal (but which must, if we take the naturalistic view of the matter, be quite distinct 
persons or animals chancing to have certain features in common with one another) 
makes multiple appearances.  In the Hoffmann story Nathanael, having, as he thinks, 
put the dreadful Coppelius and his machinations behind him, encounters an Italian 
lens-polisher going by the name of Coppola who, though he speaks with an 
outrageous Italian accent, bears a strong resemblance to his near namesake.  In the 
Poe story the protagonist, having mutilated and finally hanged his pet cat Pluto, 
discovers another cat identical in all respects to the first, except for a white mark on 
its chest which eventually takes the form of a gallows.  Similarly in Der Tod in 
Venedig various figures of strikingly similar appearance, all brutal and impulsive in 
manner, all strangers to the place in which they are encountered (‘nicht 
Bajuwarischen Schlages’, ‘nicht Venezianischen Schlages’ etc.), confront 
Aschenbach at different moments of his adventure.  And though Aschenbach does 
not, as Nathanael and the protagonist of ‘The Black Cat’ do, make a direct connection 
between them – that is, the third person narration never allows us to overhear 
Aschenbach thinking: ‘just who or what are these pale-skinned, emaciated figures?’ – 
the impression they make on the reader is that of a supernatural conspiracy.
48
 
 
As has been remarked by many Mann scholars, the apparitions bear the insignia of the 
pagan deity Hermes (staff and hat) as well as being associated with travel in various 
ways (the man on the chapel steps is in walking-dress, the gondolier navigates for a 
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 Aschenbach only once makes an explicit connection between the apparitions and his predicament.  
‘Er erinnerte sich eines weißen Bauwerks, geschmückt mit abendlich gleißenden Inschriften, in deren 
durchscheinender Mystik das Auge seines Geistes sich verloren hatte; jener seltsamen Wanderergestalt 
sodann, die dem Alternden schweifende Jünglingssehnsucht ins Weite und Fremde erweckt hatte.’ (2.1, 
581)  At the actual time of the encounter between the man on the chapel steps and Aschenbach, the 
latter does not, apparently, associate the former with his ‘Wanderlust’.   
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living, the leader of the troupe of street performers is an itinerant).  Now it is common 
knowledge that pagan deities are supposed to enjoy the power of impersonation, and 
Mann seems to have been particularly intrigued by the prospect of a supernatural 
being which can assume any identity at will.  That would account for much of the 
delight he took in Kleist’s play Amphitryon.49  In the lecture Mann dedicates to it he 
pays particular attention to the role of Hermes (referred to by an adaptation of his 
Roman name, Merkur, throughout the play), who impersonates Sosias the slave in 
order to perform two important functions.
 50
   The one function is that of pander in 
Jupiter’s service, for it is the false Sosias who persuades Charis to drop her bourgeois 
scruples and who makes vice ‘bequem und liebenswürdig’ to her. (IX, 190) The other 
is that of an improvisational creator of the very drama the audience witnesses: ‘Dieser 
feige und drollige Kauz ist ein Dramatiker.’ (IX, 191) That is, he both organizes much 
of the action and heralds (in accordance with his traditional duty) the significance of 
what is going on.  It is surely not hard to see that the Hermes-like figures in Der Tod 
in Venedig play (or seem to) a similar role vis-à-vis Aschenbach: on the one hand by 
seducing him into an exotic adventure and undermining his sense of bourgeois 
propriety, on the other hand by marking the significance of the various stages of that 
adventure.  The role of seducer, trickster and subtle herald does not, of course, 
exhaust the functions of Hermes: there is traditionally a beneficent and educative side 
to him which often works harmoniously with his more infuriating characteristics.
51
  
But that is a matter we intend to address later.  For the moment it is enough to note 
that Mann was familiar with and almost ecstatically enthusiastic about a work in 
which there is no question as to the reality of supernatural entities (Amphitryon is a 
marvellous work, according to Todorov’s classification) and of their ability – having 
adopted mortal guise – to alter the course of human affairs.  
 
The justice of the statement with which we began this chapter: that in order to make 
the case for Der Tod in Venedig as a fantastic work one need only describe it fairly – 
should now be obvious.  The ‘strong’ supernatural explanation for Aschenbach’s 
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 The intensity of Mann’s enthusiasm for Amphitryon can be gauged from such declarations as this: 
‘[…]das Gesetzmäßige in dem Verhältnis meiner Natur zu diesem Gegenstande hat sich bewährt: ich 
bin entzückt, ich glühe.  Das ist das witzig-anmutsvollste, das geistreichste, das tiefste und schönste 
Theaterspielwerk der Welt.’ (IX, 187) 
50
 First given as lecture in 1927, but attesting to a long familiarity with the play. 
51
 For example, Plato has Hermes deliver Zeus’ beneficent laws to mankind in ‘Protagoras’.  (322-323) 
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adventure is as unmistakeable as it is rarely articulated:
52
 he is being harried by an 
other-worldly entity in the way Nathanael in ‘Der Sandmann’ feels himself to be – an 
other-worldly entity we are tempted to identify with Hermes but which need not 
wholly coincide with that figure of legend.
53
  But just as we did in the case of ‘The 
Black Cat’ we can contrast the ‘strong’ supernatural hypothesis with a ‘weak’ one, 
whereby the man on the chapel steps, the gondolier, and the leader of the singing 
troupe are not incarnations of a traditionally conceived supernatural force but would 
prove, could we but examine their lives in more detail, fully human beings who, 
despite being strangers to Munich and Venice respectively, could boast established 
identities and flesh-and-blood relationships in their societies of origin.
54
  In this case 
we must conceive coincidence as the sign of a more diffusely present intention behind  
the universe of the senses – Kant’s ‘etwas Unsichtbares für sich selbst Tätiges’ – 
undetectable at a cause-and-effect level but susceptible to that instinctive 
apprehension which the narrator of ‘The Black Cat’ finds such a burden.  By this 
account it would be destiny which conducts Aschenbach to an end that seems to be 
signalled at every turn.  Signalled not by the Hermes-like figures alone, but by a host 
of minor characters, incidents and objects – ranging from the aged and effeminate 
dandy on the ship which conveys Aschenbach to Venice, to the mix-up with the 
luggage which keeps him there, to the prominence and frequency of the red-coloured 
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 Hans-Joachim Sandberg comes close (though remaining chary, like most Mann scholars, of the word 
‘supernatural’): ‘Auf der mythologischen Ebene läßt der Autor in Einklang mit der von Euripides 
dargestellten Strategie den Gott sich verkleiden.  Aschenbach, der mit Blindheit geschlagen 
‘Schauende’, ist selbst außerstande, die Identität des Gottes in allen jenen Gestalten wahrzunehmen, in 
denen dieser ihm in den Weg tritt.’ (Sandberg 1991, 109)  
53
 Dierks places more emphasis on the Dionysian than on the Hermetic attributes of the apparitions, 
even disputing that the hat of the man on the chapel steps (πέταςος) is an exclusively Hermetic symbol: 
‘Seine von Thomas Mann beabsichtigte Beziehung zum einwandernden Dionysos muß aber nicht 
ausgeschlossen werden.’ (Dierks 1972, 25) Bernd Kraske, by contrast, suggests that Dionysos – though 
the power behind the apparitions – is never himself manifest in Der Tod in Venedig: ‘Die Hermes und 
Charongestalten[…]sind Werkzeuge und Kumpane des fremden Gottes.  Sie locken und führen 
Aschenbach nach Venedig, dem Ort seines Untergangs.’ (Kraske 1997, 96) Without pretending to a 
final adjudication in the matter we might point out that it is possible to regard the apparitions as 
Hermes alone, but a Hermes whose brutal and impulsive nature reflects both the supernatural entity: 
Dionysos, and the metaphysical force: the ‘Wille’, in whose service he performs his duty as an agent 
and herald.  Even within the confines of Der Tod in Venedig, however, Hermes is not associated 
exclusively with such impulsive and instinctive forces.  He is also associated with a Platonic empyrean, 
the perfection and beauty of which he manifests in the guise of Tadzio psychopompos.  Hermes, that is, 
takes his attributes from the master he happens to be serving. 
54
 Although these two hypotheses do indeed contrast they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  We 
can take Nathanael’s word for it that Coppelius is the devil in disguise, all the while noting that the 
latter is abetted in the accomplishment of his wicked ends by apparently chance events which we are 
not obliged to attribute to any machinations of his.   
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articles (red hat-bands, red pomegranate juice, red strawberries etc.) which fill the 
narrative.
55
 
 
The ‘Symbolic’ Objection 
 
That, then, is the case for the role of the supernatural in Der Tod in Venedig.  What 
are the alternatives?  The most obvious is that the story lists a series of authentically – 
and not just phenomenally – unrelated coincidences, and that the third-person narrator 
although formally distinct from Aschenbach is actually retailing the events of the 
story as filtered through the protagonist’s sensibility.  However, a third possibility has 
been advanced by Terence J. Reed.  Here is how he puts the matter in The Uses of 
Tradition: ‘The psychological process is converted into an apparently fated course, it 
is realized in symbolic figures and motifs.  This is not to say that fate in any other 
sense than the psychological is being seriously put forward as the reality of 
Aschenbach’s death.’ (Reed 1996, 173)  And here is how he phrases the same idea in 
his single-volume study of Der Tod in Venedig: ‘All this[…]is a message to the reader 
rather than to Aschenbach.  That remains largely true for the rest of the story: 
Aschenbach will only feel the disturbing effect of his experiences at the immediate 
level; he will notice the disturbing episodes and figures accumulate but will not see 
them as signs, much less glimpse the pattern they constitute.’ (Reed 1994, 31)  Reed, 
then, is not saying that the figures are hallucinations or chance encounters worked up 
by an over-imaginative protagonist into a psychodrama.  But he forbids us from 
concluding that they are supernatural beings as traditionally conceived or part of a 
more general noumenal plan.  So what does he contend?  Is he suggesting that Der 
Tod in Venedig is an allegory – that the meaning of the novella was conceived before 
Mann ever set pen to paper, and that the strange events it recounts are not to be taken 
literally, but should rather be understood as a direct communication between Mann 
and the reader with no bearing on the novella’s fictional reality?   
 
The matter is important because, as we have seen, deviations from naturalism can be 
accounted for in terms of the supernatural or in terms of allegory.  In the first case, we 
                                                 
55
 Partially explicable in terms of the allusion to Poe’s Red Death, though red – in particular red hair – 
seems to have unsettling implications in much of Mann’s fiction: the sinister Gerda von Rinnlingen in 
‘Der Kleine Herr Friedemann’, for example, has red hair, as does Sammiel in Doktor Faustus. 
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look for an agent within the fiction’s imagined world to account for the violation of 
naturalism, in the second case we understand that this agent lies outside that fictional 
world – is the author, in fact.  Once we decide for allegory, the flouting of naturalistic 
norms ceases to be a matter of wonder and we devote our attention to divining the 
evaluative concept to which those norms are made to yield.
56
  An allegorical 
interpretation of Der Tod in Venedig, then, is a threat to the fantastic interpretation 
because it eliminates altogether the supernatural ingredient indispensable if the 
fantastic is to gain any purchase.   And the threat is all the more pressing in the light 
of Mann’s undoubted penchant for abstract thinking, for it is quite clear that many of 
his works – especially amongst the short stories – are exercises in various kinds of 
intellectual and philosophical discipline.  For example, the early short story ‘Tobias 
Mindernickel’ is an exercise in Nietzschean thinking (Mindernickel’s apparently 
kindly treatment of a wounded dog is shown to be a form of power-hunger) and the 
novella ‘Die vertauschten Köpfe’ is an exercise in Schopenhauerian thinking.57 On the 
other hand, neither of these stories is allegorical: it is one thing for a writer to impose 
on a story a perspective which is not necessarily his own, in the same spirit he might 
impose on it the rules of a particular genre, and quite another to make of it the vehicle 
for an evaluative concept.  Mann is generally reluctant to subordinate his fiction to so 
simple a scheme, and even when naturalism is openly defied in his works (as it is in 
‘Die vertauschten Köpfe’) we search in vain for the kind of determined meaning 
which allegory serves.   
 
In the light of all this, it is certain that Der Tod in Venedig is not an allegory.  On the 
one hand, no didactic programme seems to intervene in the novella’s Venice, and it 
would, indeed, be hard to find a work of fiction so thoroughly ambiguous in terms of 
a controlling concept.  This is not to dispute that we can infer a meaning from it; 
indeed it will be the purpose of the next chapter to determine what that meaning might 
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 To return to our example: once we grasp that the ‘Olympia’ interlude serves an allegorical purpose 
we cease to wonder why nobody (not just Nathanael) who meets this crude automaton recognizes it for 
what it is.  
57
 Given that Schopenhauer owes so much to eastern mysticism, Mann no doubt felt that it was 
appropriate to make an Indian folk-tale a vehicle for his philosophy.  As soon as we read that ‘man 
kann von Nirwânâ nur in Verneinungen reden’ (VIII, 719) we know whose doctrine animates the 
narrative, and when we hear Kali addressed in these terms: ‘Anfangslose, die vor allen Entstandenen 
war!  Mutter ohne Mann, deren Kleid niemand hebt!  Lust- und schreckensvoll Allumfangende, die du 
wieder einschlürfst alle Welten und Bilder, die aus dir quillen,’ (VIII, 747) we know which 
metaphysical force she personifies. 
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be.  But no analytic effort on our part can hope to exhaust Der Tod in Venedig’s 
potential for further interpretation, whereas the meaning of the ‘Olympia’ allegory is 
as blatant as it is definitive.  And on the other hand, the rules of naturalism are never 
unambiguously defied in Der Tod in Venedig – any more than they are in ‘The Black 
Cat’.  In Mann’s novella, just as in Poe’s story, there is an accumulation of 
coincidences which suggest to us the possibility of some kind of supernatural 
intervention.  But both stories are careful not to flout the laws of nature, nor do they 
set at nothing the usual psychology of human beings.   
 
But though Der Tod in Venedig is not a work of allegory, Reed still feels that the 
Hermes-figures and all the other events which apparently conspire to bring about 
Aschenbach’s death are to be understood as realizing purely psychological forces 
within him, despite the fact that they are not, still according to Reed, the result of 
those forces.  But how can the hypothesis: ‘Aschenbach’s decline and fall is 
exclusively psychologically determined’ be in any way realized by a narrative which 
shows that, unbeknownst to the protagonist at the time, he is stimulated to take his 
journey to Venice at the subliminal suggestion of a freakish-looking stranger, and that 
he would have left Venice in good time – though with a heavy heart, it is true – if his 
luggage had not gone astray?  If these details of the narrative are not to be traced back 
to Aschenbach’s own psychology, then they must offer support for an alternative to 
the psychological explanation.
58
  And to say that the Hermes-figures and all the other 
suspicious-looking incidents in Der Tod in Venedig are a realization of Aschenbach’s 
state of mind without being in some way the product of that state of mind is to say 
that one of two mutually exclusive alternatives, the supernatural and the natural, can 
‘realize’ the other. 
 
It would be well to remember that though Der Tod in Venedig carries an 
extraordinarily heavy burden of cultural reference, its genesis lies in Mann’s own 
experiences.
59
  It is these, and not a definitive judgment on them, which he transferred 
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 Surely the most obvious way to realize the notion that Aschenbach’s destiny is the product of his 
own psychology would be to demonstrate that such was the case by, for example, giving a naturalistic 
account of his state of mind and its impact on his behaviour and choices.  The phenomenal is as such 
real, and nothing can be added to its factuality by clothing it in symbolic garb. 
59‘Im “Tod in Venedig” [ist] nichts erfunden: Der Wanderer am Münchener Nordfriedhof, das düstere 
Polesaner Schiff, der greise Geck, der verdächtige Gondolier, Tadzio und die seinen, die durch 
Gepäckverwechslung mißglückte Abreise, die Cholera, der ehrliche Clerc im Reisebureau, der 
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from the real Venice he knew to Aschenbach’s fictional one: and the reason that he 
made of such experiences the nucleus of his story is that they struck him as 
meaningful.  Schooled as he was by the nay-saying, psychologizing Nietzsche, he of 
course knew full well that the naturalist view of such ‘meaning’ was that it was the 
accidental product of various meaningless phenomenal forces (biology, social 
conditioning, habitual brain activity) – but to take the naturalist view exclusively 
would be to dispute his own motive for writing the novella at all.  We remember that 
fiction which on the one hand falls short of strict naturalism (and naturalism’s 
insistence that human beings are nothing more than cause-and-effect creatures, as 
insusceptible to legitimate moral criticism as a caterpillar or a stone), and on the other 
hand deals with the close interplay of human beings, has no difficulty in accepting as 
meaningful the account it gives.  After all, it is a universal custom to attribute to men 
and women the moral autonomy and intentionality which naturalism would deny 
them, and to grant them such an autonomy is to make a meaningful evaluation of their 
behaviour possible.  But Aschenbach’s adventure is not of this kind.  During the 
whole course of the novella we never witness the give-and-take of conversation or the 
emergence of distinct personalities, so that the protagonist, though surrounded by 
people, seems infinitely alone.  That is, human beings are no more than links in a 
chain of experiences for Aschenbach and hardly to be distinguished from non-human 
ones.  There is no question of the meaning which emanates from fully human fictional 
beings like, say, the most prominent members of the Buddenbrook family, emerging 
from the bit players in Aschenbach’s adventure.60  When we read Der Tod in Venedig 
we must seek meaning where Mann himself felt its presence during the Venetian 
                                                                                                                                            
bösartige Bänkelsänger oder was sonst anzuführen wäre – alles war gegeben, war eigentlich nur 
einzustellen und erwies dabei aufs verwunderlichste seine kompositionelle Deutungsfähigkeit.’ (XI, 
124)  
60
 Richard Sheppard in an article on Buddenbrooks published in the The Modern Language Review 
notes precisely the same improbable plethora of apparent coincidence along with the presence of 
characters who seem to be supernatural agents in disguise that we have noted in Der Tod in Venedig.  
Grünlich, Sheppard suggest, might be regarded as ‘a descendant of the Green Huntsman of Germanic 
mythology: that is, the Devil,’ (Sheppard 1994, 926) and various other figures are seen as portending 
(Klothilde) or as surreptitiously promoting (Gerda – another sinister red-head, we might add) the 
family’s destined collapse.  But in every case we notice that though these characters are vivid enough 
apparitions they are not really known to us as people, so that their meaning (unlike that of Tony, 
Thomas and Hanno) emanates not from the play of free personalities but rather from the supernatural 
as traditionally conceived or from that noumenal substrate of intention so well described by Kant.  In 
other words, Buddenbrooks and Der Tod in Venedig have a good deal in common, and Sheppard is 
quite right to emphasize the continuity between Mann’s first novel and his later works in respect of the 
supernatural.   
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sojourn which gave rise to the novella: as somehow at work behind the phenomenal 
world at large. 
 
The reason we devote so much time to Reed’s position is not to refute the views of 
this particular scholar, for the tendency to write-off the potentially supernatural as a 
mere symbolic realization of the natural is widespread amongst Mann critics – though 
few engage with the notion as explicitly as Reed does in the passages we have 
quoted.
61
  And it is just because the tendency is widespread that it deserves a proper 
analysis.  The ‘symbolic’ reading of Der Tod in Venedig tacitly accuses Mann of a 
kind of redundancy, not to say insincerity – its implication being that, convinced as he 
was that the naturalist account of human beings and their activities was the be-all and 
end-all, he was prepared nonetheless to clothe the phenomenal truth in a vestment of 
illusory meaning which he knew could never fit it and of which we, the readers, are 
supposed to strip it.  If Mann, so such a reading gives us to understand, adds to the 
tale of Aschenbach’s psychologically determined self-destruction a surfeit of 
symbolic details, then not to bring to our attention an alternative to the phenomenal 
account in which the author really believes, but only to conduct us by a devious route 
back to that same phenomenal account.  ‘Leitmotif’ as ‘Ab-’ and ‘Umleitmotif’, as it 
were. 
 
The Supernatural and the Metaphysical 
 
The truth is that there is considerable reluctance amongst certain Mann critics to 
acknowledge the supernatural as such in his works.  Reed’s reaction to the apparition 
of Joachim’s ghost in Der Zauberberg is unmistakeably hostile: ‘Allegory has taken 
over to the point of doing violence to the surface realism which carries it.  Nowhere in 
Mann’s work is the manipulation of reality to make an argument less acceptable.’62  
                                                 
61
 A sort of critical elision is in play.  Instead of taking immediate cognizance of the possibly 
supernatural elements in his fiction, Mann scholars often limit themselves to noting that such elements 
are the result of Mann’s decision to include them.  They are the result of such a decision, obviously, but 
this is no more true of the ambiguously supernatural than of the unambiguously natural in his fiction.  
But whereas Aschenbach is accepted as integral to Der Tod in Venedig’s fictional world, the 
ambiguously supernatural is understood as being in principle extrinsic to it. 
62
 (Reed 1996, 266) Herwig makes a point of answering the accusation: ‘Die Erscheinung Joachims 
während der Séance mußte auch von der Leserschaft der zwanziger Jahre nicht unbedingt in dem Maße 
als Verletzung des Oberflächenrealismus durch übertriebenes Allegorisieren rezipiert werden.’ (Herwig 
2004, 130) 
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Once again, it is important that we understand that Reed is hardly alone in this distaste 
for the supernatural.  Indeed, it is so widespread that it sometimes seems that the very 
word ‘supernatural’ is taboo, and that other less offensive alternatives are always to be 
preferred.  One such alternative is ‘myth’, and it is quite true that many of the 
ambiguously supernatural figures who haunt Mann’s fiction can be identified with 
figures recognizable from pagan religions – for example the Hermes-like visitants in 
Der Tod in Venedig.
63
  But merely to designate them as mythical is to evade the 
question of their status within Mann’s fictional reality, because the term can mean two 
opposite things.  It can mean myth exposed: the allegedly supernatural entities 
accepted by certain individuals and societies as a force to be reckoned with do not 
exist except as elements of individual and group psychology.  Or it can mean myth 
believed: those same entities are more than just elements of group and individual 
psychology and are indeed a force to be reckoned with.  It is only the latter definition 
which allows ‘myth’ to function as an alternative to naturalism, while ‘myth’ taken in 
the former sense actually constitutes the naturalistic, psychological explanation of Der 
Tod in Venedig.  It is, of course, the term’s very ambiguity which commends it to 
critics chary of the obvious contrary to natural explanation – which is to say: 
supernatural explanation. 
 
All this would be dubious enough if Mann were a defiant naturalist.  After all 
numerous writers of ghost stories have avowed their scepticism vis-à-vis their own 
subject matter.
64
  This does not, however, entitle us to write off every emergence of 
the supernatural in their works as the mere ‘realization’ of the phenomenal forces 
which their authors swear by in real life.  But, as a matter of fact, Mann was far from 
being a hardened sceptic with regard to the supernatural, as a perusal of his essay 
‘Okkulte Erlebnisse’ demonstrates.  In it he, evidently half humorously, declares, ‘Es 
ist nicht anders: ich bin den Okkultisten in die Hände gefallen’, (15.1, 612) but his 
more considered opinions are scarcely less compromising for those who would read 
his works as ‘naturalism plus disguised naturalism’. 
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 The index to The Uses of Tradition lists twenty entries under ‘myth’ and not a single one under 
‘supernatural’. 
64
 H.G. Wells is an outstanding example. 
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Was mich betrifft, so hatte ich Zeit meines Lebens in Fragen des Okkultismus theoretisch 
ziemlich weit ‘links’ gestanden, hatte also, im Sinn jenes weitergehenden Skeptizismus, das 
Verschiedenste für möglich gehalten, ohne mich übrigens persönlich irgendwelcher 
Erfahrungen auf dem Gebiet des Übersinnlichen rühmen zu können. (15.1, 619) 
 
He then retails – we may feel rather credulously – his experiences at a séance held in 
the house of one Baron von Schrenck, at which, after various disappointments and a 
final agonizing struggle, the supernatural manifests itself in the form of a 
handkerchief and other knick-knacks animated by an unseen hand!
65
  And he 
mentions that the supernatural is to be understood as an emanation of the 
metaphysical, though he seems uncertain what kind of metaphysics might be in play.  
Is it a value-free Schopenhauerian Wille as suggested by the flattering reference to 
Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung? (15.1, 613)  Or is it rather a Platonic empyrean as 
suggested by such phrases as, ‘Man ruft, mit anderem Worte, einen Hilfsbegriff von 
platonischem Zauber, nicht ohne schmeichelhafte Eigenschaften für das Ohr des 
Künstlers, der schnell bereit sein wird, nicht nur sein eigenes Handwerk, sondern auch 
die gesamte Wirklichkeit als ideoplastisches Phänomen zu deuten’? (15.1, 614)   Or is 
it, again, a Hegelian ‘Geist’? 
 
Es war Hegel, der gesagt hat, daß die Idee, der Geist als letzte Quelle anzusehen sei, aus der alle 
Erscheinungen fließen; und diesen Satz zu beweisen, ist die supranormale Physiologie vielleicht 
geschickter als die normale – ja, sie unternimmt es, den philosophischen Beweis des Primats der 
Idee, des ideellen Ursprungs alles Wirklichen neben den biologischen von der Einheit der 
organischen Substanz zu stellen. (15.1, 649-50) 
 
We shall return to the vexed question of Mann’s attempts to negotiate the competing 
claims of various philosophers in the next chapter.  At this point in the argument it is 
enough to acknowledge the attested fact that he took the supernatural seriously in life 
and that he strongly associated it with metaphysics.  Irrespective of the character of 
the metaphysical realm, the supernatural as traditionally understood (objects that seem 
to move themselves in the case of the ‘Okkulte Erlebnisse’) is an extension of that 
realm into the phenomenal world.  He is well aware that this is in defiance of all 
                                                 
65
 (15.1, 638)  Mann fictionalized his experiences at the séance in the ‘Fragwürdigstes’ chapter of Der 
Zauberberg, in which the role of the real-life Willi S. is taken by Ellen Brand, that of Mann himself by 
Hans Castorp, and where the equivalent of the animated handkerchief, bell, musical-box and what-not 
is Joachim’s ghost. 
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reason – aware, that is, of the problematic status of the supernatural we considered 
earlier – but identifies that problematic character as its peculiar attraction: that the 
supernatural seems to promise a phenomenal confirmation of a metaphysical truth.  
‘Noch einmal möchte ich, gereckten Halses, die Magennerven angerührt von 
Absurdität, das Unmögliche sehen, das dennoch geschieht.’ (15.1, 652)  
 
The Naturalist Interpretation  
 
To repeat, the only reasonable counter to the supernatural reading of Der Tod in 
Venedig is a naturalist one.  And as good a case as can be made for the naturalist 
hypothesis has been mounted by Ritchie Robertson in an essay entitled ‘Classicism 
and its Pitfalls’.  In it he outlines an interpretation parallel to that developed by certain 
critics of ‘The Turn of the Screw’ – notably Edmund Wilson in his 1934 essay ‘The 
Ambiguity of Henry James’.66  Wilson sums up his ‘Freudian’ view of ‘The Turn of 
the Screw’ thus: 
 
[…]we are inclined to conclude[…]that the story is primarily intended as a characterization of 
the Governess: her sombre and guilty visions and the way she behaves about them seem to 
present, from the moment we examine them from the obverse side of her narrative, an accurate 
and distressing picture of the poor country parson’s daughter, with her English middle-class 
class-consciousness, her inability to admit to herself her natural sexual impulses[…]Remember, 
also, in this connection, the peculiar psychology of Governesses, who, by reason of their 
isolated position between the family and the servants, are likely to become ingrown and morbid. 
67
 
                                                 
66
As a matter of fact the two stories have a good deal in common beyond their fantastic ambiguity.  In 
both cases the protagonist is isolated from his or her usual social context (the Governess at Bly, 
Aschenbach in Venice), in both cases there is a suggestion of frustrated sexuality (the Governess has a 
crush on the absent Master of the house, Aschenbach has lost his wife and found no replacement), in 
both cases the protagonist idolizes and yearns for a child or adolescent of a particular stamp.  Compare, 
for example, Aschenbach’s infatuation with Tadzio with the Governess’s idolization of Miles: ‘I 
remember feeling with Miles in especial as if he had had, as it were, no history.  We expect of a small 
child a scant one, but there was in this beautiful little boy something extraordinarily sensitive, yet 
extraordinarily happy, that, more than in any creature of his age I have seen, struck me as beginning 
anew each day[…]Of course I was under the spell, and the wonderful part is that, even at the time, I 
perfectly knew I was.’ (Henry James 1996, 657) Both Aschenbach and the Governess are prepared to 
endanger their loved one in order to remain in possession of him – Aschenbach refuses to alert the 
Polish family to the presence of the cholera in Venice, the Governess actually helps bring about Miles’ 
death by forcing him to confront the ghost she is sure he is aware of.  And it is hard to overlook the 
physical similarity between Quint (red-haired, pale-skinned, and with an unmistakeable air of 
challenge) and the apparition on the chapel steps who grimaces so menacingly at Aschenbach.  
67
 (Wilson 1952) Brooke-Rose’s highly critical response to Wilson forms the nucleus of  ‘ “The Turn of 
the Screw” and its Critics’ which details the apparent inability of many critics to refrain, when 
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And here, by comparison, is how Robertson explains the apparitions which confront 
Aschenbach: 
 
In Death in Venice, ‘mythic’ experience is shown by the sceptical narrator to be projected onto 
his actual experience by the increasingly enraptured Aschenbach.  If a day on the beach is 
‘strangely exalted and mythically transformed’, that is because his view of Tadzio colours his 
view of the scene around him.  The wanderers who cross Aschenbach’s path likewise derive 
their disturbing aura from his emotional projections. Not only are these figures wanderers, like 
Aschenbach, but they also share some of his traits: the slight build, the loose mouth and the 
short nose.  They represent the unacknowledged and unwelcome shadow-side of Aschenbach 
himself, the rootless, bohemian aspect which he has done his best to repress.  Jung has shown 
that the heightened sensibility accompanying a mid-life crisis can generate precisely such 
visionary embodiments of psychic forces.  (Robertson 2002, 101) 
 
It is not, of course, necessary that we accept Freud’s authority as Wilson does, or 
Jung’s as Robertson does, in order to grasp that a psychological explanation of some 
kind is necessary in the case of the ghosts at Bly, and highly appealing in the case of 
the apparitions in Venice.  If the ghosts are not, in point of fact, supernatural entities 
intent on corrupting two children in order to perpetuate their wickedness beyond the 
grave, then they must by some means or other be the product of the Governess’s 
psychology.  And as we are indeed informed that she is sexually and romantically 
inexperienced, (Henry James 1996, 639) easily ‘carried away’, (644) and has a rather 
melodramatic notion of sinfulness, (648) a possible connection between the 
Governess’s state-of-mind and her experiences is hard to overlook.  By the same 
token, if the apparitions in Der Tod in Venedig have no objective significance – if 
they are neither the impersonations of a pagan deity nor phenomenal indications of a 
noumenal destiny – then we have to ascribe their presence in the novella either to a 
string of unlikely coincidences or to Aschenbach’s peculiar perspective.  And as we 
are informed that he is a man who has reached the verge of exhaustion, (2.1, 501) has 
sacrificed his life to the struggle for literary creation, (512) and is a lonely widower, 
(515) and given, furthermore, that as a writer he is bound to possess abnormal powers 
of imagination, a possible connection between Aschenbach’s state-of-mind and his 
                                                                                                                                            
confronted by fantastic fiction, from deciding for a naturalist or supernatural reading (usually the 
former). (Brooke-Rose 1981, 128-157) 
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experiences is equally hard to overlook.  Such indications that a psychological 
explanation might be available for the apparently supernatural in the two novellas are 
clearly not accidental.  Both James and Mann are keen to maintain the feasibility of a 
naturalist interpretation for ‘The Turn of the Screw’ and for Der Tod in Venedig 
respectively, so that if we are determined to read these works in a non-supernatural 
fashion we can find justification in the authors’ evident intentions.    
 
There are, however, obvious objections to be made against both Wilson’s and 
Robertson’s approach.  In the first place, if we are ready to set store by authorial 
intention as expressed through the text itself, then we are obliged to recognize that 
both James and Mann seem as inclined to promote the supernatural as they are the 
naturalist understanding of these stories.  The argument outlined earlier against 
Reed’s ‘symbolic’ reading is just as valid in countering a purely naturalistic reading: 
if either author had intended his fiction to be read in a spirit of untroubled naturalism 
then why did he introduce material which could only weaken such an interpretation?  
In the case of ‘The Turn of the Screw’, the prima facie case for a supernatural 
interpretation is so strong that it hardly occurred to a whole generation of readers to 
regard it as other than a ghost story.  But even now, when the countervailing case for 
a naturalistic reading of the novella has become common knowledge, we should not 
forget that the Governess’s account of a supernatural adventure is neither self-
contradictory nor refuted by anybody else.
68
  We can, on the strength of her own 
admissions, make the case that she is prone to delusions, but we cannot with justice 
convict her whole account on the strength of suspicion alone.  If we once admit the 
possible validity of supernatural explanation, we must concede that the Governess’s 
account is as consistent with an experience of visitations from beyond the grave as it 
is with an experience of a series of hallucinations.  Nor should we forget that James – 
in a problematic fictional manoeuvre to which we will return later – has the 
Governess give an apparently accurate account of Quint’s appearance despite never 
having seen him during his lifetime.  And though this awkward fact can, with some 
ingenuity and a readiness to supply details that the text leaves out, be explained away, 
                                                 
68
 There are still those who defend an unambiguously supernatural reading of ‘The Turn of the Screw’.  
For example, Edward Wagenknecht, in his Seven Masters of the Supernatural Fiction says that James 
‘wrote no word about “The Turn of the Screw” to indicate that he ever thought of it as anything but a 
ghost story.’ (Wagenknecht 1991, 39) That is no doubt correct, but it misses the point: why would 
James have included so much evidence to undermine the Governess’s credibility if he intended that her 
testimony should be regarded as absolutely trustworthy? 
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it would surely be as absurd to claim that James includes it in his story in order that it 
be explained away as it would be to suggest that Conan Doyle includes in his novel an 
exposure of the supposedly phantom hound which haunts the Baskervilles as a flesh-
and-blood animal covered in phosphorus in order that we conclude it was a 
supernatural entity after all.   
 
Now it is quite true that, so far as the supernatural is concerned, the reception of Der 
Tod in Venedig has been dissimilar to that of ‘The Turn of the Screw’.  Whereas 
James’ tale was for a long time considered a traditional ghost story, the haunted 
atmosphere of Mann’s novella has been explained in any but properly supernatural 
terms – for example in terms of symbol, leitmotif and ‘myth’.  But Robertson’s 
explanation of the visitants, signs and portents that accompany Aschenbach’s progress 
in terms of psychological projection is, surely, an admission that they are integral to 
Der Tod in Venedig’s fictional world.  And once we start to weigh the balance 
between the naturalistic and the supernatural hypotheses, we find that Mann, like 
James, has been careful to provide evidence for both.
69
  And in so far as Mann’s 
novella charts a move away from scepticism and towards supernatural credulity 
(while ‘The Turn of the Screw’ foregrounds the Governess’s affirmation of the 
supernatural before vitiating it with caveats) it resembles Poe’s ‘The Black Cat’.  In 
both stories support for a naturalist reading consists firstly in the fact that nothing 
overtly supernatural is seen to occur, and secondly in the general principle that the 
only valid explanation for events, no matter how strange, must rely on phenomenal 
cause-and-effect, no matter how implausible.  If we leave these two considerations 
aside, we discover a wealth of evidence to undermine the naturalist reading.  There is 
the curious recurrence of figures whose extreme similarity of manner and appearance 
suggest the intervention of some superhuman entity with the power of impersonation, 
or at the very least a noumenal intention at work behind the phenomenal surface of 
things.  There is the great difficulty we find in supposing that such unlikely 
coincidences are wholly the result of Aschenbach’s psychology – for surely 
Robertson is not suggesting that the apparitions (which according to him bear a 
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 Reed sees that Der Tod in Venedig frequently strains against naturalism, and concludes not that this 
is because Mann wishes to advance a supernatural hypothesis at the expense of the naturalistic one, but 
that the man on the chapel steps and the brutal gondolier ‘cannot be declared “real” by the criteria of 
realistic narrative.’ (Reed 1994, 30)  Which is to say that he avoids the trap – as he would see it – of 
discussing what kind of status these events have within Der Tod in Venedig’s fictional world by 
denying that they are really part of it. 
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distinct resemblance to the novella’s protagonist)70 are hallucinations?  And most 
tellingly of all, perhaps, there is the fact that so far as we can tell Aschenbach scarcely 
notices the many strange events and coincidences which the alert reader picks up on. 
 
The Protagonist and the Narrator 
 
But is it really the case that Aschenbach is so passive and unobservant a witness?  The 
question is an intriguing one, because it is the peculiar narrative technique of Der Tod 
in Venedig in terms of authorization which raises it to the first rank of fantastic 
literature.  We noted earlier that many traditional ghost stories meet the conditions of 
Todorov’s fantastic.  Like ‘The Black Cat’ they refrain from the explicit 
representation of the supernatural and content themselves with the multiplication of 
coincidence.  Or like ‘The Turn of the Screw’ they forfeit the authority of a third 
person and employ instead a first person narrator – i.e. an inhabitant of the very 
fictional world he or she is supposed to give us an account of, and whose veracity and 
perspicacity cannot be taken for granted.  However, the writer wishing to construct a 
story of sustained fantastic ambiguity by the latter means will find his way beset with 
difficulties because, although it is true that first person narrators are in principle 
dubious in a way that third person narrators are not, we are nonetheless likely to give 
them the benefit of the doubt unless we see good reason to disbelieve them.
71
  After 
all, a fictional first person account may not be susceptible to scrutiny in the light of 
independent testimony, and such is the case in ‘The Turn of the Screw’, for example.  
With the consequence that fantastic first person narrators will themselves have to give 
us cause to suspect their good judgment and impartiality if there is to be serious 
hesitation between naturalist and supernatural explanation. 
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 ‘Not only are these figures wanderers, like Aschenbach, but they also share some of his traits: the 
slight build, the loose mouth and the short nose.’ (Robertson 2002, 101) The identification of 
Aschenbach and the stranger can, however, be taken too far.  As Pierre Brunel points out: ‘L’étranger 
ressemble à Aschenbach en ce qu’il a de banal (stature moyenne, maigreur).  Au contraire, il en diffère 
radicalement par ce qui en lui sort de l’ordinaire: son nez camus s’oppose au nez aquilin et ramassé du 
protagoniste.’ (Brunel 1997, 69-70) 
71
 A first person narrator cannot speak with the authority which the third person narrator of Der 
Zauberberg, for example, vindicates when he says, ‘Will man glauben, daß unser schlichter Held nach 
so und so vielen Jährchen hermetisch-pädagogischer Steigerung tief genug ins geistige Leben 
eingetreten war, um sich der “Bedeutsamkeit” seiner Liebe und ihres Objektes bewußt zu sein?  Wir 
behaupten und erzählen, daß er es war.’ (5.1, 987) The fictional reality of Der Zauberberg exists by the 
grace of its third person narrator, whose judgments cannot reasonably be gainsaid. 
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That is precisely what happens in James’ story, of course: the account of the 
Governess includes information regarding her background and character likely to 
undermine her credibility – so much so that Wilson declares, ‘When one has once got 
hold of the clue to this meaning of “The Turn of the Screw” one wonders how one 
could ever have missed it.’ (Wilson 1952, 94) Such a strong presumption of 
unreliability would capsize the story into Todorov’s uncanny: it would be a strange 
tale, but with a naturalist core beneath an only apparently supernatural surface.
72
  The 
only way this impression can be kept at bay is the provision of evidence tending to 
fortify the Governess’s account.  Such countervailing evidence cannot, however, 
come from her alone: given our doubts as to her veracity everything she affirms in 
support of her supernatural account must support to the same degree our presumption 
of natural causation.  But it can come from the testimony – as related by the 
Governess herself – of third parties. And this, surely, is James’ purpose in having Mrs 
Grose confirm the Governess’s description of Quint, whom the latter has never seen 
during his lifetime.  Of course we may invent evidence of our own to discredit this 
apparently forceful corroboration of the supernatural hypothesis (for example John 
Silver’s contention that she has learned of Quint’s appearance while making enquiries 
in the village) but such explanations have the disadvantage of implying that the 
Governess is not merely deluded but actually deceitful.
 
(Brooke-Rose 1981, 148)  If it 
had been her intent to deceive she would hardly have permitted the intrusion into her 
narrative of those compromising details which aroused our suspicions in the first 
place.  The end result is that, despite the evident textual intention to write a story 
balanced between natural and supernatural explanation, the Governess’s clairvoyance 
at this point in the narrative so strongly favours the latter over the former that the 
fantastic is in danger of going by the board.
73
 
 
Der Tod in Venedig avoids the destabilizing oscillation at work in James’ first person 
narrative by a special use of free indirect discourse.  Although Aschenbach focalizes 
our experience of the world of the novella, the commingling of his consciousness and 
that of the third person narrator often makes it difficult to decide whose commentary 
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 As we have seen, many critics, including Wilson, argue that ‘The Turn of the Screw’ is, in point of 
fact, a strange but naturalistic tale. 
73
 In the 1961film The Innocents, Jack Clayton’s adaptation of James’ tale, this deficiency of fantastic 
technique has been corrected: the Governess sees a miniature portrait of Quint before encountering his 
ghost. (Clayton 1961) 
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on events we are reading.  Some thoughts and impressions are directly attributed to 
the protagonist: ‘Mit Erstaunen bemerkte Aschenbach, dass der Junge volkommen 
schön war.’ (2.1, 529-30) ‘In diesem Augenblick dachte er an seinen Ruhm und 
daran, daß viele ihn auf den Straßen kannten.’ (540) Other thoughts and impressions 
are so critical of Aschenbach that they can only be those of the narrator himself: ‘So 
dachte der Enthusiasmierte; so vermochte er zu empfinden.’ (554) But the attribution 
of many passages of Der Tod in Venedig to one or the other is a matter of conjecture.  
Is this, for instance, to be attributed to Aschenbach or to the narrator? ‘Seltsamer, 
heikler ist nichts als das Verhältnis von Menschen, die sich nur mit den Augen 
kennen, – die täglich, ja stündlich einander begegnen, beobachten und dabei den 
Schein gleichgültiger Fremdheit grußlos und wortlos aufrechtzuhalten durch 
Sittenzwang oder eigene Grille genötigt sind.’ (560) It is well known that Aschenbach 
is an avatar of Mann himself – he is the figure Mann might have become had he 
chosen to follow the path of classical restraint and exemplary morality to the bitter 
end.  And the narrator too is another such avatar: although author and narrator are 
formally distinct, in that the former regards the events of the novella from outside the 
text as being his own literary creations while the latter regards them from within the 
text as being real, they cannot be further distinguished.  Unlike Zeitblom, the narrator 
of Doktor Faustus, the narrator of Der Tod in Venedig is not a fictional character with 
a biography and personality of his own.  Rather, he is Mann’s fictional mouthpiece.  If 
the mentality of the narrator and the mentality of the character whose thoughts are 
channelled through free indirect discourse are decidedly different, then there will be 
no difficulty telling their thoughts apart.  But if, as here, both narrator and protagonist 
are projections of the same authorial sensibility, then the problem of attribution can 
become insoluble. 
 
This has a number of interesting consequences.  One is that despite his centrality to 
the story we never feel assured that we are getting to know Aschenbach in the way we 
can be confident of getting to know characters who narrate in their own person (such 
as the Governess in ‘The Turn of the Screw’) or who, though they do not narrate the 
story directly, have a sensibility – as expressed through turns of thought, phrase and 
vocabulary – which can clearly be distinguished from that of the third person narrator.  
And another is an insuperable difficulty in distinguishing between events in and of 
themselves strange and events whose strangeness is attributable to Aschenbach’s 
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distorted view of them.  Take for example the last of the visitants, the leader of the 
troupe of street-singers, whose description is identical in many respects with that of 
the man on the chapel steps.  We can make the assumption that the whole scene is not 
just focalized by Aschenbach – in the sense that everything the reader learns of it is 
within the field of the protagonist’s experience – but is also a vehicle for his 
sensibility.  And in this case the reason that the troupe-leader is described in terms 
identical to those applied to the earlier visitant is that consciously or unconsciously 
Aschenbach (who by this time has made a connection between the man on the chapel 
steps and his Venetian experiences), wishes that he were taking part in a supernatural 
drama and does everything he can to locate and exaggerate similarities between two 
persons whom no impartial observer would regard as much resembling one another.  
If, by contrast, the nearly identical descriptions are mandated by the third person 
narrator on his own account and not on Aschenbach’s, then they can be taken as 
indicating an identical reality: the two visitants are so genuinely similar as to suggest 
that some kind of supernatural intention, and not blind chance, is at work in Der Tod 
in Venedig’s fictional world.  If the first hypothesis were shown to be true, then we 
would have to conclude that the meaningful narrative which the novella had seemed 
to promise was in fact no more than a chimera.  What had seemed meaningful turns 
out to be meaningless.  The intimations of Hermes; Aschenbach’s spiritual and erotic 
pilgrimage through the descending circles of intoxication and humiliation; the 
culmination of a near impossible artistic vocation in that final Platonic vision of 
Tadzio with his gesture towards the ‘sea of beauty’ beyond the sandbar – all that is the 
delusory product of sparking synapses.  If the second hypothesis were shown to be 
true, then we would have to conclude that Aschenbach – unbeknownst to himself, 
perhaps – has wandered into a world of significance where the moral and aesthetic 
moment of his life receives a terrifying but dignifying confirmation.  As with all the 
fantastic works we have so far considered, there is a burden of significance riding on 
the supernatural reading of Der Tod in Venedig.   And what that significance may be 
we will now consider. 
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Chapter III: Der Tod in Venedig in the Context of Mann’s 
Philosophical Orientation 
 
Nietzsche, Schopenhauer? 
 
If the arguments laid out in the previous chapters regarding the connection between 
the supernatural and meaning in works of the fantastic are valid, and if we accept that 
Der Tod in Venedig is indeed a fantastic work, then it follows that the novella’s 
possible significance is dependent on the presence or absence in it of the supernatural.  
But which meaning?  The answer is a complex one, and it cannot be attempted 
without plotting the course of Mann’s philosophical and intellectual development 
during the early years of the twentieth century – because, as we shall argue, Der Tod 
in Venedig was written in the midst of a sea-change in Mann’s thinking.  To 
understand this development, however, it will be necessary to challenge the prevalent 
view of Mann’s relationship with philosophy, a relationship which is usually 
understood as being by and large limited to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer,
74
 with some 
critics (such as Reed) leaning heavily towards the view that not Schopenhauer but 
Nietzsche sets the intellectual tone for Mann’s fiction,75 and others (such as Børge 
Kristiansen) downplaying Nietzsche’s role as being fundamentally incompatible with 
Mann’s (as they see it) pessimistic and nay-saying attitude to life.76  Of course the 
presence of Platonic references in e.g. Der Tod in Venedig has not gone unremarked, 
but the notion that Mann was prepared to take Plato’s thinking seriously in the way 
that he took Nietzsche’s and Schopenhauer’s thinking seriously receives scant 
consideration.  Mann’s borrowings from Symposium in that novella, which are well 
inventoried by Reed, (Reed 1996, 171-178) are generally understood to be ironic or 
mere window-dressing.  We will shortly attempt to show that such a view of Mann’s 
philosophical orientation does him a serious injustice, but before we can do so we 
should ask ourselves a couple of preliminary questions.   
                                                 
74
 For example: ‘Schopenhauer und Nietzsche sind, wie man ebenfalls weiß, die Philosophen gewesen, 
die ihn ein Leben lang beeindruckt und mitbestimmt haben – aber bezeichnenderweise gibt es kaum 
Wandlungen in den beiderseitigen Verhältnissen, keine Zunahme an Erkenntnis oder einen Wechsel 
der eigenen Position.’ (Koopmann 1988, 21)  
75
 According to Reed, after 1895 ‘Nietzsche was to dominate his work’ (Reed 1996, 18) 
76
 ‘Der Protest, der somit der Ironie inhärent ist, ist NIETZSCHEs Lebensbejahung fremd; er entspricht 
vielmehr dem bösen Blick SCHOPENHAUERs, der das sinnfremde absurde Lebensgeschehen nicht 
wollte.’ (Kristiansen 1995, 263) 
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Firstly, what do we mean when we say that he was ‘influenced’ by the above 
mentioned (or indeed any other) philosophers?  It is all too easy when we make Mann 
the passive subject of a verb which anyway has overtones of irrational persuasion to 
think of him as yielding to the authority of a greater intellect than his own, as meekly 
accepting Nietzsche or Schopenhauer as a mentor.  And it is quite true that Mann was 
a child of his times, and absorbed many ideas – amongst them ideas derived from 
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer – before he had the maturity to criticize them.  But 
Mann’s relationship with his philosophical resources became more active and restless 
as time went by.  He was always on the look-out for material he could adapt to his 
own purposes, memorable phrases he could employ to express his own ideas, 
philosophical frameworks into which he could fit his own preoccupations.  He was 
nobody’s pupil and never wished to be regarded as such: ‘Ich bin kein Systematiker, 
kein Doktrinär; ich fröne nicht dem schändlichen Irrwahn des Rechthabens, und nie 
werde ich mich mit einer Wahrheit, die ich für die Wahrheit erachte, zur Ruhe setzen, 
um für den Rest meines Lebens davon zu zehren.’ (13.1, 190) Both Nietzsche and 
Schopenhauer discuss at length philosophical systems consistent or at odds with their 
own, and whether they are praising this philosopher as a genius or denouncing that 
one as a charlatan always they point backwards to alternatives to their own doctrine.  
Nietzsche expressed more truth than he knew, and could have been referring to 
himself, when he wrote: ‘Es ist gewiss einer der grössten und ganz unschätzbaren 
Vorteile, welche wir aus Schopenhauer gewinnen, dass er unsere Empfindung 
zeitweilig in ältere, mächtige Betrachtungsarten der Welt und Menschen 
zurückzwingt, zu welchen sonst uns so leicht kein Pfad führen würde.’ (Nietzsche II 
1988, 47)  While reading Nietzsche Mann discovered elements of Schopenhauer 
which struck a chord with his imagination and interests and so was naturally drawn to 
their original source where they could be found in greater abundance.  While reading 
Schopenhauer he likewise discovered non- or pre-Schopenhauerian elements 
accordant with his own preoccupations, and once again he was tempted to engage 
with them in their original context.  Instead of thinking of either Nietzsche’s or 
Schopenhauer’s doctrines as constituting Mann’s intellectual homeland it would be 
better to consider them as some of the most well-charted terrain in a more wide-
ranging voyage of philosophical exploration. 
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Secondly, which Nietzsche and which Schopenhauer do the opposing critics have in 
mind as Mann’s theoretical pole-star?  For the key positions of both these thinkers are 
not easy to pin down.  To begin with, the post-Geburt der Tragödie Nietzsche is 
unique amongst major thinkers in that the philosophical outlook (ruthless naturalism) 
which he accepts and the philosophical project (the establishment of new values) 
which he announces are wholly incompatible.  Nietzsche’s critique of established 
values consists in showing that whereas people believe them to proceed from this 
religious revelation or that metaphysical principle, they are the result of purely 
phenomenal factors, as are religion and metaphysics themselves.  All three – morality, 
religion and metaphysics – can be explained as ingrained custom arising from 
society’s need to perpetuate itself,77 or as an attempt to enrich with illusion lives 
otherwise hardly worth living,
78
 or as a form of self-dominance.
79
  The examples 
Nietzsche provides are as various as they are abundant, but all have this in common: 
never is the religious accepted as essentially religious, the metaphysical as essentially 
metaphysical.  Naturalism excludes such a possibility.  But it also excludes in advance 
the establishment of genuine new values to replace the fraudulent old ones – for from 
a naturalist perspective all values are contingent.
80
  What emerges from this 
incompatibility between philosophical outlook and philosophical ambition are two 
Nietzsches: Nietzsche the sound naturalist and Nietzsche the unsound visionary able 
to proceed only in so far as he forgets his former principle: that to reveal a value as 
proceeding from a social imperative, an instinct, a psychological state etc., is to 
expose its credentials as fraudulent.  It is the former of the two, Nietzsche the 
naturalist, to whom Mann owed a life-long debt.
81
  In his notes for the ‘Literatur 
Essay’, for example, he declares:  
                                                 
77
 ‘Wie das Herkommen entstanden ist, das ist dabei gleichgültig, jedenfalls ohne Rücksicht auf gut 
und böse oder irgend einen immanenten kategorischen Imperativ, sondern vor Allem zum Zweck der 
Erhaltung einer Gemeinde, eines Volks.’ (Nietzsche II, 93)  
78
 ‘Leute, welchen ihr tägliches Leben zu leicht und eintönig vorkommt, werden leicht religiös; dies ist 
begreiflich und verzeihlich.’ (Nietzsche II, 118) 
79
 ‘Diese Unterordnung ist ein mächtiges Mittel, um über sich Herr zu werden’ (Nietzsche II, 133) 
80
 Arthur C. Danto absolves Nietzsche of the charge of attempting to derive unconditional ‘ought’ 
statements from factual ‘is’ statements, on the grounds that ‘he holds that there are no such distinctions 
to be drawn, not because there are no moral facts, but because there are no facts at all.’ (Danto 1965, 
136) But if we accept this as a valid defence of Nietzsche, then we must accept it as a valid defence of 
the morality which Nietzsche attacked – for the burden of his accusations is that purportedly moral 
precepts have been improperly derived from phenomenal imperatives.  That is, Nietzsche’s attack on 
traditional morality relies on a distinction between factual ‘is’ and unconditional ‘ought’ statements. 
81
 In any case, as Peter Pütz points out, Mann’s interest in Nietzsche has more to do in the 
philosopher’s personality than his doctrines: ‘Es sind nicht allein Nietzsches Schriften, auf die Thomas 
Mann fortwährend Bezug nimmt, sondern auch Person und Schicksal des Autors beschäftigen ihn in 
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Wir um 70 Geborenen[…]Unser Nietzsche ist der Nietzsche militans.  Der Nietzsche 
triumphans gehört den 15 Jahre nach uns Geborenen.  Wir haben von ihm den psychologischen 
Radikalismus, den lyrischen Kritizismus, das Erlebnis Wagners, das Erlebnis des Christentums, 
das Erlebnis der Modernität, – Erlebnisse, von denen wir uns niemals vollkommen trennen 
werden, so wenig wie er selbst sich je vollkommen davon getrennt hat.  Dazu sind sie zu teuer, 
zu tief, zu fruchtbar.  (Mann 1967, 208)    
 
Reed, then, is broadly correct when he writes that ‘The essence of Nietzsche which 
Mann took in may be summed up in Nietzsche’s own description of his works as a 
“constant and imperceptible exhortation to reverse customary values and valued 
customs”, as a “school of suspicion and even more of contempt” inculcating “mistrust 
of morality”.’82  This reception of the naturalistic Nietzsche, however, does not take 
Mann so very far from the mainstream of European thought, which has always been 
fed by currents of psychological insight, distrust of traditional morality, out-and-out 
cynicism etc.  They form part of a millennia-old intellectual fund.  Nietzsche’s 
attempts at positive philosophizing, by contrast, and to which the adjective 
‘Nietzschean’ is generally taken to refer: the yea-saying attitude to life, the 
admiration, not to say idolization, of the brutal and the beautiful etc. are treated with 
irony (Mynheer Peeperkorn in Der Zauberberg, Hermann Institoris and others in 
Doktor Faustus), or toyed with as philosophical curios, or dismissed with a shrug of 
the shoulders. 
 
Schopenhauer, too, though he is evidently not as erratic in his thinking as Nietzsche, 
is inconsistent in his philosophical doctrines.  There is a ‘Vorstellung’ side and a 
‘Wille’ side to his philosophy, of course, but he characteristically writes as though the 
former were created by and subordinated to the latter, and most of the notions we 
associate with Schopenhauer’s doctrine: that the world is as bad as it feasibly could 
                                                                                                                                            
einem Maße wie keine andere Gestalt der Geistesgeschichte. (Pütz 1971, 229) It was a personality 
which, says Copleston, embodied ‘the predicament of the man for whom traditional beliefs and values 
have lost their meaning and relevance and who is searching desperately for something to take their 
place.’ (Copleston 1975, 224)  This is the view of Nietzsche which informs the artistic travails of 
Adrian Leverkühn in Doktor Faustus.  Just as Nietzsche detects in morality anything but what is 
intrinsically moral, so Leverkühn detects in the composer’s art anything but what is instrinsically 
beautiful.  But, like Nietzsche, he finds it far easier to see through and mock the pretensions of 
established values than he does to justify new ones which might take their place – and this is why his 
‘invention’ of the twelve-tone scale is presented as such a desperate and dubious enterprise.  
82
 (Reed 1996, 18-19)  One might take issue with ‘reversal of customary values’ –  Mann shows no 
sign of thinking that one can establish authentic new values simply by reversing fraudulent old ones.  
What he takes from Nietzsche is not the revaluation of values but the devaluation of values. 
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be, that progress is impossible, that the pretensions of human ‘Intelligenz’ to gain 
independence from the blind, striving metaphysical force which created it are in vain 
– all this depends upon an emphasis on ‘Wille’ at the expense of ‘Vorstellung’.  As 
Golo Mann, expressing the general view, puts the matter: 
 
Die Welt als Wille – darauf kam es ihm an.  Die Welt als Wille zu sein, zum Leben, der in jeder 
Kreatur ganz da ist mit schrecklicher Kraft und Angst, in jeder Kreatur sich auch heimlich für 
das ganze hält, so daß die Vielheit der Individuen in Raum und Zeit im Grunde Traum und 
Illusion ist und trozdem ein Kampf aller gegen alle ist, ein Überlebenwollen jedes um jeden 
Preis auf Kosten der anderen; und so die Welt nichts anderes ist als ein Fressen und 
Gefressenwerden – das ist Schopenhauers Vision. (Golo Mann 1959, 282) 
 
It is true that Schopenhauer came to change his mind about the absolute primacy of 
‘Wille’ – and his doctrine of the ‘Verneinung des Willens’ seems to postulate some 
self-determining principle such as Kant’s autonomous subject.83  But these elements 
of his thinking are not distinctively Schopenhauerian: he holds them in common with 
Kant and the German idealists.  It is important that the distinction be made because 
Mann sometimes adopts characteristic Schopenhauerian thinking: we see it to the fore 
in works like Felix Krull and, in an extreme form, in ‘Die vertauschten Köpfe’, and 
sometimes adopts non-characteristic Schopenhauerian thinking: for example that the 
‘Wille’ is ultimately free rather than just an impulsive metaphysical drive towards 
life.  In the latter case, Mann’s partiality to Kantian and idealist thinking as 
manifested by the later Schopenhauer leads him to find it in other authors – for 
example Schiller – of whom it is far more typical.  And we suggest that in the crucial 
matter of ‘Geist’ – always a key term for Mann but one whose meaning undergoes 
significant change in the course of his career – thinkers characteristically committed 
to a philosophy of freedom and value came to play a greater role than those 
characteristically committed to a philosophy which conceives necessity to be 
ineluctable and values to be a chimera. 
                                                 
83
 Julian Young explains Schopenhauer’s later position thus: ‘What the mature Schopenhauer realises is 
that if ultimate reality really were the evil will, if Book II was the absolute end of the story, then there 
would be not just nothing knowable by us but absolutely nothing beyond the will.  He realises that the 
claim that his metaphysical will represents ultimate reality commits him to an absolute nihilism – 
existence is both evil and eternally inescapable – in which case there would be no point in his bothering 
to write his philosophy.  What Schopenhauer realises, in other words, is that his youthful claim that in 
Book II he had cracked the problem of the Kantian thing in itself is inconsistent with the doctrine of 
salvation propounded in Book IV and, for this reason, too, has therefore to be abandoned.’ (Young 
2005, 101)   
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Negative ‘Geist’ 
 
Why did Thomas Mann, writing his notes for the never-to-be published ‘Literatur 
Essay’, declare civilization to be ‘Vernunft, Aufklärung,[…]Sänftigung, Sittigung, 
Skeptisierung, Auflösung’ and then sum up all that in a single world: ‘Geist’? (Mann 
1967, 215)  Why, having identified it as the polar opposite of art in the same notes, 
does he add that ‘Der Geist, mit seiner Tendenz zur Zerstörung der Leidenschaften, 
will letzten Endes das reine Nichts’? (Mann 1967, 184) What is the meaning of 
‘Geist’ in these passages?  It seems to denote the intellect in rebellion – the intellect 
which, created to meet and regulate the phenomenal needs of mankind, has somehow 
developed enough critical independence to judge the world altogether insufficient, 
and to turn away in disgust, dragging with it the organism it was supposed to serve.  It 
is a concept quite different from that of an autonomous Kantian subject or a Platonic 
soul, for both of these can positively intervene in the world of the senses to make it 
more conformable to themselves or the ideas they apprehend.  They certainly do not 
long for ‘das reine Nichts’.  But it is a concept shared by Nietzsche and Schopenhauer 
in their different ways for, while dismissing the pretensions of the intellect to be 
something altogether distinct from the rest of the phenomenal world, each recognizes 
that it sometimes shows itself to be implacably hostile to that world.
84
   
 
This rebellious tendency of ‘Geist’ dismayed Nietzsche and led him to view man’s 
striving to live in accordance with a putatively other-worldly discipline as the 
symptom of a perverse strain in the ‘Wille zur Macht’.  Schopenhauer, by contrast, is 
full of praise for ‘Erkenntnis’, the intellect’s foreswearing of life.  But though these 
two thinkers react so differently with regard to the same fact, it could be argued that 
the contrast between them in this respect is more a matter of taste than principle.  For 
does Schopenhauer’s metaphysical perspective provide the authentic criterion – 
something which Nietzsche’s naturalism perforce lacks – which would make the 
rejection of the phenomenal world a cause for celebration?   Does his noumenon 
furnish a benchmark of value comparable to those of Plato and Kant, a benchmark 
against which this or that fact, or life itself, could be found wanting?  It does not.  
                                                 
84
 It is important to bear in mind that although, according to Schopenhauer, the intellect springs from 
the ‘Wille’, so does the rest of the observable world.  That is, the intellect enjoys no metaphysical 
distinction. 
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Although Schopenhauer’s ‘Wille’ is similar to Plato’s ideas and to Kant’s thing in 
itself in subsisting beyond the world of the senses, it is in every other salient respect 
dissimilar to them.
85
   The chief of Plato’s ideas is το καλόν, and is understood to be a 
real criterion of value against which the things and deeds of the phenomenal realm 
(not to mention other ideas in the noumenal realm) may be found more or less 
satisfactory.  Kant’s ‘Ding-an-sich’ refers – apart from that thing-without-qualities 
which the subject works up into definite entities existing in time and space – to the 
perceiving subject himself who is likewise beyond the natural world and, enjoying 
freedom from that world’s necessity, has the power of moral choice and action.86  But 
Schopenhauer’s ‘Wille’ is in no sense an evaluative alternative to the realm of the 
phenomena, for it evinces exactly the same moral nullity that characterizes the natural 
world – which, after all, it creates according to its own character.  And whereas Kant 
has a non-phenomenal subject with an independent ontological status, Schopenhauer, 
while he sometimes writes as if it is the intellect which creates the phenomenal world 
from the ‘Wille’ (implying that the latter has no positive input into the complexion of 
the phenomenal world), more characteristically insists that it is the ‘Wille’ which 
creates the intellect. 
 
Zuförderst also sagen wir: die Welt ist nicht mit Hülfe der Erkenntnis, folglich auch nicht von 
außen gemacht, sondern von innen; und dann sind wir bemüht, das punctum saliens des 
Welteies nachzuweisen.  So leicht auch der physikotheologische Gedanke, daß ein Intellekt es 
sein müsse, der die Natur geordnet und gemodelt hat, dem rohen Verstande zusagt, so 
grundverkehrt ist er dennoch.  Denn der Intellekt ist uns allein aus der animalischen Natur, 
folglich als ein durchaus sekundäres und untergeordnetes Prinzip in der Welt, ein Produkt 
spätesten Ursprungs: er kann daher nimmermehr die Bedingung ihres Daseins gewesen sein 
noch kann ein mundus intellegibilis dem mundus sensibilis vorhergehn; da er von diesem allein 
seinen Stoff erhält.  Nicht ein Intellekt hat die Natur hervorgebracht, sondern die Natur den 
Intellekt.
87
 
                                                 
85
 It is true that Schopenhauer also includes in his system what he calls ‘Platonic ideas’ but these are 
not criteria aiding the ψυχή in its attempts to establish the quality of things in the phenomenal world, 
but more like Aristotelian teleological causes.   
86
 For example: ‘Man kann ihnen [i.e. those who point out the incompatibility of human freedom with 
the necessity of the phenomenal world] nur zeigen, daß der vermeintlich von ihnen darin entdeckte 
Widerspruch nirgend anders liege als darin, daß, da sie, um das Naturgesetz in Ansehung menschlicher 
Handlungen geltend zu machen, den Menschen notwendig als Erscheinung betrachten mußten und nun, 
da man von ihnen fordert, daß sie ihn als Intelligenz auch als Ding an sich selbst denken sollten, sie ihn 
immer auch da noch als Erscheinung betrachten.’ (Kant IV, 96-97) 
87
 (Schopenhauer III, 360)  This is evidently not the place for an exhaustive criticism of 
Schopenhauer’s theorizing, but we might note in passing that he presents the conversion of the ‘Wille’ 
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The result is that there is no possibility of recourse to independent criteria of value in 
Schopenhauer’s system: neither in the ‘Wille’ itself nor in the phenomenal world 
which it creates (with or without the help of its hand-maid, the intellect).  And though 
Schopenhauer is keen to explain the compatibility of his system with what is 
conventionally called moral behaviour he in no sense attempts to justify such 
behaviour as intrinsically moral but rather shows it to proceed from the enlightened 
self-interest of the ‘Wille’ in certain of its instantiations – instantiations which more 
or less clearly recognize that as all phenomena are expressions of the same 
metaphysical entity there can be no real distinction between one individual’s suffering 
and that of all the world.  And this recognition issues in sympathy – the root, 
according to Schopenhauer, of all the other moral virtues.  But it is surely evident that 
self-interest (no matter how enlightened) cannot underwrite morality, for self-interest 
is exclusively a matter of ‘wollen’ and not of ‘sollen’ – so that Schopenhauer’s 
explanation of the moral demoralizes it just as surely as does the explanation of the 
anthropologist who declares that it is no more than the manifestation of certain 
biological and social imperatives, or of the economist who explains it in terms of the 
advantages accruing to a reputation for honesty.  Schopenhauer makes no bones about 
this matter: 
  
Man wird mir vielleicht entgegensetzen wollen, daß die Ethik es nicht damit zu tun habe, wie 
die Menschen wirklich handeln, sondern die Wissenschaft sei, welche angibt, wie sie handeln 
sollen.  Dies ist aber nachgerade der Grundsatz, den ich leugne, nachdem ich genugsam 
dargetan habe, daß der Begriff des Sollens, die imperative Form der Ethik, allein in der 
theologischen Moral gilt, außerhalb derselben aber allen Sinn und Bedeutung verliert.
88
  
 
The purpose of our question, as to whether the difference between Nietzsche and 
Schopenhauer was really just a matter of taste, should now be clear.  Neither 
Nietzsche nor Schopenhauer includes in his philosophical outlook the postulates of 
genuine morality, and they are in no position to say that anything ought to happen, 
only that they would personally like something to happen.  And, once again, 
                                                                                                                                            
into natural entities in two incompatible ways.  Part of the time such entities are conceived as mere 
phenomena – as objects for a subject, part of the time they are conceived more matter-of-factly as 
phenotypes – as subsisting in their own right.   
88
 (Schopenhauer III, 726) With these words Schopenhauer seems to turn his back on one of the two 
great philosophical domains distinguished by Kant: ‘die theoretische als Naturphilosophie, die 
praktische als Moralphilosophie.’ (Kant V, 242) 
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Schopenhauer is frank enough to admit that he cannot, while remaining true to his 
own system, advocate a rejection of the world (both ‘Wille’ and ‘Vorstellung’) in the 
name of this or that criterion of which it falls short, but that he can only advocate 
negation for negation’s sake – as an impulse of disgust and nothing more.   
 
Diesem [i.e. philosophy as distinct from theology and mysticism] nun entspricht es, daß meine 
Lehre, wann auf ihrem Gipfelpunkte angelangt, einen negativen Charakter annimmt, also mit 
einer Negation endigt. Sie kann hier nämlich nur von Dem reden, was verneint, aufgegeben 
wird: was dafür aber gewonnen, ergriffen wird, ist sie genötigt[…]als Nichts zu bezeichnen.
89
   
 
Many of Mann’s early works take this view – either directly from Schopenhauer or 
from Nietzsche writing in a Schopenhauerian spirit. ‘Tonio Kröger’ is a fine example.  
It tells the story in fictional terms of Mann’s own, immensely difficult, literary 
vocation – difficult because the writer’s art entails a disillusioned analysis of the 
actual motives of human beings and the detection of abject origins behind the ‘values’ 
which make the bourgeois world go round.  When Lisaweta Ivanovna praises ‘Die 
reinigende, heiligende Wirkung der Litteratur, die Zerstörung der Leidenschaften 
durch die Erkenntnis und das Wort’ (2.1, 275) Tonio responds: 
 
Es gibt etwas, was ich Erkenntnisekel nenne, Lisaweta: Der Zustand in dem es dem Menschen 
genügt, eine Sache zu durchschauen, um sich bereits zum Sterben angewidert (und durchaus 
nicht versöhnlich gestimmt) zu fühlen, – der Fall Hamlets des Dänen, dieses typischen 
Litteraten.  Er wußte, was das ist: zum Wissen berufen werden, ohne dazu geboren zu sein.  
Hellsehen noch durch den Thränenschleier des Gefühls hindurch, erkennen, merken, beobachten 
und das Beobachtete lächelnd bei Seite legen müssen. (2.1, 276) 
 
The immediate literary source for ‘der Fall Hamlets des Dänen’ is a comment by 
Nietzsche in Die Geburt der Tragödie,
90
 and Mann declares in ‘Freud und die 
Zukunft’ that ‘Tonio Kröger’ has ‘gut Nietzsche’sches Gepräge’,91 but what Tonio 
                                                 
89
 (Schopenhauer II, 783-784)  Schopenhauer concludes this extraordinary passage by advising those of 
his readers who feel the need for a positive reason to renounce the world that they will find what they 
seek among the mystics and mystical philosophers – such as Plotinus. 
90
 ‘In diesem Sinne hat der dionysische Mensch Aehnlichkeit mit Hamlet: beide haben einmal einen 
wahren Blick in das Wesen der Dinge gethan, sie haben erkannt, und es ekelt sie zu handeln, denn ihre 
Handlung kann nichts am ewigen Wesen der Dinge ändern.’ (Nietzsche I, 56-57) This is an excellent 
example of the Schopenhauer to be found in Nietzsche. 
91
 As Reed notes: ‘Aus dem eigentümlichen Schülerverhältnis NIETZSCHES zu SCHOPENHAUER 
und den strukurellen Ähnlichkeiten ihrer Systeme[...]ergibt sich die Quasi-Unmöglichkeit, den Einfluß 
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describes in the above passage suggests nothing of the ‘Rausch’ which Nietzsche 
attributes to the Dionysian’s insight into the ‘Wille’ – it suggests only that 
disenchantment with and foreswearing of life which Schopenhauer extols.  But at this 
point the problem of a purely negative attitude, a renunciation lacking any evaluative 
guarantee, an ‘Ekel’ and nothing more – becomes apparent.  Just because Tonio’s 
‘Erkenntnis’ is Schopenhauerian in character he has nothing to offer by way of 
positive alternative to the naïve but misguided beliefs of Hans Hansen, Ingeborg 
Holm and all the thousands like them.  So that, realizing the inadequacy of his 
position, he hopes with all his might that Hans Hansen never did make the mistake of 
reading ‘Don Carlos’, hopes that his old friend will ‘frei vom Fluch der Erkenntnis 
und der schöpferischen Qual leben, lieben und loben in seliger Gewöhnlichkeit!’ (2,1, 
311) ‘Tonio Kröger’ is, amongst other things, the renunciation of a renunciation.  And 
yet there can be no question of Tonio (or Mann) participating as a writer in the 
sentimentality of the good folk he so admires, which would be a ‘Pfuscher-Irrtum’ 
(2.1, 271) – with the result that the story ends in a kind of stalemate.  For how is it 
possible simultaneously to accept the world on its own terms while obeying the 
literary command that the world never be accepted on its own terms – even though 
(according to both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche) those are the only terms to be had? 
 
It is a commonplace of Mann criticism that the period between the publication of 
Buddenbrooks and Der Tod in Venedig was, with certain exceptions such as ‘Tonio 
Kröger’ and ‘Tristan’ (which treats of the same theme as did the earlier story but in a 
register of Nietzschean irony rather than of Schopenhauerian regret), a time of 
thwarted and misbegotten literary ambition, of imaginative and critical works 
undertaken but not brought to completion – while the one achieved novel, Königliche 
Hoheit, has been described scathingly by Reed as a ‘a single idea developed from an 
image, a symbolic bee in the writer’s bonnet, with no reference beyond himself.’92  
But we have not far to seek if we wish to find the cause of this unsatisfactory state of 
                                                                                                                                            
oder Quellenwert des früheren Denkers festzustellen, ohne dabei seinen abtrünnigen Schüler und 
Umdeuter mitzunennen. (Reed 1995, 122) 
92
 (Reed 1996, 118) Reed’s view of Königliche Hoheit is an extreme one, but even the book’s 
apologists tend to be half-hearted in its defence.  Klaus Haupprecht, in his biography of Mann, 
describes it as ‘ein Unterhaltungsroman im schönsten Sinn des Wortes[...]Dem leitmotivischen Spiel 
mit knappen Charakterisierungen und den Wiederholungseffekten gab sich der Autor bis an die Grenze 
der Übertreibung hin, doch die schwebende Grazie des Buches wurde durch die Verliebtheit in solche 
Art “Wirkung” kaum gefährdet.  Die Qual der Niederschrift war dem heiteren kleinen Werk nicht 
anzumerken.’ (Harpprecht 1995, 294) 
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affairs, because ‘Tonio Kröger’ has already made us acquainted with the nature of the 
problem: that Mann had assimilated a philosophical point of view from both 
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer which made any sense of creative mission extremely 
difficult to maintain.  A writer in this position may well have personal motives for 
creating and publishing his works: he might need the money, he might crave public 
adulation etc. – but he will never feel the assurance that he ought to be engaged in 
such activity.  And though there are no doubt plenty of authors who are quite 
unconcerned that their motives for writing are wholly a matter of need and appetite 
and not at all of duty, though writers such as Guy de Maupassant and H.H. Munro 
(‘Saki)’ are happy to publish a plethora of fiction in celebration of the humiliation of 
the purportedly moral and spiritual, and never feel the want of a positive alternative to 
what they are lampooning, – Mann was not a writer of this stamp.  This is not to say 
that he was insensible to the purely personal satisfactions that a successful literary 
career brings with it: he was by no means averse to making and spending money, and 
he was partial to public adulation.
93
  But the desire for both proved an insufficient 
mainspring for his literary activity.
94
  
 
This could be supplied only by the conviction that his writings might count – a 
conviction dependent on another: that things can count, that they can be measured 
against a criterion of value (an authentic criterion, not ‘did this book make me a 
profit?’ or ‘did it increase my fan-base?’) and found wanting or satisfactory.95  And 
that things can legitimately be so measured is a concession that no Nietzschean or 
Schopenhauerian can ever make while remaining a Nietzschean and Schopenhauerian.  
It seems that Mann’s mental world during these years was lacking an ingredient vital 
to the success of his creative faculties: an ‘Erkenntnis’ which was also a ‘Bekenntnis’, 
                                                 
93
 Königliche Hoheit, for example, seems to have been motivated by the desire to procure the literary 
satisfaction of purely personal wishes (the narcissism implied by the national writer/popular prince 
comparison is obvious, as is the self-congratulation implied by ‘das erlaubte Glück’), and by the desire 
to write a refined best-seller.  Michael Minden refers to the novel as a ‘market ploy’, intended to please 
the public at large without compromising Mann’s elevated literary reputation. (Minden 1995, 20)  But, 
as Harpprecht notes, Mann found the novel exceptionally difficult to write, and seems to have shared 
the reservations of those who considered such an enterprise unworthy of his talent. 
94
 This, we suggest, explains why he found ‘das leichte[…]besonders schwer.’ (Harpprecht 1995, 294) 
95
 ‘ “Himmel wie er sich wichtig nimmt!” – zu diesem Zwischenruf gibt mein Buch allerdings auf 
Schritt und Tritt Gelegenheit.  Ich habe dem nichts entgegenzustellen als die Tatsache, daß ich ohne 
mich wichtig zu nehmen nie gelebt habe noch leben könnte; als das Wissen, daß alles, was ich je 
leistete und wirkte, und zwar der Reiz und Wert jedes kleinsten Bestandteiles davon, jeder Zeile und 
Wendung meines bisherigen Lebenswerkes – so viel und so wenig dies nun besagen möge – 
ausschliesslich darauf zurückzuführen ist, daß ich mich wichtig nahm.’ (13.1, 18) 
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a ‘Geist’which could represent a positive alternative to the phenomenal realm, so that 
the critical attitude which he was quite sure was the writer’s (his kind of writer’s) lot 
could be maintained in the name of something and not in the name of nothing-but-
disgust.
96
  
 
The Evolution of ‘Geist’ 
 
This impasse did not, however, last forever.  It is quite clear that Mann comes in time 
to reject the value-free world-views of his earlier philosophical mentors.
97
  He 
continues to believe, of course, in the realm of the phenomena, but he rejects the 
Nietzschean contention that there is nothing beyond it, and rejects too the 
Schopenhauerian contention that there is something beyond it, but that this something, 
the ‘Wille’, has exactly the same character (amoral, blind, ceaselessly striving) as the 
natural world it creates.  As an alternative to Nietzsche’s value-free monism and 
Schopenhauer’s value-free dualism, he invokes a ‘Geist’ which is neither a mere 
element of naturalistically-conceived human psychology nor an impulse of self-
negation on the part of the ‘Wille’.  A glimpse at a lecture which Mann devoted to 
Joseph und seine Brüder, in which he expounds his analysis of the deepest causes of 
the Second World War, eliminates all doubt in the matter: 
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 Here is Reed’s summary of Mann’s predicament: ‘ “Blendwerk der Maja”, “Schleier der Maja”, are 
terms for the illusory character of all appearance which Schopenhauer borrows from Indian religious 
philosophy and which Nietzsche in turn took over from him.[…]In the note for Krull, the belief in 
illusoriness is put as radically as by Schopenhauer, the pessimism goes deeper than mere scepticism 
about the artist’s relations with his gullible audience.  His activity is valueless because it is a response 
to an illusory world; his efforts are pitiful in advance.  His techniques and his achievements are merely 
emulation of the world’s deceit, and their purpose is to help maintain a life which has been seen 
through.  If the radical pessimism is akin to Schopenhauer’s, the resolve to go on serving illusion, if 
necessary by the creation of yet more illusion, is an exact equivalent to Nietzsche’s “transcending” of 
Schopenhauer, which takes the continuing of life as an overriding value.’ (Reed 1996, 111-112)  No 
wonder Mann had difficulty bringing anything to artistic fruition during this period!  How can a writer 
of Mann’s stamp ascribe value to his own activity, and thus prosecute it with any conviction, if he is all 
the while conscious that value itself is a delusion?  Nietzsche’s ‘transcendence’ of disbelief is a logical 
impossibility – an attempt, as it were, to push and pull at the same time – and it is no wonder that Mann 
considered the outright rejection of scepticism which he has Aschenbach carry through in Der Tod in 
Venedig.  When Mann, in his twilight years, resumed Felix Krull where he had left off (and in more or 
less the same Schopenhauerian spirit), he was confronted by exactly the same sense of meaninglessness 
which had checked the novel’s progress more than thirty years before.  In a diary entry for July 1951 he 
writes: ‘Nagende Zweifel ob es “Sinn” hat, den Krull-Roman fortzusetzen.  Geistiger Hintergrund fehlt 
bis auf das Künstlertum, das abgeschmackt ist.’ (TB IX, 77-78)  
97
 Peter Pütz, in an article significantly entitled ‘Der Ausbruch aus der Negativität’, identifies Der Tod 
in Venedig as marking a decisive step towards a more positive philosophical position: ‘Thomas Mann 
[erarbeitet] spätestens seit dem Tod in Venedig eine Position[…], von der aus jenseits rückloser 
Erkenntnis ein Ethos der Arbeit und Anstrengung erstrebt wird, das sich einer relativistischen oder gar 
nihilistischen Ausschweifung mit aller Kraft entgegenstemmt.’ (Pütz 1988, 8)  
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Daß immer der Geist der Wirklichkeit voran ist, daß die Materie ihm nur schwerfällig folgt, das 
versteht sich.  Aber eine so krankhafte, so unverkennbar gefahrdrohende Spannung im 
politischen, sozialen und ökonomischen Leben der Völker zwischen Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit, 
zwischen dem im Geiste längst erreichten und vollzogenen und dem, was sich Wirklichkeit zu 
nennen erlaubte, hatte es vielleicht nie zuvor gegeben, und in dem närrischen Ungehorsam 
gegen den Geist, oder, religiös ausgedrückt, gegen Gottes Willen, haben wir gewiß die 
eigentliche Ursache der Wetterentladung zu suchen, die uns betäubt.
98
 
  
‘Geist’, then, is not part of the world of things (for if it is ‘der Wirklichkeit voran’ it is 
evidently not ‘Wirklichkeit’ itself) and at the same time it is a productive and 
progressive force with a sovereign right to regulate the phenomenal realm.
99
  As a 
matter of fact, the notion that human beings can be wholly accounted for in 
naturalistic terms is quite unacceptable to Mann in his later years, as the following 
declaration from his 1946 essay on Dostoevsky makes clear: 
 
Wir wollen es aussprechen: Eine Humanität reift heran oder stellt sich aus der Vergessenheit 
wieder her, die den Begriff des Lebens und seiner Gesundheit der Biologie, die ein besonderes, 
ein ausschließliches Anrecht daran zu haben glaubt, aus den Händen nimmt und ihn auf freiere 
sowohl wie frömmere, vor allem auf wahrheitsgemäßere Weise zu verwalten sich anheischig 
macht.  Denn der Mensch is kein bloß biologisches Wesen. (IX, 666) 
 
And although such statements were made more than thirty years after Mann’s most 
intensely Nietzschean and Schopenhauerian period, they cannot be dismissed as a sort 
of philosophical and religious conversion brought on by intimations of personal 
mortality.  On the contrary, the first steps towards this wholly different attitude 
towards the other-worldly can be traced back to before the First World War.  An 
examination of ‘Geist’ in works such as Betrachtungen and Der Zauberberg reveals 
that Mann, although he occasionally writes as though it is just another name for life-
denying ‘Erkenntnis’, most often accuses it of having a positive agenda of its own: 
precisely as though it were a noumenal entity bent on imposing its order willy-nilly on 
the phenomenal world.  This line of thought is already discernible in the ‘Literatur 
Essay’, which alludes to the opposition between ‘Zivilisation’ which is seen as a life-
denying emanation of ‘Geist’ and ‘Kultur’ which is seen as the converse: an accretion 
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 (XI, 669) The lecture was delivered in the Library of Congress in 1942. 
99
 Evidently, what Mann says in this address has a Hegelian ring, a matter which will be addressed in 
chapter IV. 
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of uncriticized customs and habits.  That is: ‘Natur’ as expressed in human society.100  
By the time Mann comes to write his patriotic article ‘Gedanken im Krieg’ it is clear 
that the opposition between ‘Natur’ and ‘Geist’ which in ‘Tonio Kröger’ seems a 
problem for literary artists and no-one else, has become an explanatory principle valid 
not just for the First World War but for all sorts of other conflicts:
101
 ‘Zivilisation und 
Kultur sind nicht nur nicht ein und dasselbe, sondern sie sind Gegensätze, sie bilden 
eine der vielfältigen Erscheinungsformen des ewigen Weltgegensatzes und 
Widerspieles von Geist und Natur.’102 
 
This notion – that ‘Geist’ and ‘Natur’ are ‘Weltgegensätze’ – provides the key to 
Betrachtungen.  Once we grasp that Mann’s denunciations of ‘Zivilisation’, of the 
‘Literat’, of the entente powers etc. are actually denunciations of a metaphysical 
principle, and once we understand that, conversely, his celebrations of German 
‘barbarism’ are due to a belief in the identity of his fatherland and ‘Natur’ (so that a 
defence of one must entail the defence of the other) then we can begin to make sense 
of what would otherwise be a deeply enigmatic tract.
103
  It is, of course, sometimes 
difficult to make out this antithesis because, firstly, Mann is by no means a clear or 
systematic thinker and, secondly (as the open letter to Romain Rolland, the ‘Gegen 
Recht und Wahrheit’ chapter, frequently implies), he comes to modify some of his 
initial assumptions as the course of the war and as the composition of Betrachtungen 
unfolds.  For example, he sees that describing Germany as lacking ‘Geist’ is to do its 
artistic and intellectual heritage a disservice, and sometimes he seems to want to argue 
                                                 
100‘Kultur ist offenbar nicht der Gegensatz von Barbarei[…]Kultur kann Orakel, Magie, 
Päderastie[…],den buntesten Greuel umfassen’ (Mann 1967, 215) 
101
 In the novella the preferred term is ‘Leben’ rather than ‘Natur’ – but both words refer to the same 
thing. 
102
 (15.1, 27)  Note that of all the opposita listed in the ‘Literatur Essay’ these two have been singled 
out as subsuming all the rest. 
103
 For example: ‘Und nochmals: erweise ich denn der Zivilisation nicht Ehre?  Man hat sie materiell 
genannt: ich leugne, daß sie es sei.  Man hat sie einfach als den staatlich geordneten und gezähmten 
menschlichen Zustand zu bestimmen versucht: auch das genügt mir nicht, denn ich sehe, daß sie ein 
viel zu geistiges Prinzip ist, um beim Staate halt machen zu können, viel zu sehr Wille zur Auflösung, 
um nicht nach der Auflösung des Staates zu streben.  Sie sind Franzose, und Sie leugnen das?  Die 
Zivilisation wird sich nicht damit begnügen, den Staat aufzulösen.  Sie wird die nationalen 
Leidenschaften einschläfern und zur Ruhe bestatten.  Sie wird die pazifizierte Esperanto-Erde schaffen, 
auf welcher der Krieg unmöglich ist, – ich glaube an sie, wie Sie sehen; ich glaube an ihrer Zukunft, 
und wie sollte ich nicht.  Sie ist die Zukunft und der Fortschritt selbst.’ (13.1, 187)  Notice that though 
‘Geist’ is presented as unappetizing – ‘Esperanto-Erde’ and so on – it already displays some of the 
characteristics (it is a progressive, impersonal force which will one day inherit the earth) which Mann 
will later vindicate on its behalf. 
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that there are different kinds of ‘Geist’ in the world.104  But the most important of 
such reconsiderations is surely this: the gathering persuasion that the forces 
represented by Germany and her opponents need to be brought into some kind of 
balance or accord with one another, and that any chance of a happier European future 
depends on this happening. 
 
Man glaube es mir oder nicht: ich bin des Gedankens fähig, daß der Haß und die Feindschaft 
unter den Völkern Europas zuletzt eine Täuschung, ein Irrtum ist, – daß die einander 
zerfleischenden Parteien im Grunde gar keine Parteien sind, sondern gemeinsam, unter Gottes 
Willen, in brüderlicher Qual an der Erneuerung der Welt und der Seele arbeiten. (13.1, 530-531) 
 
And this statement, though it might seem a sudden renunciation of the anti-‘Geist’ 
rhetoric which characterizes so many passages of Betrachtungen, is by no means 
discordant with the implied principles of the work.  For Betrachtungen marks a clear 
development in the conception of ‘Geist’ and ‘Natur’ as expounded by the ‘Literatur 
Essay’, in which both principles were seen as equally valueless: ‘Geist’ being no more 
than hostility to ‘Natur’ and ‘Natur’ just a blind affirmation of itself.  Mann’s war-
time tract, by contrast, does not treat these opposites as being valueless.  Rather, it 
suggests that both have their place in the world but that the defeat of Germany by the 
allies would result in a perilous preponderance of the one over the other.
105
   And it is 
against this danger that Mann feels compelled to struggle.  It is true, of course, that as 
a writer his only means to ward off such a catastrophe is a verbal polemic against 
‘Geist’ itself, and he uses every rhetorical weapon in the armoury to this purpose.  
                                                 
104
 ‘Wir können aber unmöglich umhin, uns zu verwundern und einen gewissen Anstoß daran zu 
nehmen, daß die Verkündiger der  “Solidarität aller Geistigen” so tun, als gäbe es nur eine Art 
Geistigkeit, einen Geist an sich, und es sei[...]der Geist der Aufklärung und des Fortschritts.’ (13.1, 
351)  This is an example of Mann’s readiness to undermine the structure of his own argument for a 
momentary polemical gain.  If ‘Geist’ can be found on both sides of the universal struggle which Mann 
claims to see in every conflict, then it cannot represent one of the struggle’s oppositional principles. 
105
 In Mann’s copy of the Marbacher Schillerbuch (published in 1905 on the anniversary of the 
dramatist’s death,) we find the following passage in Adolf Baumeister’s essay ‘Schillers Idee von 
seinem Dichterberuf’: ‘Die alte Welt hatte die Natur, die griechische schon die beseelte, und so 
verlangte es sie nach ihr.  Sie ist naiv, und ihre Kunst ist es mit.  Das mittlere Alter verlor die Natur im 
Ringen um den Geist, an dem allein ihm letzlich gelegen.  Die Zukunft, die “selige Zeit”, wird Natur 
und Geist besitzen und versöhnen.’ (Schwäbischer Schillerverein 1905, 25)  Mann, having underlined 
the passage, has furnished it further with a double exclamation mark, either of recognition or of 
inspiration, in the margin.  Tschol-Za Kim, in an article which attempts to trace the relationship 
between ‘Natur’ and ‘Geist’ in Mann’s works, remarks: ‘Im Spätwerk versucht Thomas Mann “Natur” 
und “Geist” in Verbindung zu setzen, so daß “Natur” und “Geist” synthetisch erscheinen und sich 
gegenseitig erfordern.’ (Kim 1975, 72) However, the change in the relationship between ‘Natur’ and 
‘Geist’ which Kim correctly identifies would have been unthinkable without a corresponding change in 
the theoretical content of the two terms, and in particular of ‘Geist’. 
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But, as he makes clear in the above passage, he is not an implacable enemy of ‘Geist’ 
as such: rather he is against its absolute dominion. 
 
Which brings us to Der Zauberberg – a novel of encyclopaedic richness and 
complexity, but whose main ideological purpose is the proper accommodation of 
‘Natur’ and ‘Geist’.  This is not, however, to say that we should look to see the two 
opposing principles unambiguously embodied by fictional characters.  Though we 
feel tempted to identify Claudia Chauchat, whose character is marked by warm but 
ruthless instinct, with ‘Natur’, or Settembrini, whose conversation consists mostly of 
uplift and abstraction, with ‘Geist’, the fact of the matter is that each is a compound of 
both principles.
106
  Settembrini, for example, sometimes champions ‘Geist’ in the 
most unambiguous way: 
 
Eine Macht, ein Prinzip aber gibt es, dem meine höchste und letzte Ehrerbietung und Liebe gilt, 
und diese Macht, dieses Prinzip ist der Geist.  Wie sehr ich es verabscheue, irgendein 
verdächtiges Mondscheingespinst und –gespenst, das man ‘die Seele’ nennt, gegen den Leib 
ausgespielt zu sehen – innerhalb der Antithese von Körper und Geist bedeutet der Körper das 
böse, das teuflische Prinzip, denn der Körper ist Natur, und die Natur – innerhalb ihres 
Gegensatzes zum Geiste, zur Vernunft, ich wiederhole das! – ist böse – mystisch und böse. (5.1, 
378-9) 
 
But confronted with the truly pitiless ‘Geist’ propounded by Naphta – who exhibits a 
medieval relish for the sufferings of the flesh at the instigation of other-worldly 
dictates – he takes up the cudgels for ‘Natur’.  To Naphta’s ‘Aber es hieße immerhin 
Geist in die Natur tragen.  Sie hat es nötig,’ Settembrini replies, ‘Die Natur[…]hat 
Ihren Geist durchaus nicht nötig.  Sie ist selber Geist.’ (5.1, 565) Indeed, it seems that 
Mann’s purpose in introducing Naphta to Settembrini is not to play off ‘Natur’ against 
‘Geist’, but rather to show an unreflective proponent of the latter both its 
metaphysical character and its disregard for human frailty.  In order to fend off the 
little Jesuit Settembrini is obliged to embroil himself in contradictions so obvious that 
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 As Schneider points out, it is a mistake to think of all Mann’s characters as limited to the ideological 
positions indicated by the leitmotifs associated with them.  The latter should be regarded as  
‘Anspielungen, die durchaus in einem Spannungsverhältnis zur Darstellung einer Figur stehen können’ 
but not as ‘die eigentlich gültigen Aussagen über sie.’ (Schneider 1999, 125) 
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even the moderately intellectually gifted Hans Castorp can divine them.
107
   And yet 
we should not be surprised to see Settembrini prepared to change sides in this way, 
remembering how impossible Mann finds it in Betrachtungen to keep the two 
principles discrete in his consideration of the nations involved in the First World War, 
and how he allows Germany – at first seen as the wholehearted champion of ‘Natur’ – 
a degree of ‘Geist’ too.  If we take Mann’s view that ‘Geist’ is part and parcel of 
human beings then it is hard to see how it can be wholly absent from their attitudes 
and behaviour, and the ‘Weltgegensätze’ must operate within them as well as between 
them. 
 
In nobody is this struggle more evident than Hans Castorp himself.  He feels a deep 
attachment to German ‘Kultur’, that accretion of hallowed fact which his cousin 
Joachim would consider it impious to critique, and his ‘Sympathie mit dem Tode’, as 
Reed points out, should be understood as shorthand for such attachment.
108
  By 
contrast, his snow vision is an imaginative emancipation from the traditional ties that 
bind.  The world of the ‘Sonnenkinder’,109 who are shown conducting a life 
characterized by ‘leichte und unter Lächeln verborgene Ehrerbietung, die sie einander, 
unmerklich fast und doch kraft einer deutlich durch alle waltenden Sinnesbindung und 
eingefleischten Idee, auf Schritt und Tritt erwiesen’ (5.1, 742) seems very different 
from the Esperanto-world that Mann had prophesied in Betrachtungen, but it is none 
the less an expression of ‘Geist’.  Now, though, it seems infinitely desirable, while 
‘Natur’ (in its social guise ‘Kultur’) is presented under its worst aspect: two old 
women – speaking a German dialect – ritually devour a baby!  
 
Given, then, that Mann’s understanding of and attitude towards ‘Geist’ does change 
during this period, the question arises: which are the literary and philosophical 
                                                 
107
 ‘Hans Castorp[…]fragte, was denn aber bei solcher Bewandtnis mit Plotinus los sei, der sich 
nachweislich seines Körpers geschämt, und mit Voltaire, der im Namen der Vernunft gegen das 
skandalöse Erdbeben von Lisabon revoltiert habe?  Absurd?  Das sei auch absurd gewesen, aber wenn 
man alles recht überlege, so könne seiner Ansicht nach das Absurde recht wohl als das geistig 
Ehrenhafte bezeichnen, und die absurde Naturfeindschaft der gotischen Kunst sei am Ende ebenso 
ehrenhaft gewesen wie das Gebaren der Plotinus und Voltaire, denn es drücke sich dieselbe 
Emanzipation von Fatum und Faktum darin aus, derselbe unknechtische Stolz, der sich weigere, vor 
der dummen Macht, nämlich vor der Natur abzudanken.’ (5.1, 597) 
108
 ‘On the one hand, that original chink in the armour of Hans Castorp’s normality has now become 
his prime quality; on the other, it has become Thomas Mann’s catch-phrase for all those deeper 
characteristics which distinguish Germans from their western enemies and critics’ (Reed 1996, 242)   
109
 Both the Mediterranean and the sun itself, the symbol of Platonic enlightenment, are strongly 
associated with Geist for Mann. 
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sources which help him reformulate one world-view proposing nothing but a negative 
dilemma – between a valueless world of the senses and a valueless rejection of the 
same – into another quite different world-view proposing a genuine metaphysic of 
value as a counterweight to a natural world which itself is understood to have a claim 
on our respect? 
 
Plato 
 
One source is evident enough from the passages already cited in this chapter: Plato 
and the Platonic tradition – a tradition which offers a more-or-less elaborate 
metaphysic but whose central thrust is that the imperfect realm of experience can only 
be found meaningful by reference to another one, necessarily hidden from the senses, 
to which human beings as partly noumenal entities can have access.  Above all, the 
Platonic metaphysic can test the ultimate validity of evaluative statements (and of 
actions in accord with such statements) by offering an independent criterion of value 
– το καλόν.  Whereas the naturalist necessarily traces back the human experience of 
beauty and morality to things which can have no claim to either (evolutionary 
pressure, blind custom, brain activity etc.) the Platonist refers them to the beautiful 
and the moral as metaphysical truths.  And once the existence of such truths is 
granted, then so is the possibility of progress (rather than simple change, which is all 
that is left once we discount the possibility of making a valid estimate of it) in human 
affairs.  Diotima’s Eros-doctrine as related by Socrates in Symposium – a work which 
is, as Reed points out, an extremely important source for Der Tod in Venedig – 
consists in promoting the soul from an appreciation of beautiful bodies, through the 
appreciation of beautiful customs and institutions, until it can set sail at last on what 
she calls the πέλαγοϛ, the ‘open sea’, of beauty.  But she insists that the individual 
seeker after το καλόν should not become obsessed by beauty in its lower 
instantiations to the neglect of the higher ones.
110
  In fact any possible instantiation of 
the criterion of value must be considered as no more than a means to reaching and 
realizing and becoming one with the criterion itself: ‘When a man has reached this 
                                                 
110
 She mentions in passing that Eros, conceived as the search for το καλόν, has an important social 
dimension too.  It inspires the thoughtful artist, of course: ‘However, under the general heading 
“thought”, by far the finest and most important item is the art of political and domestic economy, what 
we call good judgement, and justice.’ (Plato (translator: Tom Griffith) 1997, 43)  In other words, 
Plato’s criterion of value makes possible political and not just individual progress – a notion further 
developed in Republic. 
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point in his education in love, studying the different types of beauty in correct order, 
he will come to the final end and goal of this education.  Then suddenly he will see a 
beauty of breathtaking nature, Socrates, the beauty which is the justification of all his 
efforts so far. It is eternal, neither coming to be nor passing away, neither increasing 
nor decreasing.’ (Plato (translator: Tom Griffith) 1997, 45) So she is only being 
consistent when she puts Socrates on his guard against an infatuation with beautiful 
bodies, referring to them as phantomatic εἴδωλα – useful if they help bring us closer 
to το καλόν itself, noxious if they ensnare our attention and thus prevent further 
progress.  We need only bear such strictures in mind to grasp what a perversion of 
true Platonism Aschenbach is guilty of in worshipping his ‘Idol’ in a manner such as 
this:
 111
 
 
Seine Augen umfaßten die edle Gestalt dort am Rande des Blauen, und in aufschwärmendem 
Entzücken glaubte er mit diesem Blick das Schöne selbst zu begreifen, die Form als 
Gottesgedanken, die eine und reine Vollkommenheit, die im Geiste lebt und von der ein 
menschliches Abbild und Gleichnis hier leicht und hold zur Anbetung aufgerichtet war. (2.1, 
553)  
 
If we are prepared to accept that Mann considered Platonist evaluative thinking to be 
more than intellectual deadwood worthy only of pity or irony (which is surely how a 
Schopenhauerian or Nietzschean would consider it), then we can see its marks and 
repercussions throughout, for example, Betrachtungen.  Schopenhauer’s ‘Intelligenz’ 
either serves the ‘Wille’ or rejects it, but cannot perceive an alternative to it, and as 
for historical progress Schopenhauer denies that such a thing is possible.  Yet Mann’s 
‘Geist’ is, as we have seen, distinguished by ideality, universality and progression.  
Nor can we legitimately propose that Mann identifies ‘Geist’ with the persistent 
delusion that such a thing might exist, for he explicitly rejects any such explanation – 
even when he is defending ‘Natur’ against ‘Geist’ and it would surely serve his turn to 
denounce the latter as a mental figment and no more.  When Schopenhauer derides 
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 Aschenbach’s famous ‘kleine Abhandlung’ is composed ‘im Angesicht des Idols und die Musik 
seiner Stimme im Ohr.’ (2.1, 556)  Both the term ‘Idol’ and the reference to music, rather than visual 
beauty, suggest that he is a very different sort of person from the Socrates with whom he sometimes 
identifies.  Mark Pearson points out that the text is full of clues as to how distorted Aschenbach’s view 
of the philosopher is.  In the first Socratic interlude, ‘Mann [lässt] seinen Aschenbach vom Beginn der 
Umschreibung an die Formulierung “des Fühlenden ” gebrauchen.  Dies ist ganz offensichtlich “un-
Platonisch”.[...]Würde er sich streng an die platonische Doktrine halten, müßte Aschenbach 
beispielsweise “Das Schöne ist der Weg des Wahrnehmenden zum Geist ” sagen.’ (Pearson 2003, 53) 
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‘Geist’ (Hegel’s – but Schopenhauer’s strictures are just as pertinent to Plato’s) in 
these terms: ‘Geist?  Wer ist denn der Bursche?  und woher kennt ihr ihn?  Ist er nicht 
etwa bloß eine beliebige und bequeme Hypostase, die ihr nicht ein Mal definiert, 
geschweige deduziert oder beweist?’ (13.1, 333) Mann’s rejoinder is unambiguous: 
‘Wir sind weit entfernt, sie [Schopenhauer’s opinion of ‘Geist’] uns zu eigen zu 
machen’.  
 
Schiller 
 
Plato is not, however, the only source for the evaluative metaphysic which comes to 
form so important an element in Mann’s world-view.  In 1905 Mann was 
commissioned by the satirical and literary periodical Simplicissimus to write the 
fictional study of Schiller which was to become ‘Schwere Stunde’,112 and as a 
preparation Mann acquainted himself, or perhaps reacquainted himself, with 
Schiller’s theoretical works.113  This much is not disputed.  What is disputed, 
however, is that Schiller’s aesthetic philosophizing had any deep or lasting impact on 
Mann’s outlook.  Reed, for example, reviewing Sandberg’s Thomas Manns Schiller 
Studien, is quite emphatic: ‘Schiller was scarcely an influence on Mann.  Even the 
categories naif/sentimentalisch were late interpretative labels of great prestige but not 
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 Mann’s annotated edition of Symposium was published in 1903, so it is likely that his 
reconsideration of Schiller’s theoretical writings and his developing interest in Platonic thought were 
contemporaneous.  It should be noted, in passing, that this thesis is concerned with Schiller as a 
theoretician rather than as a personality with a good deal in common with Mann’s own.  Paul Bishop, 
in an essay on Mann’s intellectual background, rightly remarks that in terms of sensuality and 
extraversion on the one hand and ideality and introversion on the other hand, Mann was far closer in 
spirit to Schiller than to Goethe, (Bishop 2002, 39) and a biographical study of the parallels between 
Schiller and Mann might prove worthwhile and enlightening.  This thesis, however, is concerned 
chiefly with Schiller’s influence on the evolution of Mann’s philosophical world-view. 
113
 In his treatise on Mann’s relationship to Schiller, Thomas Manns Schiller-Studien (a treatise which 
downplays the importance of that relationship in order to emphasize instead a continuing debt to 
Nietzsche) Sandberg writes, ‘Die spärlichen Schiller Notizen in diesem Material [i.e. the notes for the 
‘Literatur Essay’] sind gewiß Niederschläge der Lektüre, zu der Thomas Mann während der 
Vorbereitung für die Schiller-Studie angeregt worden war.’ (Sandberg 1965, 61) He then goes on to list 
references and quotations from Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, and a little later 
claims that Mann’s acquaintance with Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung dates from the same 
period.  It is quite true that the ‘Literatur Essay’ contains fewer references to Schiller than to, say, 
Nietzsche.  But they are of importance none the less, starting with a quotation from Gedanken über den 
Gebrauch des Gemeinen und Niedrigen in der Kunst
 
 on the first page (‘Gemein ist alles, was nicht zu 
dem Geiste spricht und kein anderes als ein sinnliches Interesse erregt’) (Mann 1967, 152) and 
culminating in the following defence of Schiller against his detractors: ‘Mit der schönsten 
Gerechtigkeit, Einsicht, und Würde hat er seine Art gegen die des realistischen Nachbarn abgegrenzt, 
nicht abgewogen, und seine wundervolle Untersuchung “Über naive und sentiment. Dichtung” ist, trotz 
Nietzsche, eine Künstlerschrift in Vergleich mit welcher die Schriften Wagners nur ein ehrgeiziges 
Geflunker sind.’ (Mann 1967, 202-203)   
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a constitutive element.’114 And once again, Reed is typical of a more general trend, for 
although recognition of Mann’s debt to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer is a critical 
commonplace, works which take seriously the Schiller connection, which see it as 
anything more than peripheral to Mann’s thinking, are extremely rare.  For the most 
part discussion relating to the influence of Schiller’s theoretical works on Mann is 
limited to the respective artist-typologies of the two writers.   
 
It is not our intention to minimize Mann’s debt to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer – their 
influence is detectable in virtually all of his fiction.  If Reed is right – and he surely is 
– to attribute Mann’s scepticism, his determination that customary beliefs and values 
be psychologically scrutinized, to Nietzsche’s doctrines, then the whole of Mann’s 
œuvre testifies to Nietzsche’s influence.  As for Schopenhauer, Mann shows a 
continuing interest in what one might term that philosopher’s ‘mystical naturalism’.  
By which we mean the notion that the objective (i.e. independent of a legislating 
subject) phenomenal world is the creation of a metaphysical generative force.  
Whenever Mann considers the natural world, and whenever he considers human 
beings as part of that world, his thinking takes on, if not the Schopenhauerian 
terminology, at least a Schopenhauerian tenor.
115
  It is, however, our intention to 
argue that much that is most characteristic of the later Mann’s world-view is as 
irreconcilable with Nietzsche and Schopenhauer as it is consistent with Schiller.  This 
is not to say, of course, that Mann’s discovery (or rediscovery) of Schiller’s 
theoretical works – any more than his fresh acquaintance with Plato – brought about 
an immediate revolution in his thinking, and Sandberg is no doubt right to feel that 
many of his earliest reactions to Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in 
einer Reihe von Briefen and Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung are qualified 
by a previous reading of Nietzsche.  Instead of a sudden change of heart – an outright 
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 (Reed 1967, 569) This opinion seems to have attained the status of orthodoxy.  Koopmann’s article 
‘Thomas Manns Schillerbilder – Lebenslängliche Mißverständnisse’ approves without reservation 
Sandberg’s ‘immer noch maßgebende[n] Schiller-Studie.’  (Koopmann 1999, 126) 
115
 During the visit to Lisbon’s Natural History Museum, for example, Felix Krull’s admiration 
expresses itself in the following terms: ‘Wir[…]betraten rechtshin eine Flucht ungleich großer Räumer, 
wo denn nun freilich der “Sinn für die Formen und das Charaktere des Lebens”, dessen ich mich 
gerühmt hatte, sein Genüge, ja ein bedrängendes Übergenüge finden mochte, so dicht und den Blick 
der Sympathie fangend auf Schritt und Tritt war Zimmer und Saal von je und je dem Schoß der Natur 
entquollenen Bildungen, welche neben dem trüben Versuch sogleich auch das genauest Entwickelte, in 
seiner Art Vollendetste gewahren ließen.’ (VII, 573)  But when Professor Kuckuck – in response to 
Felix’s insistence that he be shown ‘den Menschen’ – invites his young guest ‘hinab’ into the 
subterranean galleries with their exhibition of prehistoric humanity,  the reply is distinctly, if playfully, 
unSchopenhauerian: ‘ “Hinauf, wollen Sie sagen,” schaltete ich geistvoll ein.’ (VII, 578) 
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rejection of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer and a declaration for Schiller – we witness a 
gradual realization on Mann’s part over a period of years that Schiller’s analysis and 
fundamental assumptions in these essays offered what was missing from the analysis 
and fundamental assumptions of Mann’s earlier philosophical masters.  These had, we 
remember, given him the choice between an uncritical ‘Bejahung’ of the phenomenal 
world or an uncritical ‘Verneinung’ of it – uncritical in the most literal sense of 
‘lacking a valid criterion’.  By contrast Schiller, following in the footsteps of Kant and 
of Plato too,
116
 emphasizes again and again that the human being as subject – a 
concept he refers to as ‘die Person’ – is not part of the phenomenal world, not 
susceptible to its necessity, and is therefore capable of making valid evaluations 
concerning the phenomenal realm.
117
 Furthermore, it can intervene in the phenomenal 
realm by the application of authentic criteria of one kind or another: can this proposed 
action stand the test of a Kantian categorical imperative, is that proposed creative 
undertaking consistent with a Platonic-sounding ‘ideal’?  As we have seen, this is 
precisely the kind of theoretical framework the later Mann takes for granted, and 
although Nolte is mistaken in trying to accommodate the theoretical division between 
being and meaning characteristic of the ‘Joseph’ novels to Schopenhauer, she is 
absolutely right to see that division as consistent with Plato and Kant.
118
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 That Schiller owes an important to debt to Plato is argued by David Pugh in an article dealing with 
the relationship between these two thinkers, and his gloss of a passage in Über das Erhabene is 
convincing: ‘Man has a rational and a natural part. We feel beauty when the two parts are in harmony, 
and we feel the sublime when the rational part is dominant.  But reason and nature here are only 
superficially psychological terms.  In fact, or so I would claim, they stand for the intelligible and 
material worlds, the borderline between which is man’s assigned place in the cosmos.  These are 
ontological terms, and Schiller’s use of them is indicative of his adoption of the entire apparatus of 
Platonic ontology.’ (Pugh 1991, 283) We might add that the ‘ideals’ which serve the sentimental poet 
as artistic benchmarks are far more easily accommodated by a Platonic than by a Kantian framework, 
as is the Schillerian notion that the physically beautiful serves as an appetizing invitation for us to 
ascend to the morally worthy.  For, terminological differences notwithstanding, this is the same 
doctrine (το καλόν in the world of physical bodies leads the soul on to το καλόν in the social and 
political sphere and beyond) expounded by Diotima in Symposium. 
117
 As explained in the eleventh letter of the Ästhetische Erziehung. 
118
 It is improbable that Mann had much direct knowledge of Kant’s philosophy.  In Betrachtungen he 
describes Kant’s style as ‘furchteinflößend’ (13.1, 191) and seems baffled, if not abashed, by Rolland’s 
attribution to him of a sound understanding of this philosopher (with the implication that Mann should 
know better than to engage in the nationalistic irrationality exhibited by ‘Gedanken im Krieg’).  Having 
done his best to assimilate Kant’s categorical imperative to Nietzsche’s ‘Moralkritik im Zeichen des 
Lebens’ (13.1, 208) Mann goes on to say: ‘Von dieser Denkweise und geistigen Struktur, diesem 
zugleich ironischen und kategorischen Begriff der Politik habe auch ich, ohne im mindesten 
“Philosoph” zu sein , irgendwie irgend etwas abbekommen.’  It may well be that after this exchange 
with Rolland Mann came to feel he had a duty, as an eminent German man of letters, to better 
appreciate his country’s most renouned thinker.  Such a cultural obligation would help explain his 
continuing interest in Schiller’s theoretical works – which reformulate key elements of Kant’s 
philosophy in a more stylistically palatable form. 
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But Schiller is more to Mann than a conduit for Kantian and a reinforcement for 
Platonic thought:
119
 he is a theoretical innovator and certain characteristic 
preoccupations and mental habits of his are easily identifiable in Mann’s fictional and 
non-fictional works.  In particular, Schiller does not have the contemptuous attitude 
towards the phenomenal realm (‘Natur’ as he customarily calls it)120 that both Plato 
and Kant are bound to have, given that they locate all value in the noumenal realm, 
and he sharply distinguishes his point of view in this matter from that of Kant which 
he summarizes so: ‘Aus dem Sanktuarium der reinen Vernunft brachte er das fremde 
und doch wieder so bekannte Moralgesetz, stellte es in seiner ganzen Heiligkeit aus 
vor dem entwürdigten Jahrhundert und fragte wenig darnach, ob es Augen gibt, die 
seinen Glanz nicht vertragen.’ (Schiller 1992, 368)  Whereas Schiller’s own project is 
to effect a reconciliation of the phenomenal and noumenal: 
 
Bis hierher [i.e. that beauty is no guarantor of morality] glaube ich, mit den Rigoristen der 
Moral vollkommen einstimmig zu sein, aber ich hoffe dadurch noch nicht zum Latitudinarier zu 
werden, daß ich die Ansprüche der Sinnlichkeit, die im Felde der reinen Vernunft, und bei der 
moralischen Gesetzgebung, völlig zurückgewiesen sind, im Feld der Erscheinung, und bei der 
wirklichen Ausübung der Sittenpflicht, noch zu behaupten versuche. (Schiller 1992, 366) 
 
In Über Anmut und Würde Schiller’s defence of ‘Natur’ is relatively modest: a 
necessary condition for the full realization of noumenal morality is that its 
introduction be tempered to the character of the phenomenal realm.  Such a tempering 
lies at the heart of Schiller’s concept of ‘Menschheit’, which he understands as an 
unforced accord between humanity’s empirical self and its ‘Person’, so that the 
former subsumes the latter, just as the latter subsists in the former.  But whereas this 
earlier justification of the respect due to ‘Natur’ seems predicated on little more than 
the phenomenal self’s readiness to adopt morality so thoroughly as to transmute the 
latter into a second nature, the last of Schiller’s great theoretical works, Über naive 
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 Frizen writes of Mann’s knowledge of Kant and Plato in the ‘Schopenhauer’ essay: ‘Allzu 
intim[...]ist die Kenntnis der beiden Philosophen nicht gewesen: bis 1938 wird Thomas Mann die 
“Kritik der reinen Vernunft” nicht in die Hand genommen und auch Plato kaum als Philosophen 
gelesen haben.’ (Frizen 1980, 21) But Mann had access to Kantian thinking through the medium of 
Schiller’s theoretical writings, and Frizen’s affirmation that he never read Plato ‘als Philosophen’ is 
simply gratuitous. 
120
 Schiller and Mann both equivocate on this word.  Sometimes it has the theoretical sense of ‘den 
ganzen Gegenstand aller möglichen Erfahrung’, (Kant III, 162) i.e. the phenomenal realm generally, 
sometimes it has the usual sense of ‘unspoilt fauna and flora’. 
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und sentimentalische Dichtung goes much further in its vindication.  For there 
‘Menschheit’ is not the result of the careful impression of the metaphysical onto the 
physical, but actually precedes the degeneration which calls forth the ideals of the 
‘sentimental’ as a necessary correction.  That is: both ‘Natur’ and ‘Menschheit’ as its 
human expression are represented as a state of prelapsarian purity with a claim to 
temporal, ethical and aesthetic priority of the sort that Rousseau would have 
recognized.  Their only drawback is that they are incapable of sustaining themselves 
against the decadence to which the whole world is prey. 
 
Das naive Dichtergenie bedarf also eines Beistandes von außen, da das sentimentalische sich 
aus sich selbst nährt und reinigt; es muß eine formreiche Natur, eine dichterische Welt, eine 
naive Menschheit um sich her erblicken, da es schon in der Sinnesempfindung sein Werk zu 
vollenden hat.  Fehlt ihm nun dieser Beistand von außen, sieht er sich von einem geistlosen 
Stoff umgeben, so kann nur zweierlei geschehen.  Er tritt entweder, wenn die Gattung bei ihm 
überwiegend ist, aus seiner Art, und wird sentimentalisch, um nur dichterisch zu sein, oder, 
wenn der Artcharakter die Obermacht behält, es tritt aus seiner Gattung, und wird gemeine 
Natur, um nur Natur zu bleiben. (Schiller 1992, 780)   
 
Both of these attitudes: on the one hand the distrust of a severe morality which takes 
no notice of the complexion of the phenomenal realm, on the other hand the persistent 
and ever bolder championing of ‘Natur’ as worthy of respect – both these attitudes run 
like golden threads through Schiller’s theoretical works.  Golden threads we find 
woven, too, into the text of Thomas Mann’s literary endeavours.   
 
Let us begin with a consideration of ‘Natur’.  We have seen, in our analysis of ‘Tonio 
Kröger’, that Mann hungered for the very life which falls prey to the writer’s duty of 
‘Erkenntnis’, and there can be no doubt of his devotion, at a purely human (i.e. non-
literary) level, to the national and class ‘Kultur’ he had grown up in.  But though he 
felt himself attached to it, he was well aware that the entanglement of one set of 
phenomena (his own phenomenal self) with another set of phenomena (the things, 
habits and customs amongst which he had grown up) could never justify a literary 
commitment to them.  What he finds in Schiller, by contrast, is a theoretical (though, 
it must be admitted, not a very closely argued) justification for affirming ‘Natur’ to 
have valid claims which can with good conscience be defended against those of the 
evaluative metaphysical realm.  Mann, as we have seen, came to accept that ‘Geist’ 
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was more than the mere negation of ‘Natur’.  And though such a change of heart may 
have had its deepest origins in his creative dependence on a sense of moral 
consequence which both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer only succeeded in 
undermining, the realization of that change of heart could never have been achieved in 
the form it actually took had Plato and Schiller not been at hand.  Likewise, though 
his reasons for wanting to vindicate and protect ‘Natur’ (in the form of middle-class 
‘Leben’ or German ‘Kultur’) were personal, without Schiller’s authoritative – if 
unclear – theorizing it is doubtful whether Mann could have set it up as a positive 
alternative to an equally positive ‘Geist’. 
 
As for a distrust of the tendency of unchecked ‘Geist’ to tyrannize ‘Natur’ – the 
selfsame sentiment can be found throughout Betrachtungen and constitutes Mann’s 
main complaint against ‘Zivilisation’, the ‘Zivilisationsliterat’ etc.   Compare 
Schiller’s evident distaste for ‘Würde’ – which entails the mastery of ‘Geist’ over 
‘Natur’ rather than a reconciliation of the two principles – in such passages as ‘Die 
Anmut läßt der Natur da, wo sie die Befehle des Geistes ausrichtet, einen Schein von 
Freiwillgikeit; die Würde hingegen unterwirft sie da, wo sie herrschen will, dem 
Geist,’121 or: ‘Der Barbar verspottet und entehrt die Natur, aber verächtlicher als der 
Wilde fährt er häufig genug fort, der Sklave seines Sklaven zu sein,’ (Schiller 1992, 
567) with Mann’s:  
 
Vernunftwürde – ein schönes Wort! Ein humanes, ein Humanistenwort.  Und dennoch – wenn 
Würde, die gefestigte Würde geistiger Tugend ein hoch und edelbürgerlicher Zustand ist: ein 
eigentlich moralischer, ein religiöser oder künstlerischer, kurz, ein sehr menschlicher Zustand 
ist sie nicht, und – man muß es aussprechen – sie schließt in sich die Gefahr der Verhärtung. 
(13.1, 424) 
 
But Mann’s debt to Schiller goes beyond a ‘Geist-Natur’ theoretical framework 
wherein each principle has positive claims which its counterpart should be 
encouraged to respect, and it even goes beyond the adoption of a characteristic 
attitude and terminology in respect of those principles.  Above all, Mann takes from 
Schiller the conviction that the desired reconciliation of opposita is the special duty of 
the artist.   The main purpose of Ästhetische Erziehung is to demonstrate that art 
                                                 
121
 (Schiller 1992, 381)  It will be seen that Schiller is using the self-same terms, ‘Geist’ and ‘Natur’, in 
the self-same way that the mature Mann does. 
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(which Schiller defines extremely broadly, in line with Plato’s τεχνή) can bridge the 
gap between the noumenal and the phenomenal world, the noumenal and the 
phenomenal self.  He had already touched on this matter in Über Anmut und Würde, 
because it is clear that ‘Anmut’ (as opposed to ‘Würde’) is the most sensuously 
acceptable expression of ‘Geist’ in human comportment.  But art not only allows the 
gap between the individual’s ‘Natur’ and ‘Geist’ to be bridged; it also heals the rift 
between the two principles as they obtain within social structures, institutions, 
political movements etc.  And this because the artistic instinct, which Schiller refers 
to as the ‘Spieltrieb’, is a special aspect of ‘Geist’, free from both the necessity which 
governs the phenomenal world and that which governs the Kantian noumenal 
realm.
122
  That is: it belongs to neither world wholly, but has the power of free 
communication and negotiation between the two:  
 
Da nun aber bei dem Genuß der Schönheit oder der ästhetischen Einheit eine wirkliche 
Vereinigung und Auswechslung der Materie mit der Form und des Leidens mit der Tätigkeit vor 
sich geht, so ist eben dadurch die Vereinbarkeit beider Naturen, die Ausführbarkeit des 
Unendlichen in der Endlichkeit, mithin die Möglichkeit der erhabensten Menschheit erwiesen. 
(Schiller 1992, 659) 
 
Schiller sees not only the poet, the painter, and the sculptor as artistic practitioners, 
but also the statesman, with the consequence that he reserves his approval for those 
political initiatives and institutions mediated by the ‘Spieltrieb’: ‘Der Staat soll nicht 
bloß den objektiven und generischen, er soll auch den subjektiven und spezifischen 
Charakter in den Individuen ehren und, indem er das unsichtbare Reich der Sitten 
ausbreitet, das Reich der Erscheinung nicht entvölkern.’ (Schiller 1992, 565)  
 
These concepts too are echoed with great fidelity in Betrachtungen and elsewhere in 
Mann’s work.  His definition of the nature and role of art – and its relationship to 
politics – is practically a paraphrase of Schiller’s:  
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 In Mann’s copy of the collected works of Schiller (published 1911-12) the initial definition of the 
‘Spieltrieb’ as an intermediary between the noumenal and phenomenal realms (along with many other 
passages from Ästhetische Erziehung) has been marked  (with exclamation marks) as significant: 
‘Derjenige Trieb also, in welchem beide verbunden wirken (es sei mir einstweilen, bis ich diese 
Benennung gerechtfertigt haben werde, vergönnt, ihn Spieltrieb zu nennen), der Spieltrieb also würde 
dahin gerichtet sein, die Zeit in der Zeit aufzuheben, Werden mit absolutem Sein, Veränderung mit 
Identität zu vereinbaren.’ (Schiller 1911, 249)  
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Ihre Sendung beruht darin, daß sie, um es diplomatisch zu sagen, gleich gute Beziehungen zum 
Leben und zum reinen Geist verhält, daß sie zugleich konservativ und radikal ist; sie beruht in 
ihrer Mittel- Mittlerstellung zwischen Geist und Leben.  Hier ist die Quelle der Ironie...Hier ist 
aber auch, wenn irgendwo, die Verwandtschaft, die Ähnlichkeit der Kunst mit der Politik: denn 
auch diese nimmt, auf ihre Art, eine Mittlerstellung zwischen dem reinen Geist und dem Leben 
ein, und sie verdient ihren Namen nicht, wenn sie nichts als konservierend oder radikal-
destruktiv ist! (13.1, 620-621) 
 
Critical consideration of Mann’s debt to Schiller’s theoretical works usually begins 
and ends with the question of artist-typology,
123
 and it is indisputable that Mann owes 
an enormous debt to Über Anmut und Würde and Über naive und sentimentalische 
Dichtung in this regard.  But the extension of terms customarily limited to the 
definition and explanation of matters aesthetic to politics and society at large has the 
effect of universalizing Mann’s analysis of the artistic vocation and its travails.  There 
is no hint in ‘Tonio Kröger’ that the dilemma of its eponymous hero should be of 
concern to anybody but himself and the tiny number of authors who find themselves 
in a similar predicament.  By contrast it is evident that Adrian Leverkühn’s destiny is 
not his alone, but that the creative difficulties he faces foreshadow and accompany 
those political difficulties with which German society was confronted in the first half 
of the twentieth century, and it is equally evident that the catastrophic remedy he 
attempts should be understood as an anticipation in miniature of a historical and 
political disaster. 
 
However, Mann goes further than emphasizing the political dimension of art.  In line 
with Schiller’s analysis, he comes to see that agitators, statesmen, politicians of every 
stamp can best be understood as artists in the social realm.  And if we examine two 
figures from his later fiction: the Joseph of the tetralogy and the Moses of ‘Das 
Gesetz’ we will see how unreservedly he took some of Schiller’s pronouncements to 
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 Horst Daemmrich’s ‘Friedrich Schiller and Thomas Mann: Parallels in Aesthetics’ is a good 
example, and has the merit of emphasizing the nearly identical theoretical frameworks sustaining Über 
naive und sentimentalische Dichtung and ‘Goethe und Tolstoi’.  Daemmrich also points out that the 
failure of critics to appreciate the extent of Schiller’s influence on Mann is a natural consequence of 
their willingness to take ‘Mann’s oft-repeated assertion that Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Wagner, and in 
later years Goethe, were the dominant and informative influences in his life’ (Daemmrich 1965, 227) as 
the final word in a matter which should really be decided by an unprejudiced analysis of Mann’s texts.  
And when Mann does declare his admiration for and indebtedness to Schiller critics feel at liberty to 
dismiss his protestations as ‘große Worte,’ and assure us that ‘man soll solche 
Gelegenheitsformulierungen nicht zu hoch bewerten.’ (Koopmann 1999, 122)  
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heart, for the two figures are (amongst other things, of course) a realization of the 
different kinds of artist listed in the fourth letter of Ästhetische Erziehung.  These are: 
the mechanical artist, who is well within his rights to show no consideration for his 
material as such; the fine-artist, who must awaken the impression that he has such a 
consideration, for this helps the realization of that purpose which is his only real 
concern; and the political artist, who must devote as much real consideration to the 
material he moulds – given that it is in fact a multitude of subjects – as to the purpose 
for which it is to be moulded. (Schiller 1992, 565-6) 
 
The Moses of ‘Das Gesetz’ is a political leader, evidently enough, and, in line with 
Mann’s belief that politics is a matter of negotiating between ‘Leben’ (which, let us 
remember, is just another name, like ‘Natur’, for the phenomenal world) and ‘Geist’, 
his main task is to make of his people an instrument of the divine will,
124
 and 
everything about his demeanour suggests the ‘Würde’ of the man incapable of 
synthesizing his noumenal and phenomenal selves but insistent on the absolute 
primacy of the former over the latter – so much so that his movements and speech are 
impulsive, ill-judged and lacking all grace (necessitating the employment of his 
brother Aaron as a public speaker to persuade the recalcitrant Jews on his behalf).  
And this tyranny of ‘Geist’ over ‘Natur’ is not, of course, limited to his own person: it 
is Moses’ plan to entirely subjugate the society he is trying to form to other-worldly 
dictates.  In the pursuit of this aim he either constrains his followers to do God’s 
bidding (like the mechanical artist) or, less radically, gives them to understand that he 
has their own interests at heart (like the fine-artist), while in fact having no respect for 
them at all.
125
  And he is likened to a sculptor, his people to the block of stone he must 
work on: ‘Er selbst hatte Lust zu seines Vaters Blut, wie der Steinmetz Lust hat zu 
dem ungestalten Block, woraus er feine und hohe Gestalt, seiner Hände Werk, zu 
metzen gedenkt.’126 
 
                                                 
124
 ‘Von den Implikationen der Unsichtbarkeit, also der Geistigkeit, Reinheit und Heiligkeit, sagte er 
ihnen nichts und wies sie lieber nicht darauf hin, daß sie als verschworene Diener des Unsichtbaren ein 
abgesondertes Volk des Geistes, der Reinheit und Heiligkeit würden zu sein haben.’ (VIII, 810) 
125
 Michelangelo was Mann’s ‘model’ for Moses, as demonstrated by Klaus Makoschey in his essay on 
the topic.  (Makoschey 1998, 99-121) 
126
 (VIII, 810)  Later in the story the people are described as a block of stone, and ‘der Klotz ist nicht 
auf des Meisters Seite, sondern gegen ihn, und gleich das Früheste, was zu seiner Formung geschieht, 
kommt ihm am allerunnatürlichsten vor.’ (VIII, 847) 
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If, by contrast, we examine the Joseph of the tetralogy, we see a statesman-artist 
mediating between ‘Geist’ and ‘Natur’ in a quite different fashion.  If Moses is all 
‘Würde’ then Joseph is surely the finest example of ‘Anmut’ in the whole of Mann’s 
fictional canon.  We may be tempted to compare him in this regard to Felix Krull, but 
despite their similarities: their shared beauty, charisma, tolerance of human frailty, 
cultural and linguistic lability – despite all this their cases are fundamentally 
dissimilar on account of the different philosophical contexts which frame the two 
characters.  Felix Krull was begun when Mann’s thinking still bore a 
Schopenhauerian stamp, so that there can be no question of its hero – though he is 
likened by the Marquis de Venosta to Hermes (VII, 514) just as Joseph is likened to 
the self-same god by Pharao (V, 1454) – being an intermediary between an evaluative 
noumenal realm and the valueless phenomenal realm.
127
  Rather, he is like the Merkur 
of Kleist’s Amphitryon (which, we remember, made such an impression on Mann): a 
plausible impostor and seducer who makes vice ‘bequem und liebenswürdig’.  If he 
serves any other-worldly power at all, then certainly not ‘Geist’ (which he humiliates, 
or abets in its self-humiliation in chapter nine).   In the tetralogy, by contrast, the 
possibility that there is indeed such a world (‘Das Reich der Strenge’ and so on) is 
constantly implied and sometimes stated outright.  And there can be no doubt that 
Joseph is its intermediary.  Primed by Eliezer and his own visions and dreams, he 
believes himself to have a magnificent destiny – a destiny which consists in the 
realization of God’s will in the societies in which he finds himself.  But he does this 
gently, taking into account the weaknesses and delusions of the men and women 
whom he has to cajole into the paths of righteousness, and he understands the crucial 
importance of the aesthetic as an intermediary between stern, unyielding morality and 
the weak flesh of humankind.  It is his personal beauty, grace of bearing and pitch-
perfect eloquence which persuade so many of the influential people he needs to win 
over that there is something other-worldly about Joseph and which impel them to seek 
and heed his advice.  He is just as surely as Moses an artist (consider his playwright’s 
interest in constructing a scene like that of the reunion with his brothers) but unlike 
                                                 
127
 As Dierks remarks, Mann’s early intention in Felix Krull was probably to present its protagonist as 
an ‘Eingeweihten des Willensmysteriums’. (Dierks 1972, 49)  In the later parts of the novel he seems to 
regard himself as an ambassador of the ‘Wille’ to the phenomenal world.  That, at least, is what 
passages like the following (a classic of Mannian double-talk) suggest:  ‘Welche Gunst ist es doch über 
einen polierten und gefälligen Ausdruck zu verfügen, der Gabe der guten Form teilhaftig zu sein, die 
mir jene geneigte Fee mit zarter Hand in die Wiege legte und die mir für das ganze hier laufende 
Geständniswerk so sehr vonnöten ist!’ (VII 562)   
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Moses he always respects the material he has to work in – appropriately, in view of 
the fact that the material is humanity itself.  The implication of Pharao’s comparison 
is not that Joseph is a mere trickster, for the Hermes of Joseph und seine Brüder is far 
more than this. 
 
Denn er sei ein Gott des freundlichen Zufalls[...]und des lachenden Fundes, Segen spendend und 
Wohlstand, so redlich oder ein bißchen auch fälschlich erworben, wie es das Leben erlaube, ein 
Ordner und Führer, der durch die Windungen führe der Welt, rückwärts lächelnd mit 
aufgehobenem Stabe. (V, 1428) 
 
The implication is rather that the young man’s ‘Anmut’ and artistry – the fusion of the 
worldly and other-worldly in his person, the gentle reconciliation of ‘Geist’ and 
‘Natur’ which it seems to be his destiny to effect in the world – perfectly fit him for 
the role of political artist.
128
  And if we bear in mind the importance of Schiller’s 
‘Spieltrieb’ and what it entails, then we shall be in a position to gauge the full force of 
Jacob’s death-bed declaration to Joseph: ‘Breite Lieder sollen strömen, die deines 
Lebens Spiel besingen, immer aufs neue, denn ein heilig Spiel war es doch.’ (V, 
1804) 
 
As a conclusion to this evaluation of Mann’s debt to Schiller, we should consider 
‘Goethe und Tolstoi’ – an essay begun in 1918 but not published in its final form until 
1925.
129
  It is sustained by a reading of Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, a 
work which Mann enthusiastically declares to be the ‘klassischer und umfassender 
Essay der Deutschen.’130 (15.1, 812)  The taxonomy of Schiller’s essay is adopted – 
though Mann generally prefers the terms ‘Plastik’ to ‘Naiv’ and ‘Kritik’ to 
‘Sentimental’.  However, differences in vocabulary notwithstanding, there can be no 
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 As Jacob says: ‘Das ist ein seltener Segen, denn meist hat man die Wahl, Gott zu gefallen oder der 
Welt; ihm aber gab es der Geist anmutigen Mittlertums, daß er beiden gefiel.’ (V, 1804) 
129
 The 1925 version is closer in spirit to the even-handedness of Über naive und sentimentalische 
Dichtung and more theoretical than the 1921 version – which by and large limits itself to a 
championing of Goethe and Tolstoy while leaving Schiller and Dostoevsky relatively unconsidered.  
130
 The debt owed by Mann’s essay to Schiller’s is described in these terms by Herbert Lehnert and Eva 
Wessell in their treatise on ‘Goethe und Tolstoi’: ‘Er übernahm[…]die Kategorien “naiv” und 
“sentimental” selbst und machte sie zur Basis seiner Diskussion von poetologischen Typen in den 
Kapiteln “Krankheit”, “Plastik und Kritik” und “Freiheit und Vornehmheit”.  Damit transzendierte er 
nicht nur das überwiegend historisch-kritische Modell Mereschkowskis, er fügte ein typologisches 
hinzu und konstruierte auf diese Weise eine Viergruppierung, welche gewissermaßen beide 
essaysistischen Vorbilder, Schillers und Mereschkowskis, zusammenfaßt.’ (Lehnert/Wessell 1991, 
118) 
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doubt that Mann justifies the typological distinction between Goethe and Tolstoi on 
the one hand and Schiller (considered as a poet and dramatist rather than as a 
theoretician) and Dostoevsky on the other, in terms of the kinship of each pair to 
‘Natur’ and ‘Geist’ respectively. 
 
Offenbar gibt es zweierlei Erhöhung und Steigerung des Menschlichen: eine ins Göttliche, von 
Gnaden der Natur, und eine ins Heilige – von Gnaden einer anderen Macht, die der Natur 
entgegensteht, die die Emanzipation von ihr, die ewige Revolte gegen sie bedeutet: von Gnaden 
des Geistes. (15.1, 832)  
 
Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung displays broadly similar preoccupations 
and tendencies to those in Schiller’s other essays on matters aesthetic and moral.  
There is the same emphasis on the distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal 
(the ‘ideals’ of the sentimental poet – whether we trace the origin of the concept back 
to Plato or to Kant – are a matter of ‘Wahrheit’, not ‘Wirklichkeit’). (15.1, 832)  
There is the same insistence that the two realms are worthy of respect (this goes 
without saying for the noumenal realm, of course, but Schiller, as we have seen, 
strengthens the case for ‘Natur’ as a positive principle in its own right).  There is the 
same tendency to see artistic and moral questions as intimately associated (the essay 
ends with a consideration of naïve and sentimental agents in the moral realm, where 
they are referred to as realists and idealists respectively).  And, finally, there is the 
same impulse towards the unification of opposites (it is quietly conceded that 
sentimental poets have to be naive poets to a degree and vice-versa).
131
  And we 
should not by now be surprised to find Mann following Schiller’s example in respect 
of all of this.  It is true that ‘Goethe and Tolstoi’ devotes more space to its eponymous 
subjects than to Schiller and Dostoevsky, but Mann is careful to emphasize the esteem 
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 Of a sentimental poet: ‘Was indessen von dem Charakter sowohl dieser als aller sentimentalischen 
Dichter im Ganzen wahr ist, schließt natürlicherweise darum keineswegs das Vermögen aus, im 
Einzelnen uns durch naive Schönheit zu rühren: ohne das würden sie überall keine Dichter sein.’ 
(Schiller 1992, 752) Of a naive poet: ‘Er tritt entweder, wenn die Gattung bei ihm überwiegend ist, aus 
seiner Art, und wird sentimentalisch, um nur dichterisch zu sein, oder, wenn der Artcharakter die 
Obermacht behält, es tritt aus seiner Gattung, und wird gemeine Natur, um nur Natur zu bleiben.’ (See 
page 86)  All this is in line with Schiller’s earlier pronouncement that the aesthetically valuable 
consists in the ‘Gleichgewicht der Realität und der Form’, which can, however, be but rarely 
established.  ‘In der Wirklichkeit wird immer ein Übergewicht des einen Elements über das andere 
übrigbleiben, und das Höchste, was die Erfahrung leistet, wird in einer Schwankung zwischen beiden 
Prinzipien bestehen, wo bald die Realität, bald die Form überwiegend ist.’ (Schiller 1992, 615)  All 
poets necessarily participate in the phenomenal and noumenal realms, but the naïve poet leans more 
towards ‘Realität’, the sentimental poet more towards ‘Form’. 
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due to both ‘Geist’ and ‘Natur’ authors.  Mann, like Schiller, includes in an essay 
ostensibly devoted to artistic matters a consideration of moral matters, on the grounds 
that the different philosophical perspectives which distinguish one kind of artist from 
another must also distinguish one kind of moral agent (Schiller has individuals in 
mind, Mann individuals and nations) from another.  ‘Goethe und Tolstoi’ includes in 
its chapter on ‘Bekenntnis und Erziehung’ a long meditation on the possibility of a 
rapprochement between France and Germany,
132
 which Mann evidently felt to be 
intimately associated with the rapprochement between individual ‘Naturkinder’ and 
‘Geistessöhne’ – for this too: the drive towards the synthesis of opposites, is as great a 
concern for Mann as it is for Schiller.
133
 
 
There is, however, something new and unexpected to be found in Über naive und 
sentimentalische Dichtung, and it is this: it takes a superphilosophical view of the 
sorts of poets and moral agents it taxonomizes.
134
  In earlier essays the suggestion is 
always that, for example, ‘Anmut’ and ‘Würde’, or the ‘Naturtrieb’, the ‘Moraltrieb’ 
and the ‘Spieltrieb’ all have their place in the same philosophical system.  The 
principles of this purported system are, it is true, often difficult to discern, but the 
implication is that the whole subject-matter of a particular essay is being considered 
from a single philosophical point of view, and Schiller goes to great lengths to 
harmonize his pronouncements.  But that synthesis is more a matter of rhetorical 
effort than of genuine compatibility between key propositions.  We have seen that the 
respect Schiller accords ‘Natur’ is not really consistent with either Kantianism or 
Platonism: both Kant and Plato reject the notion that the phenomenal world can be 
valuable in itself – and each looks for criteria beyond it (whether these be noumenal 
ideas, or the will of a free and self-legislating subject) so that actions may be 
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 We have already noted the passage in Betrachtungen which looks forward to an equitable European 
peace, and mentioned its clear implication: that ‘Geist’ and ‘Natur’ must learn to properly 
accommodate one another.   Throughout Betrachtungen Mann’s position is that ‘Geist’ (i.e. the entente 
powers and those, like the ‘Zivilisationsliterat’, who support their cause in Germany) is preventing the 
establishment of such an accommodation.  In the 1924 version of ‘Goethe und Tolstoi’ Mann takes 
another tack: that ‘Natur’ is being given too free a reign: ‘Der anti-liberale Rückschlag ist mehr als 
klar, er ist kraß.  Er äußert sich politisch in der überdrußvollen Abkehr von Demokratie und 
Parlamentarismus, in einer mit finsteren Brauen vollzogenen Wendung zur Diktatur und zum Terror.’  
(15.1, 928) 
133
 According to Mann the mutual attraction of opposite philosophical principles lies behind, for 
example, the friendship between Goethe and Schiller.  
134
 Where the other essays are purportedly catholic in their theorizing Über naive und sentimentalische 
Dichtung is avowedly ecumenical.  It is characterized not just by a dualistic outlook, but by a dualistic 
outlook which includes as one of its elements a monistic outlook. 
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determined to be good or evil,
135
 objects may be determined to be beautiful or ugly.
136
  
In Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung Schiller concedes that this is so, and 
identifies the sentimental poet and personality (the idealist) with the Kantian/Platonic 
perspective, the other kind – the naïve poet and personality (the realist) with – what?  
From a strictly theoretical (rather than practical) point of view, with what we have 
called ‘naturalism’, if we are to judge by Schiller’s definition of the realist’s mentality 
as ‘ein nüchterner Beobachtungsgeist und eine feste Anhänglichkeit an das 
gleichförmige Zeugnis der Sinne.’137  And though Schiller understands full well that 
no single philosophical point of view can incorporate the postulates of the idealist 
(who is a dualist) and the realist (who is a monist), he none the less states that both 
points of view are necessary to the artistic creator and the moral agent.
138
 
 
It is important that we remark this changed emphasis because it finds its counterpart 
in Mann’s essay.  Both ‘Natur’ writers like Goethe and Tolstoy and ‘Geist’ writers 
like Schiller and Dostoevsky have a claim to high approbation, but these claims can 
only be recognized from mutually exclusive points of view.  If we deny the reality of 
a metaphysic of value and insist that all analysis of aesthetic experience and of 
apparently moral behaviour be limited to the phenomenal world, then clearly we must 
strip the ‘Adel des Geistes’ of its honours.  If we deny, not the reality of course, but 
the value of the phenomenal world, then we cannot in conscience esteem artistic 
works which are the uncritical products of that world.  Schiller in Über naïve und 
sentimentalische Dichtung and Mann in ‘Goethe und Tolstoi’ adopt an alternating 
philosophical perspective (rather than the synoptic perspective with two aspects which 
                                                 
135
 Both Kant and Plato 
136
 Plato only.  According to Kant the relationship between the good and the beautiful (whereby the 
latter analogizes the former) is not one of identity.  Schiller, however, following what looks like an 
undeclared programme to reformulate Platonic notions as Kantian ones, sees it as his duty in Kallias to 
show how criteria of beauty might be derived from some sort of ‘aesthetic categorical imperative’: ‘Die 
Schwierigkeit, einen  Begriff der Schönheit objektiv aufzustellen und ihn aus der Natur der Vernunft 
völlig a priori zu legitimieren, so daß die Erfahrung ihn zwar durchaus bestätigt, aber daß er diesen 
Ausspruch der Erfahrung zu seiner Gültigkeit gar nicht nötig hat, diese Schwierigkeit ist fast 
unübersehbar.’ (Schiller 1992, 276) 
137
 (Schiller 1992, 798)  Schiller also suggests that such naturalism may provide the basis for some kind 
of morality by making an unexplained distinction between the ‘Notwendigkeit’ and the ‘Nötigung’ of 
the phenomenal world.  Probably the distinction is only that between unenlightened and enlightened 
self-interest, for Schiller says later in the same essay, ‘Der Realist wird fragen, wozu eine Sache gut 
sei? und die Dinge nach dem, was sie wert sind, zu taxieren wissen: der Idealist wird fragen, ob sie gut 
sei? und die Dinge nach dem taxieren, was sie würdig sind.’ (Schiller 1992, 803) That naturalists 
recognize and act on hypothetical imperatives is, of course, not in dispute, but it is hard to see how 
hypothetical imperatives can form the basis for morality. 
138
 See footnote 28 of Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung. (Schiller 1992, 798)   
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characterizes Schiller’s earlier essays).  There is an obvious correspondence in all this 
with the dual perspective we see at work in so much fantastic fiction, in which we 
find a concurrence of purely naturalistic and supernatural/evaluative explanations for 
the strange events recounted.  It is true that it is possible – remembering what Kant 
had to say about the limitation of the ‘Verstand’ to cause-and-effect explanations in 
the phenomenal realm so that it must leave the noumenal realm unscrutinized – to 
accommodate this duality-of-vision to a single theoretical framework, but the 
naturalistic tenor of certain passages in, for example, ‘Der Sandmann’ alternating 
with the supernatural tenor of others, indicates an alternation of two points of view 
which, though theoretically reconcilable, are felt to be mutually exclusive.  That is, 
just as readers of the two essays under discussion are not allowed to settle into a 
unified framework, so the reader of certain works of fantastic literature is prevented 
from adopting a synthetic position by the strong emphasis by turns on naturalism and 
on the supernatural. 
 
But ‘Goethe und Tolstoi’ is more than an essay in Schillerian thinking.  It marks an 
important stage in the systematization of Mann’s own theoretical world – in particular 
with regard to the relationship between science and ‘Geist’.  We remarked in the 
context of Betrachtungen Mann’s tendency to use the word ‘Geist’ in inconsistent 
ways.  On the one hand, it can mean mere descriptive intelligence so that, for 
example, psychology (with its tendency to undermine the beliefs and activities of 
human beings by exposing the real origins of such beliefs and activities) can count as 
‘Geist’.  And on the other hand, it can refer to prescriptive intelligence which judges 
phenomena and finds them more or less wanting.  Which is to say that the term 
wavers between the Nietzschean/Schopenhauerian conception which colours Mann’s 
thinking in the years before 1914, and the Platonic/Schillerian conception which 
comes to dominate it after 1918. Mann himself was aware of this ambiguity: ‘vordem 
[wollte und durfte man] Geist und Tat, Erkenntnis und Tat als etwas sehr 
Verschiedenes und schlecht Verträgliches auseinanderhalten[...]Das ist der Geist als 
AntiRevolutionär.  Heute erklärt er sich mit der Revolution, der politischen 
Revolution.’ (13.1 538-539)  
 
‘Goethe und Tolstoi’ distinguishes between its eponymous subjects as representatives 
of ‘Natur’ and Schiller and Dostoevsky as representatives of ‘Geist’.  But Mann is by 
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no means suggesting that Goethe and Tolstoy are less intelligent than Schiller and 
Dostoevsky, that they lack that descriptive penetration previously associated with 
‘Geist’.  Rather, he is suggesting that the former two are entirely worldly in their 
outlook, devoted to the phenomenal realm and enjoying a semi-mystical union with it 
(so that the religious belief best suited to the ‘Natur’ artist, should he need one, is the 
pantheism – God as world – which Goethe in fact cultivated).139 (15.1, 904)  And he 
also makes much of the fact that Goethe in particular sees no distinction in principle 
between human beings and the rest of the observable universe, between human beings 
and other animals, recounting of him that: 
 
Der Zwischenkieferknochen, sagt er, der bei den Tieren, je nach Umständen und Bedürfnis, 
verschieden gestaltet sei, – zuletzt, im Menschen, dem edelsten Geschöpf, verberge er sich 
schamhaft, ‘aus Furcht, tierische Gefrässigkeit zu verraten’.  Idealistischer Menschenstolz 
könnte einwenden, dann sei es recht inhuman, das schamhaft Verborgene zu entdecken. (15.1, 
906)   
 
And Tolstoy, though never a scientist in the way Goethe was, displays an equally 
secular orientation, and indeed seems to be almost an animal himself: ‘Tolstois 
sinnliche Begabung, persönlich gesprochen, muß die eines edlen, von der Natur aufs 
vollkommenste ausgestatteten, hochempfindlichen Tieres gewesen sein, – verstärkt, 
sublimiert durch das reflektierende Bewußtsein des Menschen.’ (15.1, 900)  From all 
of which we can conclude the following: observation and analysis (no matter how 
mystically motivated and ecstatically experienced) of the phenomenal world have 
ceased to count as ‘Geist’ for Mann.  It has been definitively classified as ‘Natur’.  
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 Heimendahl writes of Mann and his conception of ‘Geist’ in the following terms: ‘Er folgt 
Schopenhauers Entlarvung des Intellekts als eines Rechtfertigungsautomaten der Begierden, die ihm 
schon durch Nietzsche vetraut war, und teilt Schopenhauers geistkritische These von der Abhängigkeit 
des Intellektes vom Willen.  Wo Schopenhauer aber seinem eigenen System zuwiderhandelt und einen 
weiteren Intellekt postuliert, der zur Verneinung des Willens in der Lage sei, und mit dem 
Schopenhauer die asketischen Traditionen vom Stoizismus bis zum christlichen Mittelalter rehabilitiert 
und eine erneute Herrschaft des Intellektes etabliert, bleibt Thomas Mann Nietzsche treu und verneint 
die Verneinung des Willens.  Es gibt keinen Geist, der eine willensferne Wahrheit für sich in Anspruch 
nehmen könnte und nicht einer psychologischen Entlarvung anheimfiel.  Geist bleibt für Thomas Mann 
eine Erscheinungsform des Willens und damit eine Angelegenheit der Leidenschaft.’ (Heimendahl 
1998, 234)  But it is evident that there could be no ‘Natur/Geist’ conflict at all if the latter were entirely 
a manifestation of and in thrall to the former.  Heimendahl is quite right to point out that ‘Intelligenz’ 
as Schopenhauer typically conceives it is a handmaid to the ‘Wille’, but the conclusion to draw from 
this observation so far as Mann is concerned is not that ‘Geist’ is bound to the ‘Wille’ (on the grounds 
that ‘Geist’ is just another word for ‘Intelligenz’) but that ‘Geist’ and ‘Intelligenz’ are two distinct 
things.  The independence of ‘Geist’ and its opposition to ‘Natur’ is a constant theme in Mann’s fiction 
and non-fiction.   
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Conversely the ‘Geist’ of Schiller and Dostoevsky has nothing to do with their powers 
of observation, analysis and deduction in the world of the senses: it has rather to do 
with the fact that they critique the world of the senses according to a standard beyond 
it: a Kantian/Platonic realm of freedom and value in Schiller’s case, a Christian God 
in Dostoevsky’s. 
 
The Meaning of Der Tod in Venedig 
 
We are now in a position, having traced an evolution in Mann’s thinking which, in 
time, assumes the dimensions of a revolution, so that one world view (according to 
which a value-free ‘Geist’ attempts to negate a value-free ‘Natur’), gives way to a 
quite different world view (according to which an evaluative ‘Geist’ must come to an 
accommodation  with a ‘Natur’ which is also to be respected), – we are now in a 
position to reconsider Der Tod in Venedig.  For Mann published it in 1912, after 
abandoning the ‘Literatur Essay’, but before beginning the composition of 
Betrachtungen, and it alternates between the Schopenhauerian/Nietzschean
140
 
perspective which predominates in the first of these works and the Platonic 
perspective which predominates in the second.  We should not let Mann’s persistence 
in using the same terms – in particular ‘Geist’ – for quite different concepts mislead 
us into thinking that the novella’s various philosophical inspirations can easily 
tolerate one another.  That Mann does indeed find a way of including them in a single 
imaginative system is a remarkable achievement, but it is likely to be overlooked if 
the difficulties obstructing it go unrecognized.   
 
We should remember, however, that no matter which philosophical framework 
obtains in a given episode of the novella, no matter which meaning such a framework 
might advance, its validity depends on the reality of the supernatural.  We can 
suppose that Aschenbach, like Mann himself, was a keen reader of Nietzsche and 
Schopenhauer, and attribute apparently significant incidents to his unconscious 
realization of the doctrines of those two philosophers.  To take such a view is to 
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 The Nietzsche of Geburt der Tragödie is evidently still very close in philosophical outlook to 
Schopenhauer.  Though he later, in ‘Versuch einer Selbstkritik’, claims that Geburt der Tragödie owes 
little more than its terminology to Schopenhauer, the distinction between Dionysos and Apollo derives 
what dramatic and explanative force it has from the abyss which divides the worlds of ‘Wille’ and 
‘Vorstellung’.  Without Schopenhauer’s philosophical dimension they are just novel names for certain 
psychological conditions and the kind of art they generate.    
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accept that the story itself is not a straightforward confirmation of the 
Schopenhauerian/Nietzschean view, any more than ‘Der Sandmann’ is a 
straightforward validation of Nathanael’s philosophical musings.  By the same token, 
we can suppose that Aschenbach, like Mann himself, was a keen reader of Plato, and 
conclude that the whole of the erotic adventure with Tadzio – which, as Reed notes, is 
informed by Diotima’s understanding of the power of το καλόν – is his realization of 
notions expounded in Symposium.  Once again: a story which leads us to believe that 
its apparent meaning is no more than the manifestation of a character’s psychology is, 
necessarily, a story which refuses to underwrite that meaning.  Alternatively, we can 
accept that the story itself realizes, independently of Aschenbach, sometimes a 
Schopenhauerian and Nietzschean meaning, sometimes a Platonic meaning.  Because 
Der Tod in Venedig does not allow us to adjudicate between a naturalistic and a 
supernatural interpretation of its events, it refuses to vouch for the metaphysics of 
which the supernatural is a manifestation. 
 
Perhaps the best route to an interpretation of Der Tod in Venedig’s meaning is by an 
examination of its protagonist and the way he is represented.  Various critics have 
taken the view that Aschenbach is an Apollonian writer and understand the 
classicizing style of parts of the novella to be an expression of the protagonist’s own 
sensibility. Reed points out that this style fulfils a literary ambition which Mann 
himself had once taken seriously: ‘Was there not, among the temptations which 
Mann-Aschenbach underwent, a pressure to move away from the analytical to the 
beauties of the surface, to plastic recreation and richness of detail?  We know there 
was.’ (Reed 1976, 174)  However, the differences between Nietzsche’s Apollonian 
artist and the mature Aschenbach are hard to overlook, for Geburt der Tragödie 
adopts the Schopenhauerian doctrine, according to which a value-free noumenal 
realm (‘Wille’) opposes a value-free phenomenal realm (‘Vorstellung’), so that 
neither the Dionysian, as representative of the former, nor the Apollonian, as 
representative of the latter, recognizes any place for morality in art.  Geburt der 
Tragödie is by no means a model of harmonious theorizing, but on this point it is 
unambiguous.  Of Apollonian art Nietzsche says:  ‘Hier erinnert nichts an Askese, 
Geistigkeit und Pflicht: hier redet nur ein üppiges, ja triumphierendes Dasein zu uns, 
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in dem alles Vorhandene vergöttlicht ist, gleichviel ob es gut oder böse ist.’141  But it 
is quite clear that the mature Aschenbach, considered as a writer, is first and foremost 
a moralist and not merely a connoisseur and purveyor of beautiful superficialities.  If 
Mann wants us to consider his fictional avatar as ‘Apollonian’, then he and Nietzsche 
must mean something quite different by the term.
142
  
 
Let us consider Aschenbach’s literary career.  He began it in the following fashion:   
 
Er hatte dem Geiste gefrönt, mit der Erkenntnis Raubbau getrieben, Saatfrucht vermahlen, 
Geheimnisse preisgegeben, das Talent verdächtigt, die Kunst verraten, – ja, während seine 
Bildwerke die gläubig Genießenden unterhielten, erhoben, belebten, hatte er, der jugendliche 
Künstler, die Zwanzigjährigen durch seine Zynismen über das fragwürdige Wesen der Kunst, 
des Künstlertums selbst in Atem gehalten. (2.1, 512 -13)  
 
What is meant by the ‘Geist’ to which Aschenbach was once indentured?  Not, surely, 
that ideal, universal, progressive property which goes by this name in Mann’s later 
works.
143
  The reference is rather to a Schopenhauerian/Nietzschean power of analysis 
and exposure which the protagonist of ‘Tonio Kröger’ – a novella which focuses par 
excellence on the ‘fragwürdige Wesen der Kunst, des Künstlertums selbst’ – believes 
                                                 
141
 (Nietzsche 1 1988, 34-35)  Nietzsche goes on to say that he means by Apollonian exactly the same 
thing that Schiller meant by naïve: ‘Wo uns das “Naive” in der Kunst begegnet, haben wir die höchste 
Wirkung der apollinischen Cultur zu erkennen[...]Aber wie selten wird das Naive, jenes völlige 
Verschlungensein in der Schönheit des Scheines, erreicht!’ (Nietzsche 1, 37) What Mann, by contrast, 
means by Apollonian is something close to Schiller’s ‘sentimental’.  This very anti-Nietzschean view 
of the Apollonian had already been proposed by Ricarda Huch in a work known to Mann: Blüthezeit 
der Romantik.  Sandberg points out that Mann marked the following passage in his own copy of 
Blütezeit der Romantik with ‘Randanstreichung, Unterstreichung und zwei Ausrufzeichen.’ (Sandberg 
1991, 88) In contrast to the Dionysian poet, writes Huch, ‘der apollinische Dichter ist ärmer und kälter, 
aber er hat die Form in seiner Gewalt, und deshalb wird sein Werk die Herzen im ersten Augenblick 
weniger entzünden, aber es wird leben und dauern.  Die Form ist das Organische und wird aus dem 
Unbewußten heraus geschaffen, die feinste Bildung und Fülle des Geistes kann sie nicht geben; der 
Körper muß aus dem körperlichen geboren werden.’ (Huch 1899, 113-114) The compatibility of that 
last sentiment with a Platonic aesthetic is hard to overlook.  
142
 In the ‘Literatur Essay’ Mann sets up a table of ‘Gegensätze’.  There we find ‘Natur’ opposed to 
‘Geist’, ‘Wille’ opposed to ‘Vorstellung’, ‘Naiv’ opposed to ‘Sentimental’, ‘Realismus’ opposed to 
‘Idealismus’. (Mann 1967, 218)  It is clear that these pairs do not fully coincide – we have seen how 
different Schopenhauer’s metaphysic is from that of Schiller – but it is equally clear that Mann thinks 
of them all as being in some way equivalent.  Certainly he has no compunction about using one set of 
opposita as a surrogate for another.  The result is that Apollo, who for Nietzsche represents the tranquil 
appreciation of the phenomenal world (‘Vorstellung’), can represent for Mann not only this but also 
‘Geist’, the ‘Sentimental’, and ‘Idealismus’. 
143
 But not just in his later works: Der Tod in Venedig itself often anticipates such a sense: ‘Nur ewiges 
Zigeunertum findet es langweilig und ist zu spotten geneigt, wenn ein großes Talent dem libertinischen 
Puppenstande entwächst, die Würde des Geistes ausdrucksvoll wahrzunehmen sich gewöhnt.’ (2.1, 
514) 
101 
 
to be his chief literary duty.  If we were to choose a category for the young 
Aschenbach within Mann’s mature analytical taxonomy, then it would have to be that 
of the ‘Natur’ artist.  For Mann – even in ‘Goethe und Tolstoi’ which he evidently 
intends should champion its subjects – goes much further than Schiller in emphasizing 
the value-free character of such writers, and is happy to point out their amorality, even 
their wickedness, when seen from the vantage-point of ‘Geist’.144  And we remember 
that Goethe (always according to Mann) does not merely revel in the phenomenal 
world, but also takes a sardonic pleasure in showing the human beings who insist on 
their unique independence from it that they are just one animal species amongst many.   
 
But if the young Aschenbach is a ‘Natur’ artist, what of his later development?  We 
are told that he rejects his earlier dalliance with naturalism, convinced as he is that 
‘die schwermütig gewissenhafteste Gründlichkeit des Jünglings Seichtheit bedeutet 
im Vergleich mit dem tiefen Entschlusse des Meister gewordenen Mannes’ (2.1, 513) 
and it is in this spirit that he writes (amongst other works of a similar character) ‘Ein 
Elender’:  
 
Die Wucht des Wortes, mit welchem hier das Verworfene verworfen wurde, verkündete die 
Abkehr von allem moralischen Zweifelsinn, von jeder Sympathie mit dem Abgrund, die Absage 
an die Laxheit des Mitleidssatzes, daß alles verstehen alles verzeihen heiße[...]seltsame 
Zusammenhänge!  War es eine geistige Folge dieser ‘Wiedergeburt’, dieser neuen Würde und 
Strenge, daß man um dieselbe Zeit ein fast übermässiges Erstarken seines Schönheitssinnes 
beobachtete, jene adelige Reinheit, Einfachheit und Ebenmässigkeit der Formgebung, welche 
seinen Produkten fortan ein so sinnfälliges,
145
 ja gewolltes Gepräge der Meisterlichkeit und 
Klassizität verlieh?
 146
  
 
He has gone from one extreme to another.  If the younger Aschenbach is a literary 
exemplar of what Schiller terms in Ästhetische Erziehung a ‘Wilder’: someone who 
recognizes ‘die Natur als seinen unumschränkten Gebieter’, (Schiller 1992, 567) then 
                                                 
144
 ‘Der Geist ist gut.  Die Natur ist es durchaus nicht.  Sie ist böse würde man sagen, wenn moralische 
Kategorien in Hinsicht auf sie überhaupt statthaft wären.’ (15.1, 871) 
145
 It is worth emphasizing that the word ‘sinnfällig’ has nothing to do with sensuality – which would 
go against the general tendency of this passage –  but refers to ease of intelligibility.  ‘Sinnfällig (Adj.): 
einleuchtend, leicht verständlich.’ (Duden Universalwörterbuch 1989) 
146
  (2.1, 513-514) ‘Classicism’ is another treacherous term whose meaning has to be decided according 
to the context in which it is employed.  Whereas Goethe – no doubt with Homer and the tradition of 
epic poetry in mind – took it to be an equivalent of Schiller’s naïve, Mann – assuredly with Plato in 
mind – takes it to be an equivalent of Schiller’s sentimental.   
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the elderly Aschenbach is just as surely a literary exemplar of the ‘Barbar’: someone 
who makes absolutely no compromise with the phenomenal world but subjugates it to 
the dominion of values beyond it.  What, after all, does ‘moralischer Zweifelsinn’ 
entail if not the persuasion that moral values lack all metaphysical guarantee, in 
accordance with a philosophical outlook ‘welche es wagt, die Moral selbst in die Welt 
der Erscheinung zu setzen, herabzusetzen’,147 what does the ‘Mitleidssatz’ that ‘alles 
verstehen alles verzeihen heiße’ entail if not the recognition that human beings are 
wholly natural creatures bound by the same necessity which governs the rest of the 
observable universe, that they lack the freedom which is a postulate of morality?  
Conversely, how can a sincere rejection of that ‘moralischen Zweifelsinn’ and that 
‘Mitleidssatz’ be accomplished which is not at the same time an acceptance of a 
noumenal freedom to act in accordance with genuine benchmarks of value?  And 
linked to this moral ‘Würde’ and ‘Strenge’ is his newfound artistic sensibility which 
is, likewise, a non-phenomenal one.  Instead of revelling in a profusion of naturalistic 
detail the elderly Aschenbach subjects his material to clarification and simplification 
until it conforms to ideal criteria.  
 
What was it that motivated the change from naturalism to moralism, from the 
degenerate naïve to the severely sentimental?  This insight, surely: that the persuasion 
that the world is bereft of all meaning necessarily deprives literary endeavour of its 
sense of mission and leaves the conscientious writer in a state of creative 
enervation.
148
  The matter is well put by Aschenbach’s Socrates who towards the end 
of the novella explains that,‘die Erkenntnis, Phaidros, hat keine Würde und Strenge; 
sie ist wissend, verstehend, verzeihend, ohne Haltung und Form; sie hat Sympathie 
mit dem Abgrund, sie ist der Abgrund.’ (2.1, 589)  Such ‘Erkenntnis’, of course, 
could never sustain a sense of artistic duty, which it would, on the contrary, be bound 
to regard as vanity.  When Aschenbach ‘lets himself go’ in Venice, to the point where 
‘der Gedanke an[…]Besonnenheit, Nüchternheit, Mühsal und Meisterschaft widerte 
ihn in solchem Maße, daß sein Gesicht sich zum Ausdruck physischer Übelkeit 
verzerrte’ (2.1, 581) he is reliving, at a personal rather than at a literary level this time, 
                                                 
147
 (Nietzsche I, 17-18)   The quoted phrase forms part of Nietzsche’s description of an element 
essential to his own philosophical outlook: that ‘nur als ästhetisches Phänomen die Welt gerechtfertigt 
ist’. (Nietzsche I, 17) 
148
 ‘Es scheint, daß gegen nichts ein edler und tüchtiger Geist sich rascher, sich gründlicher abstumpft 
als gegen den scharfen, den bitteren Reiz der Erkenntnis.’ (2.1, 513) 
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that inability to critique and act upon the phenomenal world which once weakened his 
powers of sustained literary creation. 
 
If the mature Aschenbach is a ‘Geistessohn’, then he is one by adoption and not to the 
manner born.  And the uncompromising severity of his morality, the ideal purity of 
his artistry, are best understood in the light of Schiller’s disquisition on ‘Würde’ in 
Über Anmut und Würde – where this quality is defined as essentially defensive.  
Unlike ‘Anmut’, which denotes that the noumenal has so thoroughly penetrated the 
phenomenal that it can realize itself without the least show of effort or severity, 
‘Würde’ denotes the struggle of a noumenal under siege from a phenomenal which 
threatens to overcome it at every moment.  Which is to say that it denotes an 
insufficiency: ‘Da aber das Ideal vollkommener Menscheit keinen Widerstreit, 
sondern Zusammenstimmung zwischen dem Sittlichen und Sinnlichen fodert, so 
verträgt es sich nicht wohl mit der Würde, die, als ein Ausdruck jenes Widerstreits 
zwischen beiden, entweder die besondern Schranken des Subjekts oder die 
allgemeinen der Menschheit sichtbar macht.’ (Schiller 1992, 382) Schiller is not, of 
course, entirely negative about ‘Würde’, any more than he is entirely negative about 
the severity of Kant’s view of morality, but he evidently both fears for it and distrusts 
it – a distrust which finds its expression in his description of the ‘Barbar’ in 
Ästhetische Erziehung: ‘Der Barbar[…]fährt[…]häufig genug fort, der Sklave seines 
Sklaven zu sein.’ (Schiller 1992, 567)  The clear implication of ‘Sklave seines 
Sklaven’ is that the ‘Barbar’ is often a hypocrite,149 and the biography of Aschenbach 
as writer in the second chapter of ‘Der Tod in Venedig’ lends substance to the same 
suspicion with regard to his moralism.  For if Aschenbach’s decision to reject value-
free naturalism in favour of a ‘Würde’ predicated on the metaphysical and evaluative 
– if that decision arose not from an unforced belief in ‘Geist’ but rather from the need 
to be productive, is it not vulnerable to the accusation of insincerity?  We are told that 
his ‘ganzes Wesen auf Ruhm gestellt war’ (2.1, 508) so that when it is explained a 
                                                 
149
 This is true of the Moses of ‘Das Gesetz’, for example, who thinks nothing of laying down the law 
regarding all sorts of sexual impropriety to the Israelites, but keeps a ‘Mohrin’ as a mistress.  When 
Miriam and Aaron reproach him with this, though, he answers, ‘Was Gott mir auferlegt zu sein, das bin 
ich.  Wie häßlich, daß ihr mir meine Lust mißgönnt und die Entspannung an meiner Mohrin Brüsten!  
Denn es ist keine Sünde vor Gott, und ist kein Verbot unter allen Verboten, die er mir eingab, daß man 
bei einer Mohrin nicht liegen solle.  Nicht, daß ich wüsste.’  To which his accusers reply, ‘er suche sich 
die Verbote aus nach eigenem Geschmack und werde wohl nächstens noch aufstellen, daß es geradezu 
geboten sei, bei Mohrinnen zu liegen.’ (VIII, 857) 
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little later that an author’s success depends on the consonance between his destiny and 
that of his readership, we wonder whether Aschenbach, fully aware of the fact, has 
consciously mimicked the public mood.  At any rate there is a strong suggestion that 
his new-found morality is defensive and factitious in character.   
 
Schopenhauer vs. Plato 
 
With this in mind we can see that the supernatural, once its presence in the novella is 
accepted, might support a Schopenhauerian interpretation.  Aschenbach is just a 
human being, a phenomenal expression of Schopenhauer’s ‘Wille’ – and thus a 
creature not essentially different from all the others which inhabit the observable 
universe.  When still a novice writer he was only too happy to espouse this truth, but 
the mature Aschenbach has the hubris to set himself above both the cause-and-effect 
realm of the senses and also above that striving noumenal force which gives rise to 
the realm of the senses while imparting to it an identical amoral character.  The 
disguised and recurring Hermes who both launches the adventure and sets his seal on 
it is just what his close association with Dionysos would suggest he is: an agent for 
the ‘Wille’ in the phenomenal world, with a brief to humiliate high-minded moral and 
aesthetic pretensions.  And who would be a more likely quarry for such a Hermes than 
the mature Aschenbach, with his insistence on the absolute and the ideal?  Socrates, in 
the second interlude, bemoans the fact that the artist’s love of ideal beauty (‘will 
sagen der Einfachheit, Größe und neuen Strenge’ (2.1, 589) ensnares him by a fatal 
misapprehension in the toils of sensual beauty (a ‘Gefühlsfrevel, den seine eigene 
schöne Strenge als infam verwirft’).150  But whereas the imagined Socrates explains 
the matter in general terms, so that according to him the artist’s predicament arises 
naturally from the contradictions in an artistic vocation, who is the particular culprit in 
Aschenbach’s degradation, if not Hermes himself?  It is he who inspires Aschenbach 
with ‘Reiselust’ (the man on the chapel steps), he who habituates Aschenbach to the 
idea that he would do better to let things run their course and foreswear intervention 
                                                 
150
 (2.1, 589)  Clearly, the notion that the ideal leads to the sensual has nothing to do with Plato’s 
Socrates.   
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(the gondolier),
151
 he who sets him on to both recognize and accept the character of 
his feelings for Tadzio (the leader of the troupe of street-singers).
152
 
 
This is surely a persuasive reading of Der Tod in Venedig – and all the more so in the 
light of Schopenhauer’s conviction that his own doctrine is fully compatible with the 
supernatural (which he takes quite seriously) in a way that a purely phenomenal 
understanding of the world is not.  Here is how he explains ghostly interference in the 
world of the living: 
 
Wollten wir[…]den von so vielen und so verschiedenen Seiten erzählten und beteuerten 
Vorfällen, die entschieden eine objektive Einwirkung Verstorbener anzeigen, einige Wahrheit 
einräumen; so müßten wir uns die Sache so erklären, daß in solchen Fällen der Wille des 
Verstorbenen noch immer leidenschaftlich auf die irdischen Angelegenheiten gerichtet wäre und 
nun in Ermangelung aller physischen Mittel zur Einwirkung auf dieselben jetz seine Zuflucht 
nähme zu der ihm in seiner ursprünglichen, also metaphysischen Eigenschaft, mithin im Tode 
wie im Leben zustehenden magischen Gewalt.
153
  
 
And, if Der Tod in Venedig is indeed a tale in which the Schopenhauerian ‘Wille’ 
manifests itself directly in the world of ‘Vorstellung’ then it is by no means 
unexampled in supernatural literature.  Arthur Machen, for example, had published in 
1890 ‘The Great God Pan’, a short story whose debt to Schopenhauer is hard to 
overlook.  In it a young woman is subjected to an operation which allows her to see 
the real world underlying the apparent one and promptly goes insane.
154
 It transpires 
                                                 
151
 ‘Was war zu tun?  Allein auf der Flut mit dem sonderbar unbotmäßigen, unheimlich entschlossenen 
Menschen, sah der Reisende kein Mittel, seinen Willen durchzusetzen.’ (2.1, 525) 
152
 ‘Aschenbach ruhte nicht mehr im Stuhl, er saß aufgerichtet wie zum Versuche der Abwehr oder 
Flucht.  Aber das Gelächter, der heraufwehende Hospitalgeruch und Nähe des Schönen verwoben sich 
ihm zu einem Traumbann, der unzerreißbar und unentrinnbar sein Haupt, seinen Sinn umfangen hielt.’  
Then, having met Tadzio’s gaze: ‘Diese kindliche und beziehungsvolle Folgsamkeit hatte etwas so 
Entwaffnendes, Überwältigendes, daß der Grauhaarige sich mit Mühe enthielt, sein Gesicht in den 
Händen zu verbergen.’ (2.1, 576)   The following day, Aschenbach, who has discovered that cholera is 
abroad in Venice, decides that he would rather know Tadzio in mortal danger, but have him, than be 
assured of his safety, but lose him.  
153
 (Schopenhauer IV, 369) Plato also accounts for the supernatural in philosophical terms.  In Phaedo 
Socrates explains that after death ‘the soul which is full of desire for the body[…]hovers around the 
body and the visible world for a long time, with many struggles and sufferings, before being dragged 
off, by force and with great difficulty, by its appointed guardian.’ (Plato (trans. Griffith) 1987, 200) 
154
 ‘There is a real world, but it is beyond this glamour and this vision[…]beyond them as beyond a 
veil.  I do not know whether any human being has ever lifted that veil; but I do know[…]that you and I 
shall see it lifted this very night from before another’s eyes.  You may think all this strange nonsense; it 
may be strange, but it is true, and the ancients knew what lifting the veil means.  They called it seeing 
the god Pan.’ (Machen 1964, 62)  One only need reflect on the etymological implications of the name 
106 
 
in the course of the story that she has gone on to have a daughter (a woman of 
extraordinary beauty going by the name of Helen Vaughan) who is responsible for a 
string of suicides: each of the men who dally with her hangs himself in desperation.
155
  
She is, in fact, an agent of a dreadful metaphysical reality abroad in the phenomenal 
realm, with a mission to corrupt and humiliate it.  When she is finally tracked down 
and destroyed she demonstrates in her death-agony a complete freedom from any 
particular phenomenal form, as one of her persecutors, Dr. Matheson, explains. 
 
Here too was all the work by which man had been made repeated before my eyes.  I saw the 
form waver from sex to sex, dividing itself from itself, and then again reunited.  Then I saw the 
body descend to the beasts whence it ascended, and that which was on the heights go down to 
the depths, even to the abyss of all being.  The principle of life, which makes organism, always 
remained, while the outward form changed. (Machen 1964, 110-111) 
 
‘The Great God Pan’ is no doubt a rather lurid fictional expression of 
Schopenhauerian thinking.  But there can be no question about its philosophical 
ancestry, just as there can be no question that it assumes a close relationship between 
the metaphysical and the supernatural.   
 
In chapter II it was pointed out that traditionally supernatural fiction also assumes a 
close relationship between ghosts, gods and demons and the metaphysical.  But the 
metaphysic such fiction draws upon is, as one would expect, of the traditional variety: 
the evaluative metaphysic which we have seen both Plato and Kant try in their 
different ways to elucidate and organize.  Because supernatural beings are not wholly 
part of the phenomenal world they are not subject to its necessity and are thus  
susceptible to moral analysis, so that their behaviour can be with propriety lauded or 
reprehended.  Their unambiguous presence in a story lends it a moral complexion, and 
when the dead return to exact revenge, to right wrongs, or to do penance, they are not 
merely the rightful subjects of an evaluative regime but also its agents and emissaries.  
Schopenhauer’s noumenal realm by contrast is in no sense evaluative.  The ‘Wille’ 
understands nothing of right and wrong and though it is of course free of the necessity 
                                                                                                                                            
Pan to see why Machen chose this pagan god over Dionysos and Hermes as representative of an all-
present metaphysical reality.   
155
 The connection between ‘Wille’ and sexuality is as clear in Machen’s short story as it is in Mann’s 
novella. 
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which governs the phenomenal realm it is not free of its own character, a character 
which begins and ends in blind, ceaseless striving.  Schopenhauer’s system accounts 
for what is generally regarded as morality in terms of sympathy, but this is just a 
feeling – engendered by a reluctance on the part of the ‘Wille’ in certain of its 
instantiations to increase its own suffering as experienced by certain other of its 
instantiations – which, though it sometimes gains the upper hand over egotism, is no 
better than egotism.  As for a belief in a world of values along Platonic lines or in a 
world of freedom along Kantian lines, Schopenhauer sometimes pours scorn on it, 
sometimes commiserates with the sorry facts of life which bring it about, but he does 
not – except, perhaps, at the very end of his philosophical journey, and then 
grudgingly – subscribe to it. 
 
The result is, that when the Schopenhauerian metaphysic manifests itself as the 
supernatural it is a wholly amoral force, and its tendency is to annihilate not the 
morality of the phenomenal realm (for the postulates of genuine morality, freedom 
and values, are not present there – in this matter at least Plato, Kant and Schopenhauer 
are in complete agreement) but the pretensions to morality which subsist in the 
phenomenal realm.  We mentioned earlier that the mature Aschenbach’s unyieldingly 
worthy classicism might be regarded as hubris by a supernatural agent of the ‘Wille’, 
but this should not be taken to imply that he deserves punishment for falling short of 
some sort of noumenal criterion.  For whereas a nineteenth-century ghost story 
typically lays low its protagonist’s scepticism and materialism for his or our alarmed 
edification, there can be no question of a truly Schopenhauerian supernatural doing 
anything of the kind.  If Aschenbach’s pretensions to moral and aesthetic severity are 
humbled by the ‘Wille’, then it is to no other purpose than the vindictive exposure of 
delusory meaning and the affirmation of authentic meaninglessness.  What conclusion 
could Aschenbach draw from such an experience but that, in point of fact, nothing 
stands in the way of the indulgence of his appetites and emotions but a chimera, or, at 
its most substantial, a fellow-feeling which though it might sometimes struggle on an 
equal footing against other feelings has no right to preside over them?   
 
That, however, is not how Aschenbach regards his predicament: the second Socratic 
interlude is an expression of appalled remorse at the betrayal of values still held dear.  
It is certainly not an expression of disabused complacency occasioned by the 
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discovery that those values were never more than phenomena amongst phenomena.  
Which is to say, he regards the exposure and annihilation of morality in a thoroughly 
moral way.  Is Aschenbach’s offended propriety in respect of his own conduct to be 
regarded as nothing more than an inconsistency, as something quite at odds with the 
general thrust of a Schopenhauerian novella?  The answer, it seems, is both ‘yes’ and 
‘no’.  It would certainly be at odds with an unequivocally Schopenhauerian 
perspective – which, though it includes the possibility of a life-denying ‘Erkenntnis’ 
excludes that of genuinely moral evaluation.  But it is not at odds with Der Tod in 
Venedig because the latter deploys throughout a Platonic metaphysic of meaning as a 
rival to a Schopenhauerian metaphysic of meaninglessness. 
 
Reed points out that Der Tod in Venedig owes a good deal to Plato’s Symposium – in 
which Eros is declared to be the means of attaining knowledge of the ultimately good 
and beautiful.  Diotima’s Eros personifies the state-of-soul of the lover: ‘he’s always 
poor, and so far from being soft and  beautiful (which is most people’s view of him), 
he is hard, unkempt, barefoot, homeless[…]need is his constant companion’ (Plato 
(trans. Griffith) 1987, 37) but, as she concedes, this is not the way he is traditionally 
represented, which is, of course, as a beautiful pubescent male.
156
  At any rate, there is 
much to be said for Reed’s hypothesis that ‘it is even possible to see Tadzio in the 
role of Eros – the god Plato calls young and delicate  – before his function as 
Aschenbach’s guide to death made the analogy with Hermes conductor of souls to the 
underworld seem more appropriate.’157 For Diotima herself reveals how 
fundamentally compatible are Plato’s Eros and Mann’s Hermes.158  According to her 
Eros is   
 
something between a mortal and an immortal,[…]a great spirit, Socrates.  Spirits are midway 
between what is divine and what is human.’ Socrates: ‘What power does such a spirit possess?’ 
                                                 
156
 More generally, it is normal to confuse desire and object of desire.  If one speaks of ‘one’s love’ one 
may be referring to the person one loves or the feelings one has for that person. 
157
 (Reed 1996, 162)  The description of Eros Reed refers to is attributed by Plato to Agathon, whose 
views in this regard, although they lack the imprimatur of Socrates’ approval, are the ones which Mann 
adopts.  Reed notes that the words ‘Jung ist der Gott, und seine Gestalt von zarter Bildung’ (Plato 1903, 
38) – Kassner’s translation of νέος  μὲν  οὖν  ἐστι, πρὸς  δὲ τῷ νέῳ  ἁπαλός (195 c6) – are underlined 
in Mann’s copy of Symposium.  It is possible that it was the appropriate ambiguity of the word 
‘Bildung’ (which has no counterpart in the original) which drew the phrase to Mann’s attention, given 
that Tadzio as Eros is both delicately beautiful and performs a gently educative function. 
158
 Tadzio is a close physical match for the classical Hermes: ‘et crines flavos et membra decora 
iuventae.’ (Aeneid IV 559)  
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Diotima: ‘He acts as an interpreter and means of communication between gods and men.  He 
takes requests and offerings to the gods, and brings back instructions and benefits in return.  
Occupying this middle position he plays a vital role in holding the world together. (Plato 
(translator: Tom Griffith) 1997, 36) 
 
To express the matter in mythological terms (as Diotima does in the above passage) 
both Eros and Hermes belong equally to the celestial and to the earthly realm.  Their 
role is to maintain communications between the two and reconcile the differences 
between them.  To express the matter more philosophically (which Diotima goes on to 
do with regard to Eros) they both lead mankind to a knowledge of and a communion 
with the authentically valuable, but they do so by the exploitation and education of 
humanity’s natural tendencies rather than by the denunciation and denial of those 
tendencies.
159
  Both are fitting embodiments of Schiller’s ‘Spieltrieb’, that creative 
spirit which moves freely between hostile principles to effect an otherwise impossible 
reconciliation. 
 
What now becomes apparent is that the supernatural (admitting its presence) in Der 
Tod in Venedig will support an interpretation radically different from the 
Schopenhauerian one.  Instead of Hermes being an emissary of the ‘Wille’ he is, on 
the contrary, an emissary of an ideal realm.  He is no longer the malevolent figure 
whom we saw seduce Aschenbach – abetted by the latter’s delusions of moral 
grandeur – from the paths of moral and artistic rectitude into an abyss of sensual 
excess.  Instead he is a benevolent figure whom we see charm Aschenbach – abetted 
by the latter’s carnal frailty – out of the abyss of sensual excess and on to higher and 
better things.  Just consider how the novella ends.  Socrates in his second interlude 
confesses to Phaedrus that ‘wir vermögen nicht, uns aufzuschwingen, wir vermögen 
nur uns auszuschweifen’ (2.1, 589) and bids his companion a shamefaced farewell.  
But the next and final scene presents us with what Reed calls ‘the suggestion of an 
apotheosis’. (Reed 1976, 162) Aschenbach looks on as Tadzio – Tadzio, whom he had 
previously refused to safeguard by warning his mother of the cholera epidemic – is 
                                                 
159
 Eros induces us to seek το καλόν first amongst its lower, then amongst its higher instantiations, as a 
preparation for an encounter with this principle in its purity.  He does not – which is what Schiller 
accuses Kant of doing – overmatch humanity’s weakness with a precocious revelation of absolute 
value.    And we have seen what Pharao says about Hermes, that he is ‘ein Gott des freundlichen 
Zufalls[...]und des lachenden Fundes, Segen spendend und Wohlstand, so redlich oder ein bißchen 
auch fälschlich erworben, wie es das Leben erlaube, ein Ordner und Führer, der durch die Windungen 
führe der Welt, rückwärts lächelnd mit aufgehobenem Stabe.’ (V, 1428) 
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physically overcome by the more virile Jaschu: ‘Entsetzt wollte Aschenbach zur 
Rettung aufspringen, als der Gewalttätige endlich sein Opfer freigab.’ (2.1, 591)  And 
then Tadzio, who had seemed on the point of expiring altogether, regains his feet and 
composure, makes his way to the sandbar, stands before the open sea, and looks over 
his shoulder at his suitor.  ‘Ihm war aber, als ob der bleiche und liebliche Psychagog 
dort draußen ihm lächle, ihm winke; als ob er, die Hand aus der Hüfte lösend, 
hinausdeute, voranschwebe ins Verheißungsvoll-Ungeheure.  Und, wie so oft, machte 
er sich auf, ihm zu folgen. (2.1, 592) If there is a battle in Der Tod in Venedig 
between Schopenhauerian and Platonic interpretations, then it is clear which has the 
last word.   
 
The situation, then, is one of unusual complexity.  Considering the point in his 
theoretical development at which this story was written, it is not surprising to find 
Mann hesitating between a Platonic empyrean and a Schopenhauerian ‘Wille’.  And 
once we accept that different philosophical frameworks do indeed obtain in different 
episodes, then we can grasp why Hermes seems to be following two contrary policies, 
each of which is bound to impede the realization of the other.  But can we propose 
this ‘external’ explanation of Hermes and his actions in Der Tod in Venedig without 
conceding that the story is internally inconsistent?  Such inconsistency, it is true, 
disappears the moment we discount the supernatural hypothesis and fall back on a 
naturalistic, psychological explanation of events.  According to this, Aschenbach’s 
own reading of philosophy and classical mythology leads him to associate an entirely 
imaginary Hermes sometimes with Schopenhauer, sometimes with Plato – and it is 
surely not a fault on Mann’s part if the paranoid protagonist of this novella fails to 
notice the inconsistency of his own delusions.  But we have already seen that Der Tod 
in Venedig – though like all works of the fantastic it leaves open the possibility of a 
purely psychological explanation – provides plenty of evidence to strengthen a 
supernatural interpretation of Aschenbach’s adventure.  Furthermore, as with ‘The 
Turn of the Screw’, to dispute the supernatural too thoroughly is to dispute that the 
story has any meaning at all: what was apparently meaningful turns out to be a 
concatenation of phenomena and nothing more. 
 
Alternatively, we might attempt to vindicate the story by recourse to the weaker 
supernatural hypothesis mentioned in chapter II, according to which what we have 
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regarded as various manifestations of Hermes (the red-headed apparitions, Tadzio 
himself) are nothing of the kind.  Rather, they are banal human beings whose 
mysterious allure would disappear completely if we could investigate their life-stories 
and personalities, but who none the less play their part in a destiny which our 
phenomenal analysis is as powerless to detect as our sense of moral consequence is 
anxious to divine.  But this hardly helps matters: such an intentionality would be at 
war with itself, Aschenbach’s destiny being simultaneously to descend into the 
maelstrom of sensuality and humiliation and to ascend to a seventh heaven of spiritual 
beauty.  And while a Platonic or Kantian evaluative metaphysic is certainly 
compatible with a sense of destiny (even an evil destiny) the same cannot be said of 
Schopenhauer’s ‘Wille’, which, while we can well imagine it impulsively projecting 
Hermes as a cat’s-paw into the phenomenal realm to crush there an individual who 
has dared challenge its might, cannot be credited with the freedom and susceptibility 
to moral adjudication indispensable to our sense that the world we perceive is as 
pregnant with meaning as we consider ourselves to be.  Would we, then, be justified 
in considering Der Tod in Venedig a rich, intriguing, but theoretically undigested 
work?   
 
‘Spieltrieb’ 
  
Perhaps, having tried in vain to reconcile the Schopenhauerian and Platonic 
interpretations of the novella, we should see what Schiller can do as intermediary.  
For a good many of Der Tod in Venedig’s contradictions disappear if we remember 
that Hermes is a commutative figure and that his back-and-forth between the 
noumenal and the phenomenal makes of him the perfect mentor for Aschenbach – an 
artist who has so misunderstood the role of art as ‘Spieltrieb’, as negotiator between 
the noumenal and the phenomenal, that his later works are as exclusively devoted to 
‘Geist’ as his earlier ones were to ‘Natur’.160  This devotion to ‘Geist’, this ‘Würde’ 
                                                 
160
 It might be objected that Hermes can hardly negotiate between the noumenal and phenomenal 
realms by allying himself sometimes with a Schopenhauerian ‘Wille’, sometimes with a Platonic 
empyrean – for are not both of these noumenal?  That is so, of course, but we must bear in mind that 
Mann viewed the ‘Wille’ as a nature-metaphysic – good for explaining the striving, amoral character of 
the natural world and of human beings regarded as part of that world, but quite incompatible with the 
pretensions of ‘Geist’.  And a nature-metaphysic has this advantage over nature understood as 
exclusively phenomenal: that it allows for the natural-supernatural – a paradoxical concept but one 
familiar to Mann, who describes Goethe’s uncanny sensitivity to weather in the following terms: ‘Sie 
ist jener fast übertriebenen sinnlichen Begabtheit zuzurechnen und geht ins Okkult-Natursichtige über, 
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goes beyond a reluctance to forgive every weakness, misdemeanour and crime on the 
grounds that these are only the inevitable effects of given causes; it refuses to admit 
them into consciousness – or at least into language – at all. As Hermann Luft (whose 
treatise Der Konflikt zwischen Geist und Sinnlichkeit in Thomas Manns 'Tod in 
Venedig' informs the perspective on Aschenbach’s artistic career adopted here) puts 
the matter: ‘Hier ging eine gewagte Stilisierung des Lebens vor sich, die es ablehnte, 
das innere Wesen des Menschen zu verstehen, zu erkennen oder zu akzeptieren, weil 
es Aschenbachs moralischem Ideal nicht entsprach.’ (Luft 1976, 25) The policy of 
rejecting in the name of morality the world’s imperfection, rather than morally 
engaging with such imperfection, is, as the narrator points out, itself ethically dubious, 
and it has reduced Aschenbach’s style to a repetitive caricature of classicism.161 
  
Etwas Amtlich-Erzieherisches trat mit der Zeit in Gustav Aschenbachs Vorführungen ein, sein 
Stil entriet in späteren Jahren der unmittelbaren Kühnheiten, der subtilen und neuen 
Abschattungen, er wandelte sich ins Mustergültig-Feststehende, Geschliffen-Herkömmliche, 
Erhaltende, Formelle, selbst Formelhafte und wie die Überlieferung von Ludwig XIV. wissen 
will, so verbannte der Alternde aus seiner Sprachweise jedes gemeine Wort. (2.1, 514-515) 
 
The result of such extreme moral and aesthetic intolerance is that crisis of creativity 
which the very first paragraph of Der Tod in Venedig alludes to.  At this point in a 
literary career which has from the beginning been pursued in a spirit of ‘Durchhalten’ 
Aschenbach, ‘überreizt von der schwierigen und gefährlichen, eben jetzt eine höchste 
Behutsamkeit, Umsicht, Eindringlichkeit und Genauigkeit des Willens erfordenden 
Arbeit,’ (2.1, 501) writes by dint of effort and determination and nothing else.  More 
than this: it is all-too-evident that will-power can no longer make good the creative 
deficit which is the inevitable result of excluding from art its phenomenal matter in 
favour of articulating and reiterating immaculate criteria of value.  Remembering 
what Schiller says about that ‘Schwankung zwischen beiden Prinzipien[…]wo bald 
                                                                                                                                            
wenn er nachts in seinem Schlafzimmer zu Weimar das Erdbeben von Messina wittert.  Auch der 
nervöse Apparat der Tiere vermag ja dergleichen Ereignisse vor- und mitzufühlen.  Das Tierische 
transzendiert.  Alle Transzendenz ist tierisch.’ (15.1, 901)  The ‘Transzendenz’ referred to is of 
evidently Schopenhauerian character.  Dierks notes the competing metaphysics at work in ‘Goethe und 
Tolstoi’, (Dierks 1972, 74) but Der Tod in Venedig makes clear that their coexistence was a 
longstanding element of Mann’s world-view by the time he came to write that essay.    
161
 ‘Aber moralische Entschlossenheit jenseits des Wissens, der auflösenden und hemmenden 
Erkenntnis, – bedeutet sie nicht wiederum eine Vereinfachung, eine sittliche Vereinfältigung der Welt 
und der Seele und also auch ein Erstarken zum Bösen, Verbotenen, zum sittlich Unmöglichen?’ (2.1, 
514) 
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die Realität, bald die Form überwiegend ist,’ we can see that Aschenbach has swung 
so far from the golden mean in the direction of ‘Geist’ that a compensatory correction, 
a re-acquaintance with the phenomenal world and with his own phenomenal self – in 
short with ‘Natur’ –  has become necessary.  We can see that, but it is not at all 
evident that the enervated Aschenbach of the opening paragraphs of the novella shares 
our insight.  For what triggers his decision to begin the journey which will take him to 
Venice is not the conscious analysis on his part of a creative predicament, but 
(accepting a supernatural reading of these events) the apparition of Hermes himself, 
whose role is essentially tutelary.  Only after this encounter does he conclude that his 
present difficulty is the final result of a mistaken artistic policy: ‘Rächte sich nun also 
die geknechtete Empfindung, indem sie ihn verließ, indem sie seine Kunst fürder zu 
tragen und zu beflügeln sich weigerte und alle Lust, alles Entzücken an der Form und 
am Ausdruck mit sich hinwegnahm?’162 
 
It may seem rather astounding that the Hermes who appears as the snarling man on 
the chapel-steps, the menacing gondolier and the repulsive troupe-leader should be 
regarded as benevolent, that the supernatural presence who mocks and humiliates and 
destroys Aschenbach is really his guardian angel, but this is none the less the case.  
Hermes has two purposes in Der Tod in Venedig, both of them salutary.  The less 
important is to correct the imbalance in the writer’s ‘Spieltrieb’ by leading him into an 
erotic and sensual adventure absolutely at odds with the moral and aesthetic rigidity 
which have made of Aschenbach a copy-book favourite in German schools.  The at 
least temporary achievement of this happy artistic medium is testified by the 
‘Abhandlung’ which Aschenbach writes in Tadzio’s presence – ‘jene anderthalb 
Seiten erlesener Prosa[…]deren Lauterkeit, Adel und schwingende Gefühlspannung 
binnen kurzem die Bewunderung vieler erregen sollte.’163 (2.1, 556) But an equally 
                                                 
162
 (2.1, 506) Andrea Rudolph is one of few critics to have understood the importance of Schiller’s 
theoretical works to Der Tod in Venedig.  She writes: ‘An die von Schiller beschriebene jeweils 
einseitige Akzentuierung des Verhältnisses von Geist und Willen auf der einen Seite und Sinnlichkeit 
und Natur auf der anderen Seite knüpft Thomas Mann sichtlich an, wenn er Aschenbachs Verirrungen 
beschreibt.  Aschenbach hatte einst seine Empfindung “geknechtet”, “das Gefühl gezügelt und 
gekältet”, im Sinne Schillers unterdrückt, “was sinnlich ist”.  Auf diese Weise ist er zwar zu einer 
“Freiheit” gelangt, die ihm anscheinend wieder “Gelassenheit” ermöglicht.  Seine “durch Vernunft und 
von jung auf geübte Selbstzucht” wird jedoch von “merklicher Gewalt und großer Anstrengung” 
begleitet.’  (Rudolph 1991, 143) 
163
 (2.1, 549) Luft puts the matter thus: ‘ “Geist und Sinnlichkeit” oder “Gedanken und Gefühl” halten 
sich die Waage.  Die Einseitigkeit von Aschenbachs Künstlerwesen, wie sie im vorhergehenden 
Kapitel aufgezeigt wurde, ist damit aufgehoben.’ (Luft 1976, 74) 
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strong testimony is that florescence of joyous – rather than forbidding – classical form 
and imagery which marks, for example, the opening paragraph of the fourth chapter 
of Der Tod in Venedig: ‘Nun lenkte Tag für Tag der Gott mit den hitzigen Wangen 
nackend sein gluthauchendes Viergespann durch die Räume des Himmels, und sein 
gelbes Gelock flatterte im zugleich ausstürmenden Ostwind etc.’  Aschenbach is here 
living a balanced sensibility which would, were he able to sustain it, completely 
transform his literary reputation.
164
  But of course he cannot sustain it because, as the 
reference to Tadzio as ‘Idol’ suggests and as the second Socratic interlude makes 
clear, Aschenbach is afflicted by an incorrigible bias towards the emotional and the 
sensual.  He has been able to keep this bias in check by the adoption of a rigid and 
creatively exhausting moral posture.  But it has not gone away, and the moment he 
drops his guard lust and lassitude overcome his whole being, so that any sense of 
moral and artistic calling goes by the board and Aschenbach becomes a creature of 
appetite, desire, sensation, his classicism a hypocritical camouflage for yearnings that 
cannot be avowed. 
 
And this brings us to the second of Hermes’ purposes, for which the first was an 
essential preparation.  It is to lead Aschenbach away from a ‘Geist’ which is little 
more than a defensive and insincere strategy: a determination to say ‘no’ to the 
meaningless world of the senses in the name of a noumenal realm invoked but hardly 
believed in – and towards a communion with moral and aesthetic beauty which can 
only be reached by the full experience of their contrary.  Aschenbach is made to drink 
the cup of disgrace to its dregs: to dog Tadzio through the streets of Venice, to enjoy a 
sense of complicity with the cholera contaminating the city, to refuse to alert Tadzio’s 
mother of the danger her child is in, to suffer the fascination of a dreamed Dionysian 
orgy at which the true character of his own motives is revealed to him, to have his hair 
dyed and his face smeared with cosmetics.  It is because he has made this descent into 
                                                 
164
 In Mann’s copy of Schiller’s collected works, the following passage has been marked as important.  
What it says of the ‘Spieltrieb’ could as well be said of the Hermes-figures in Der Tod in Venedig: 
‘Durch die Schönheit wird der sinnliche Mensch zur Form und zum Denken geleitet; durch die 
Schönheit wird der geistige Mensch zur Materie zurückgeführt und der Sinnlichkeit wiedergegeben.’ 
(Schiller IV 1911, 262) 
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the abyss, because his rue, in the character of Socrates, is sincere and not an 
impressive form of words,
165
 that he is granted salvation.
166
 
 
This notion: that the mere cognizance of a truth is insufficient, that difficulties such as 
Aschenbach’s must be lived through and not merely thought through, was of personal 
significance to Mann,
167
 and recurs in his writings.  An obvious example would be 
Hans Castorp’s snow-dream, which yields the insight: ‘Der Mensch soll um der Güte 
und Liebe willen dem Tode keine Herrschaft einräumen über seine Gedanken.’ (5.1, 
748) In terms of Castorp’s own life this insight is without discernible consequence, 
and he almost immediately forgets it.  But Der Zauberberg none the less looks 
forward to a profound change of heart and behaviour – on the far side of an 
experienced struggle between the forces of ‘Tod’ and ‘Leben’, ‘Natur’ and ‘Geist’ 
adumbrated by Castorp’s vision and articulated, albeit fleetingly, by his conscious 
mind.  In the last paragraphs of the ‘Fülle des Wohllauts’ chapter his devotion to the 
‘Zauberlied’ is explained as a devotion to all that the song represents,168 which is to 
say: that German tradition and German culture verbally rejected after the snow-dream.  
On both occasions they are identified with ‘Der Tod’ because this is how Mann now 
terms an uncritical attachment to what merely exists.
169
  German tradition and 
German culture are phenomena which happen to have become enmeshed, through the 
chance of long acquaintance, with Castorp’s own phenomenal self, and the continuing 
adoration of them signifies the hibernation of his noumenal self.  The latter might one 
day come into its own, but only after patriotic devotion has reached a crisis of 
intensity: ‘Es war so wert, dafür zu sterben, das Zauberlied!  Aber wer dafür starb, der 
                                                 
165
 Instead of a ‘Wucht des Wortes, mit welchem[...]das Verworfene verworfen wurde’ (2.1, 513) we 
hear only Socrates’ downcast: ‘Und nun gehe ich, Phaidros, bleibe du hier; und erst wenn du mich 
nicht mehr siehst, so gehe auch du.’ (2.1, 589) 
166
 It is hard not to be reminded of the crucified Christ in the Gospel of St Matthew (27: 45-6): ‘My 
God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?’  The most glorious of destinies is reached through the 
deepest pit of despair. 
167
 He clearly believed that his democratic stance in the Weimar period was all the more valuable for 
having been achieved by way of the conservatism of Betrachtungen: ‘Ich verleugne die 
“Betrachtungen” nicht und habe sie mit keinem Worte verleugnet, das ich nach ihrer Beendigung 
schrieb.  Man verleugnet sein Leben, seine Erlebnisse nicht, verleugnet nicht das, was man 
“durchgemacht ” hat, weil man es “durch” gemacht hat und – wenn nicht wesentlich, so doch 
willentlich – ein Stück darüber hinausgekommen ist.’ (XII, 639) 
168
 ‘Das Lied bedeutete ihm viel, eine ganze Welt und zwar eine Welt, die er wohl lieben mußte, da er 
sonst in ihr stellvertretendes Gleichnis nicht so vernarrt gewesen wäre.’ (5.1, 987) 
169
 ‘Tod’ is equivalent in this context to ‘Natur’, which Mann, we remember, identified during the First 
World War and earlier with both ‘Kultur’ and Germany.   It is also what he refers to as ‘Leben’ in 
‘Tonio Kröger’.  During that earlier phase it was ‘Geist’ (Platonism and Christianity) which Mann – in 
accordance with Schopenhauerian doctrine – associated with death. 
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starb schon eigentlich nicht mehr dafür und war ein Held nur, weil er im Grunde 
schon für das Neue starb, das neue Wort der Liebe und der Zukunft in seinem 
Herzen.’ (5.1, 990)  If we bear this pronouncement in mind, then the fact that when 
we last glimpse Castorp amidst the carnage of battle he is singing the ‘Zauberlied’ 
becomes intelligible – like Aschenbach he has taken his infatuation to its nadir in 
order to transcend it.
170
  
 
The supernatural in Der Tod in Venedig, though it seems to emanate from disparate 
and, we might object, mutually exclusive metaphysical realms, can none the less 
sustain the following integrated reading: Aschenbach’s travails are a necessary 
prelude to his salvation, and the premature assumption of an insincere ‘Geist’ is 
almost as reprehensible as an uncritical surrender to ‘Natur’.  On the other hand, there 
is little doubt as to the proper upshot of the interaction between the evaluative 
noumenal and the value-free (but by no means to be despised) phenomenal – it is that 
vision of goodness and beauty which is Aschenbach’s last on earth.  Hermes – for all 
his back-and-forth – is a celestial being, just as the ‘Spieltrieb’ is a manifestation of 
‘Geist’, and it is thither his guidance tends by fair and unfair means.  Not, of course, 
that we are obliged to accept such an interpretation.  Der Tod in Venedig is not a work 
of allegory: its provisional meaning emerges freely from its fictional world, whereas 
the determinate meaning of an allegory is thrust with violence upon its fictional world 
(so that animals can talk or a young man and his friends fail to notice that a crude 
automaton isn’t really a young woman etc.) and thereby thrust upon the reader.  It is 
characteristic of the fantastic, after all, to refrain from flouting the laws of nature.  But 
it would be equally mistaken to think of Der Tod in Venedig as incapable of yielding a 
satisfactory meaning.  If we look beneath its glossy surface we are at first surprised to 
discover a struggle of contradictory philosophical assumptions.  But if we look yet 
deeper we can discern beneath the contradictions themselves a sustaining insight 
which, though it is never forced upon us, is present throughout the work. 
 
 
 
                                                 
170
 ‘Augenblicke kamen, wo dir aus Tod und Körperunzucht ein Traum von Liebe erwuchs.  Wird auch 
aus diesem Weltfest des Todes, auch aus der schlimmen Fieberbrunst, die rings den regnerischen 
Abendhimmel entzündet, einmal die Liebe steigen?’ (5.1, 1085) 
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Chapter IV: Joseph und seine Brüder 
 
The Naturalistic Reading of Joseph 
 
In chapters II and III we asked the following questions in regard to Der Tod in 
Venedig: (1) does this work of fiction belong in the category of the fantastic as 
defined by Todorov and if it does (2) what kind of metaphysical and philosophical 
system underpins the supernatural aspect of the narrative?  In this chapter the same 
questions will be asked in respect of Joseph und seine Brüder.   
 
To begin with then: does the tetralogy give us any grounds for supposing that the 
supernatural is at work in the narrative – or is one of its purposes, on the contrary, to 
demonstrate that episodes which have traditionally been regarded as the result of 
divine providence can be better explained as the result of human psychology at the 
group and individual level?  That is, ought Joseph und seine Brüder to be regarded as 
‘The Turn of the Screw’ is sometimes regarded: as an attempt to debunk the 
supernatural?  This question can hardly be evaded in view of the strongly naturalistic 
tendency of certain passages in the first two books in particular, in which the 
propensity of characters to accept an apparently destined role is explained in terms of 
inherited patterns of belief and identity.  
 
Wir geben uns keiner Täuschung hin über die Schwierigkeit, von Leuten zu erzählen, die nicht 
recht wissen, wer sie sind; aber wir zweifeln nicht an der Notwendigkeit, mit einer solchen 
schwankenden Bewußtseinslage zu rechnen, und wenn der Isaak, der Abrahams ägyptisches 
Abenteuer wiedererlebte, sich für den Isaak hielt, den der Ur-Wanderer hatte opfern wollen, so 
ist das für uns kein bündiger Beweis, daß er sich nicht täuschte – es sei denn, die Opfer-
Anfechtung habe zum Schema gehört und sich wiederholt zugetragen. (IV, 128) 
 
Implied in such a hypothesis is the radical meaninglessness integral to naturalism. 
Isaac’s acts and experiences are not validated, as he thinks they are, by a religious and 
metaphysical context which lends significance to them.  On the contrary those actions 
only seem meaningful to him by dint of their ingrained familiarity.  The narrative 
traditions of his tribe have taught him how an Isaac typically behaves and when he 
manages to conform to the established pattern he feels his sense of identity and of his 
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special place in the scheme of things affirmed.  But the pattern is simply a self-
perpetuating state of affairs.   
 
Consistent with this naturalistic explanation is Joseph’s own sensitivity to myth as a 
cultural and psychological factor which he can exploit to his own ends.  He stimulates 
the interest and evokes the sympathy of the powerful (whether it be the leader of a 
commercial caravanserai, the head of an aristocratic household, a prison-governor, or 
Pharaoh himself) by allusive appeals to the myths which condition their thoughts.  For 
example, right at the beginning of his exile he manages to persuade the leader of the 
Mitanni-traders not only that he (Joseph) is of noble ancestry and position, but also 
that he will one day be restored to the glory he has lost.  As the narrator explains: 
  
Es ist einmal so, daß der Mensch ganz vorwiegend in Schablonen und Formeln fertigen 
Gepräges denkt, also nicht wie er sich’s aussucht, sondern wie es gebräuchlich ist nach der 
Erinnerung, und schon indem der Alte von Jenem sprach, der da aus schöner Hoheit in Wüste 
und Elend getrieben wird, war er ins Göttlich-schablonenhafte geraten. (IV, 677) 
 
And it is with a mind to exploit the tendency of human beings to think in ‘Schablonen 
und Formeln’ that Joseph a little later renames himself ‘Usarsiph’, a combination of 
his rightful name and Osiris.  He has learned from the leader of the Mitanni-traders 
that the popular deity Osiris represents the power of resurrection for the Egyptians, 
and ‘Usarsiph’ slyly implies that Joseph too, though at first sight a lowly foreign 
minion, is in truth a temporarily eclipsed numinous presence who will one day come 
into his own.  And whenever his superiors gain the impression that they are dealing 
with someone marked out for a high destiny, they render his path towards the 
acquisition of actual power and high social standing a little smoother.  The leader of 
the Ismaelites who, persuaded of his slave’s future greatness, places him in the house 
of a noble Egyptian, is only the first of many wielders of influence to help Joseph on 
his way. 
 
Such passages as these can be called in evidence to support a purely naturalistic 
account of Joseph und seine Brüder.  And we are all the more receptive to such an 
account when we read passages such as this one in ‘Freud und die Zukunft’ (an 
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address which is as much concerned, if not more, with the Joseph novels as with 
Freud): 
 
Die Neigung, Wahrheit und Wissen psychologisch zu verstehen[...], die man wohl naturalistisch 
nennen und der Erziehung durch den literarischen Naturalismus zuschreiben muß, ist mir 
geblieben, und sie bildet eine Vorbedingung der Aufgeschlossenheit für die seelische 
Naturwissenschaft, die den Namen ‘Psychoanalyse’ trägt.
171
 
 
The naturalistic, psychological interpretation of the tetralogy, then, is easily discerned.  
It is not the story of a young man who, with supernatural help, accomplishes a divine 
destiny.  Rather, it is the story of a young man who, cherishing the delusion that he is 
a favourite of the God of his fathers while at the same time identifying and 
manipulating the religious delusions of others, achieves high social and political 
standing.  And though Joseph himself might make a clear distinction between the 
superstitions of the ignorant and the God whom he is doing his best to reach and 
realize, the naturalistic current in the novel allows for no such distinction on our part.  
From a naturalistic perspective the God of Joseph is wholly explicable in phenomenal 
terms.  He exists in the brains of human beings, nowhere else, and is the product of 
various material circumstances – biological evolution, cultural change, the quirks of 
individual psychology etc.  The God of Joseph is, the naturalist must insist, as much a 
chimera as Osiris and Astaroth. 
 
Taking their lead from such passages, certain critics have identified this naturalistic 
perspective as essential to the novel, while regarding the alternative perspective – the 
supernatural and metaphysical perspective – as scarcely present and, in so far as it is 
present, a mistake on Mann’s part.  Reed, for example, believes that the novel fails to 
integrate the psychological and the mythical, and declares that the former nullifies the 
latter.  According to him Joseph is mostly just ‘unmysterious surface-story heavily 
hinting at a piece of mythology’, and he goes on to say, ‘in character as well as 
author, myth and psychology have met.  Myth cannot survive.’ (Reed 1996, 345) 
However, given that so much of the tetralogy is devoted to the search for God, and 
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 (IX, 481) It will be seen that Mann uses the term ‘naturalism’ in the same way it has been employed 
throughout this thesis to mean a strictly phenomenal analysis of human beings and the world they live 
in.  Furthermore he acknowledges the aspiration of psychoanalysis to be a natural science – one which 
has no truck with the noumenal or the supernatural. 
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given that this religious mission underpins Joseph’s sense of his place and role in the 
world just as surely as an unconscious adherence to tradition underpinned that of 
Isaac, does not the strictly naturalist analysis subvert the whole enterprise?  Can a 
story so apparently dependent on a touchstone of meaning – the will and existence of 
God – for any particular significance it might have survive the destruction of that 
touchstone?    
 
There have been attempts to answer the question of the tetralogy’s meaning without 
reference to the religious and metaphysical, or which while accepting the terms 
‘religious’ and ‘metaphysical’ do so only on the condition that their normal meaning 
be altered out of all recognition and utility.  The view promoted by Raymond 
Cunningham’s Myth and Politics in Thomas Mann's 'Joseph und seine Brüder' is that 
we can make out, if we put aside as irrelevant the novel’s regrettable supernatural 
paraphernalia, a political and ethical agenda wholly explicable in naturalistic terms.  
That agenda prescribes the cultivation in inauspicious circumstances of an 
‘enlightened’ attitude: the canny guidance of mythopoeic tendencies to achieve 
humanitarian ends.  Cunningham concedes, it is true, that terms like ‘Geist’ and 
‘Seele’ are metaphysical principles for Mann – but then goes on to imply that the 
metaphysical is simply another name for certain aspects of human psychology and 
thus not categorically distinct from the natural world (whereas, of course, the whole 
point of the term ‘metaphysics’ is to make such a distinction).  He interprets the 
‘Roman der Seele’ as a myth ‘which depicts not transcendent but human truth’ and 
adds:  
 
it reveals human, psychological truth; and though this is the true function of both the myth and 
the ‘Roman’ the term ‘myth’ carries strong connotations of transcendence, of irrationalism 
(even more so in Mann’s day, when it was a holy term for irrationalist thinkers), whereas the 
novel is unquestionably the literary mode of rationalism, of enlightenment, of psychological 
analysis.  Implicit in the term ‘Roman der Seele’ is the idea that all myths are actually ‘Romane’ 
– and ‘Romane der Seele’. (Cunningham 1985, 191)  
 
And Elaine Murdaugh in her progressivist Salvation in the Secular: The Moral Law in 
Thomas Mann's 'Joseph und seine Brüder' takes a similar view both of the novel’s 
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ethical purpose and the character of the religion which is to bring it about.
172
  She 
explains the latter in these terms: ‘the “religion” of the novel is a secular religion, an 
oxymoron which itself embodies the double and the union of spirit and life.  That is, it 
is a religion of humanism, and the question of whether a thought system which rejects 
the priority of the transcendent is still a religion is moot.’ (Murdaugh 1976, 12) 
 
The problems such views of Joseph entail are hard to overlook.  The first problem 
concerns morality and meaning.  Though terms such as ‘secular religion’ and ‘myths 
of psychological truth’ are not fully explained, their implication is surely that the 
secular and the psychological are a sufficient basis for Joseph’s and the novel’s 
ethical project, but that the regrettable mythopoeic tendency of human beings must 
needs be satisfied if that project is to be achieved.  But this is a strange position to 
adopt in view of Joseph’s naturalistic perspective, which is the perspective 
Cunningham and Murdaugh are most comfortable with.  For given that secular 
enlightenment can only legitimate itself by reference to the phenomenal world (for 
any ulterior appeal would be incompatible with its secularity) then all the factors 
which might thwart it: self interest, emotional imperatives of various kinds, not to 
mention misplaced religious zeal, would enjoy an equal legitimacy, for they too are 
the result of phenomenal factors.  And whereas naturalism might expose Jacob’s and 
Joseph’s sense of their own destiny and God’s presence as being just a matter of 
social conditioning and individual psychology, secular enlightenment could never 
consistently claim to be anything but a matter of social conditioning and individual 
psychology.  The second problem has to do with authorial intention.  It is quite true 
that, for example, Joseph’s behaviour as a prison ‘trusty’ in Zawi-Rê is comparatively 
‘humane’, and that his management of the Egyptian economy is ‘enlightened’, if those 
adjectives are understood in a common-sense way, and ‘progress’ is indeed an 
important theme in the novel – a theme to which we shall return later in this chapter.  
But if Mann had intended us to regard humanity, enlightenment and progress as self-
evident values in need of no appeal to the religious and metaphysical, the policy of 
presenting them to us in the context of a young man’s progress towards what he 
regards as a destiny ordained by providence, and who takes God’s will (and not an 
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 ‘The novel is addressed to a world which it views as democratic, and the moral obligation it imposes 
on this world is democratic[…]This view bespoke an optimistic liberalism which was not only in 
defiance of the intellectual trends of fascist Germany, it was also an attack on the very fundaments of 
Western dualistic philosophy since Plato.’ (Murdaugh 1976, 34) 
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instinct of compassion, say) as his supreme criterion – this policy would have been 
most inappropriate to the task.  The tetralogy’s chief concern is Joseph himself, and in 
what light his personality, thoughts and actions should be understood.  We can adopt 
his own view, that his story is framed by a religious and metaphysical context from 
which it derives its significance, or we can dismiss the religious and metaphysical 
context as delusory and accept that the story has no significance, that it is just a 
procession of meaningless events. 
 
As we have seen, the narrator frequently invites us to take the latter, naturalistic view 
of the story.  Is there anything in the novel which would tend to confirm Joseph’s 
religious and metaphysical view of the matter?  Come to that, what could confirm the 
religious and metaphysical assumptions of a character in a work of fiction?  The 
answer to that question is: the supernatural.  In chapter II we pointed out that in many 
tales of ghosts, gods and demons the supernatural represents an evaluative 
metaphysic.  Such apparitions often pursue a positive moral purpose, but even when 
they are nefarious their freedom from the necessity of the phenomenal realm, to which 
they only partially belong, makes them as insusceptible to naturalistic analysis as it 
makes them susceptible to moral analysis: ghosts, gods and demons can be properly 
described as good and evil and their presence imparts a moral dimension to the stories 
in which they figure.  It is true that Schopenhauer conceived a metaphysic from which 
the element of freedom and moral choice was excluded, and we saw in chapter III that 
such a philosophical development is capable of literary exploitation.  But all strictures 
against undue generalization notwithstanding, it remains true that the supernatural 
tends to be the guarantor of meaning wherever it crops up in traditional fiction, and 
that fantastic works such as ‘The Turn of the Screw’ or ‘Der Sandmann’ make it 
difficult for us to reject their supernatural elements by binding them to the narrative’s 
moral import. 
 
However, whereas it is necessary to make a case for the connection between the 
supernatural and evaluative metaphysics in the context of nineteenth century ghost 
stories, the contention that Judaeo-Christian religious thinking has for millennia 
considered God to be at once supernatural and metaphysical hardly needs defending – 
for nobody would think to deny it.  On the one hand He is a personal God who, 
despite a magical superiority to the laws of physics, none the less betrays phenomenal 
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character attributes: jealousy, anger, partiality etc.  And on the other hand He is a 
metaphysical essence, beyond time and space (which are His creations, after all) and 
the uttermost criterion for moral justification: to do right by God is to do right 
absolutely.  It is in regard to God as authentic criterion of value that, firstly, certain of 
his supernatural emanations (angels, demons and souls) gain their moral complexion 
and, secondly, certain facts and deeds in the strictly phenomenal world can be 
adjudicated good or evil.  We might wonder, then, if the obvious alternative to a 
naturalistic and meaningless interpretation of Joseph und seine Brüder – given that it 
is a retelling of a Bible story – might not be a religious one in which a Judaeo-
Christian metaphysic is validated by supernatural interventions.  We shall, however, 
postpone until later further analysis of the metaphysic underpinning the tetralogy.  
Before that matter can be dealt with another must be confronted: are there, in fact, any 
signs that the supernatural is present in the Joseph novels? 
 
The Supernatural Reading of Joseph 
 
The answer – as in the case of Der Tod in Venedig and the acknowledged fantastic 
works mentioned in chapter II – is that various facts and events seem so improbable 
from a naturalistic point of view that we are tempted to attribute them to supernatural 
agency, especially as that supernatural agency is, as we have seen, the likely guarantor 
of any meaning the work might have.  But none of the facts and events which take 
place within the narrative proper is inexplicable in naturalistic terms:
173
 they can be 
attributed to extraordinary coincidence, for example.  Alternatively, strange 
occurrences which the narrator apparently vouches for might be attributed instead to 
the distorting mentality of one or more characters. 
 
These facts and events make their modest first appearance in Die Geschichten 
Jaakobs.  We remember that Jacob, like Joseph after him, has the conviction that, 
despite Laban’s hostile machinations, the God of his fathers will smooth his path to 
freedom and prosperity, and we also remember that this conviction is borne out in the 
course of the narrative.  Some of his success can be attributed to his own 
resourcefulness, of course, some to a gift (again foreshadowing Joseph’s technique) 
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 That is, the narrative as it deals with human characters rather than episodes such as ‘Vorspiel in 
Oberen Rängen’ etc. 
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for persuading others that he is a divine favourite and thus worth cultivating, and 
some to blind chance.  But there are moments when Jacob’s luck is hard to write off 
in this way.  For example, one of the most important stages in his progress is 
represented by his discovery of a subterranean well on Laban’s property.  He suffers 
something like a seizure while walking the fields at twilight and in its aftermath 
beholds a vision of Ea-Oannes, a fish-like local deity, drawing water with a bucket 
from a particular spot.  So that is where Jacob digs, and finds the water he seeks.  This 
might be a coincidence: what Jacob takes as a divination is nothing more than a brain-
storm entirely unconnected with the actual presence of water.  But there is no getting 
round the fact that his own view of the matter: ‘Er fand Wasser[…]wie er wohl wußte, 
mit Hilfe des Herrn, seines Gottes, obgleich sich Erscheinungen einmischten, die 
diesem eigentlich hätten zuwider sein müssen’, (IV, 257) is confirmed by events.  
And this is by no means the end of Jacob’s startlingly good fortune.  He strikes the 
following bargain with Laban (who is anxious to placate a son-in-law threatening to 
leave and take his good luck with him): the piebald sheep – those already present and 
those yet to be born – of the property’s flock are to be his.  Despite Laban’s extremely 
unfavourable stipulations – black and white sheep are not to be allowed to interbreed 
and Jacob must pasture the white, rather than the piebald, sheep – Jacob is persuaded 
that the deal will be to his benefit because he believes he has a certain method of 
increasing the proportion of piebald sheep in the flock.  He has made the ‘discovery’ 
that ‘der Anblick von Scheckigem sich bei der läufigen Kreatur auf die Frucht warf, 
die sie bei solchem Anblick empfing, und daß Scheckig-Zweifarbenes danach zutage 
trat.’ (IV, 356)   
 
Now Jacob for his part may consider the belief that he can influence the chromatic 
complexion of a burgeoning flock by such means to be valid, but we for ours are 
bound to regard it as an erroneous assumption only apparently verified by certain 
irrelevant circumstances – the ewe would have given birth to a piebald lamb whether 
or not she was gazing at something chequered at the moment of conception.  But if we 
accept that there is no scientific basis for Jacob’s confidence, how are we to explain 
that the narrative justifies that confidence? – for he does indeed succeed in breeding a 
great many piebald sheep from the white flock and thereby increases his already 
considerable independent fortune.   If we adopt the naturalistic point of view, then we 
are forced to attribute Jacob’s success in this venture to astronomical levels of good 
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luck.  He was lucky to make an erroneous assumption about the nature of colour-
inheritance, and he was twice lucky to speculate on the proliferation of piebald lambs 
amongst a white flock when, as we know, he had no effective means to effect that 
outcome – lucky because without making those two mistakes he could never have 
been rewarded by the entirely fortuitous realization of his purpose!  As happens so 
often in fantastic literature, we find ourselves tempted to reject an interpretation 
which is scientifically possible but astoundingly improbable, and to accept an 
interpretation which seems less improbable while being scientifically impossible: that 
a divine providence works to accomplish Jacob’s ends even when he himself is 
ignorant of its agency. 
 
This tendency of events to justify far-fetched expectations on the part of the novel’s 
characters becomes ever more pronounced as the narrative progresses.  It is evidently 
true with regards to Joseph himself, of course, whose adolescent vision of apotheosis 
foretells, in celestial terms, a destiny improbable indeed for the son of an itinerant 
shepherd like Jacob.  In the presence of the ‘Vater der Welt’ a voice speaks to him 
saying, ‘Du Menschenkind, tritt auf deine Füße!  Denn fortan sollst du vor meinem 
Stuhl stehen als Metatron und Knabe Gottes, und ich will dir Schlüsselgewalt geben, 
meinen Araboth zu öffnen und zu schließen, und sollst zum Befehlshaber gesetzt sein 
über alle Scharen, denn der Herr hat Wohlgefallen an dir.’ (IV, 466) This position of 
second-only-to-the-almighty is, of course, attained by Joseph in Joseph der Ernährer 
when he becomes Pharaoh’s lieutenant.  Unfeasibly grandiose as the dream seems it 
never the less comes true.  After having recounted his dream to Benjamin he adds 
that, although his imagined experiences were so intense as to banish all thought of his 
family, ‘über ein kleines, des bin ich gewiß, hätte ich euer gedacht und euch 
nachkommen lassen, daß auch ihr wäret erhöht worden neben mir, der Vater, die 
Weiber, die Brüder und du.’ (IV, 469) And, lo and behold, once Joseph becomes ‘wie 
Pharaoh’ the occasion – in the form of a prolonged drought – to let his family follow 
him to Egypt does indeed present itself.  
 
We could multiply examples (in the final volume of the tetralogy Thamar and Jacob 
evince considerable prophetic foreknowledge) but there is no purpose in analysing in 
detail the surfeit of evidence which Joseph offers.  Clearly, the gift of divination and 
predestination which various characters take as their birthright has every appearance 
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of being underwritten by the unfolding of events.  It is all very well to say, as 
Cunningham does, with reference to Joseph’s elevation from prison ‘trusty’ to 
Pharaoh’s most powerful minister that ‘the call to the royal presence is, however, no 
deus ex machina turning apparent disaster into joyous triumph through arbitrary 
authorial (or even divine) omnipotence; it is something Joseph has earned – and 
planned for – by successfully interpreting the dreams of Pharaoh’s courtiers at Zawi-
rê’ (Cunningham 1985, 138) – no amount of planning and preparation on Joseph’s 
part could have effected this outcome.  How can he have prepared the succession to 
the throne of a young, idealistic but naïve Pharaoh in need of his particular services?  
How can he have prepared the imprisonment of the royal vintner and baker?  How, in 
the absence of divine guidance, can he be sure of the correct interpretation of their 
dreams?  For although his psychological acumen may well be sufficient to discover 
that the former is innocent, the latter guilty as charged, he cannot be certain that they 
will be found innocent and guilty as charged.  Indisputably Joseph draws on 
impressive reserves of energy, ingenuity and charisma in the pursuit of what he 
believes to be his destiny, but those qualities would be quite insufficient without what 
may be regarded either as an inexhaustible streak of good luck or as the effects of a 
supernatural power. 
 
Authors have at their disposal two methods by which supernatural and natural 
explanation may be made to coexist.  We have so far examined only one of these 
methods as applied in Joseph und seine Brüder, that of the multiplication of 
coincidence, with its tendency to undermine a purely naturalistic account of events.  It 
was the method we saw at work in ‘The Black Cat’. It suggests that chance, once it 
reaches a certain degree of persistence and intensity, can no longer be dismissed as 
mere chance but must rather be recognized as the expression of a numinous or 
noumenal intention – although, in accordance with Kant’s strictures regarding the 
limitations of the ‘Verstand’, that intention may never be definitely discerned in the 
empirical realm’s unbroken chain of cause and effect.  The other method is to advance 
the likelihood of delusional psychology, with its tendency to undermine a purely 
supernatural account of events.  It was the method we saw at work in ‘The Turn of the 
Screw’.  It suggests that strange events might be better attributed to a character’s state 
of mind than to the actual intervention of anything other-worldly.  Are there, though, 
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any other-worldly apparitions comparable to those of ‘The Turn of the Screw’ in the 
Joseph tetralogy?   
 
There is, by general consent, at least one: the ‘Mann auf dem Felde’ who seems 
intimately concerned with and strangely well-informed about Joseph and his destiny, 
and whose behaviour and conversation are exceedingly improbable from a naturalistic 
point of view.  He seems, as various critics have pointed out,
174
 to be an angel tasked 
to both announce and to guide,
 175
 and as such he evidently has much in common with 
the Hermes psychopompos of Der Tod in Venedig.
176
  In keeping with this latter 
quality he displays hermetic insignia (sandals and walking stick), and if he is lacking 
a pair of angelic wings, their absence is, so he would seem to suggest, purely 
temporary.
177
  His role in the story is by no means limited to accompanying Joseph to 
Dortan.  He watches over the empty well from which Joseph has been rescued in a 
way which prefigures that of the angel at Christ’s tomb,178 and, when Ruben asks him 
in whose commission he has undertaken such an inexplicable duty, replies allusively 
and evasively: ‘Laß das gut sein, woher so ein Auftrag kommt.  Er pflegt durch viele 
Münde zu gehen, und es frommt wenig, ihn bis zu seinem Urquell zurück zu 
verfolgen’. (IV, 617)  Finally, he guides Joseph and the Mitanni traders to Egypt but – 
just like the hermetic gondolier in Der Tod in Venedig – vanishes before he can 
receive his salary.  Throughout all his appearances he makes great show of having a 
more than common knowledge of Joseph’s family (he says that the name ‘Israel’ 
which Jacob carried victorious from his struggle at Jabbok is not the name he most 
wished to receive in blessing) (IV, 538) and of having insight into certain religious 
mysteries (he says that if the ‘Kinder des Lichtes’ ever did condescend to lie with the 
daughters of Eve they did so in a spirit of uttermost contempt).
 
(IV, 543) 
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 Examples: (Murdaugh 1976, 80- 83); (Cunningham 1985, 188); (Swensen 1994, 29-36) 
175
 He describes himself as a ‘Bote’ to Joseph (Thomas Mann 1960b, 537): ‘Bote’ = ἄγγελος. 
176
 He tells Joseph: ‘Ich führe die Reisenden und öffne ihnen die Wege, das ist mein Geschäft.’ (IV, 
537) 
177
 ‘ “Ich bin vorübergehend gewisser Erleichterungen in meinem Fortkommen beraubt,” setzte er 
hinzu und rückte die Schultern.’ (IV, 540) If this strange personage had indeed sported a pair of wings, 
the naturalistic hypothesis would have been much more difficult to maintain.  That, of course, is why 
he does not have them. 
178
 Compare: ‘For the angel of the Lord descended from heaven, and came and rolled back the stone 
from the door, and sat upon it.’ (Matthew 28.2) and: ‘Einer saß neben dem Brunnen, und der war 
abgedeckt: Der Brunnenstein lag in zwei Hälften auf den Fliesen, eine über der anderen, und darauf saß 
Einer im Mäntelchen.’ (IV, 616) 
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It has been objected that the introduction of the ‘Mann auf dem Felde’ is one of 
Mann’s ‘most shameless stylistic breaks’, (Murdaugh 1976, 81) but this is not the 
case if the term ‘stylistic break’ is intended to denote the inclusion in an otherwise 
naturalistic text of something definitely supernatural.  For although we are given 
plenty of evidence which would tend to persuade us that he is indeed a supernatural 
apparition, we can none the less, if we apply some ingenuity, account for him in 
strictly naturalistic terms, with the result that the fantastic ambiguity which marks the 
whole of the tetralogy is not fatally compromised.  After all, this personage who talks 
and behaves as though he were the messenger and agent of a higher power might be 
no more than a deranged human being – a paranoiac with delusions of transcendental 
grandeur, who has picked up some stories about Jacob from Joseph’s brothers, who 
fantasizes about the relationships between the children of light and the daughters of 
Eve, and whose prefigurement of the angel at Christ’s tomb as related in the gospel is 
entirely coincidental.
179
  It is with explanations of this kind in mind that Mann 
defends the inclusion of ‘Der Mann auf dem Felde’ in a letter to René Schickele, 
while conceding how far-fetched such explanations must seem: ‘Zwar habe ich die 
Hintertür halbwegs offen gelassen, daß er allenfalls doch ein etwas wunderliches 
Menschenkind sein kann; aber sie ist recht schmal, und man kommt fast nicht 
hindurch.’ (Mann/Schickele 1992, 71) And this defence, with its recognition that the 
highly improbable can still be formally compatible with naturalism, is valid not only 
for ‘Der Mann auf dem Felde’ but for the apparently ubiquitous influence of 
providence throughout the tetralogy.  The reader can take the naturalistic way out if 
he wishes, but he will have difficulty getting through! 
 
What does distinguish the ‘Mann auf dem Felde’ from the accumulating evidence of 
supernatural foresight, guidance and reward we discussed earlier is that he is much 
harder to ignore.  The description of Joseph’s juvenile dreams and their fulfilment in 
his adult experiences, for example, are separated by many hundreds of pages, and in 
the meantime Joseph’s ingenuity and his determination to achieve what he believes 
God has in store for him are played up for all they are worth – with the result that the 
implied challenge to naturalism is comparatively easy to overlook.  It is his 
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 An example of psychology and coincidence working hand in glove to create an overwhelmingly 
supernatural impression which is not, however, underpinned by any unambiguously supernatural 
elements. 
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obtrusiveness, we suggest, which has earned the ‘Mann auf dem Felde’ such a hostile 
reception from critics committed to the secular, and therefore naturalistic, reading of 
Joseph.
180
  But equally hard to overlook – and the object of equal bafflement on the 
part of many such critics – is the dual character and attitude of the narrator himself, 
who at times strongly favours a phenomenal cause-and-effect explanation for events, 
at others calls in aid religious and metaphysical explanations of a kind intolerable to 
naturalism. 
 
Narrative Perspectives 
 
We have already noted the narrator’s tendency to deflate the apparently fated 
behaviour of Isaac and his tribe by suggesting that this is determined by a self-
perpetuating pattern of thought in essence no more meaningful than the path of a 
watercourse which each season’s rain cannot help but confirm and deepen.  If we 
leave aside the ‘Höllenfahrt’ overture for a moment, the perspective which prevails in 
the earlier portions of the tetralogy is one of good-natured scepticism.  It is quite true 
that like many of Mann’s narrators, that of Joseph sometimes adopts by means of free 
indirect speech the thoughts of the characters who focalize the story in a given 
episode.
181
  But the opinions he voices on his own behalf seem tailor-made to appeal 
to a readership of twentieth-century rationalists.  The following defence of Joseph’s 
filial piety is typical in this respect of the earlier parts of the novel: ‘Das, was wir in 
unserer Sprache seine Vaterbindung zu nennen versucht sind, eine Bindung, desto 
tiefer und inniger, als sie kraft einer weitgehenden Gleichsetzung und Verwechselung 
zugleich Gottesbindung war, bewährte sich außerordentlich stark gerade jetzt, – und 
wie hätte sie nicht in ihm bewähren sollen, da sie sich mit ihm, an ihm und außer ihm 
bewährte?’ (IV, 818) 
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 Cunningham seems almost to invite us to excise ‘Der Mann auf dem Felde’ from the novel: ‘This 
figure is superfluous.  Joseph could surely have found his brothers without a supernatural guide; the 
Ismaelites would probably have reached Egypt with only mortal guidance; and Ruben was capable of 
ascertaining for himself that the well was empty.’ (Cunningham 1985, 187)  The effect, evidently 
enough, of attributing (or slyly getting the reader to attribute) events which might have been – but were 
not – accomplished by known natural causes to supernatural ones, is to encourage credence in the 
latter.  And if one is committed (as Cunningham is) to a secular and naturalistic reading of Joseph, then 
such credence is indefensible.    
181
 For example, it is evident from its context that this sentiment:  ‘Gott aber war Herr der Äonen, El 
olâm, und Er war es, der dem Menschen hatte olâm ins Herz gegeben,’ (IV, 405) is to be attributed to 
Eliezer and to Joseph.  It is not underwritten by the narrator himself. 
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However, this initial narratorial perspective begins to alternate, as the novel 
progresses, with another one which, far from discerning natural causation behind 
apparently supernatural intervention, on the contrary discerns supernatural 
intervention where natural causation – in particular the interplay of Joseph’s 
psychology with those of other characters – might easily explain a given occurrence.  
For example, in amongst all the ‘natürliche und nüchterne’ explanations for Mont-
Kaw’s initial interest in Joseph the narrator advances this one:  ‘Es ist möglich – wir 
wollen nur eine Vermutung blicken lassen, keine Behauptung wagen –, daß der Gott 
seiner Väter ein übriges für Joseph tat und ein Licht auf ihn fallen ließ, geeignet, im 
Herzen des Anschauenden das Zweckdienliche hervorzurufen.’182 Likewise, he is not 
content merely to report, by direct quotation and free indirect speech, Jacob’s faith in 
an ‘Einst’ to come which is as real and important as that of the past, but coins on his 
own initiative a rhyming aphorism which articulates this by no means naturalistic 
concept: ‘Wer nicht das Einst der Zukunft ehrt, ist nicht des Einst der Vergangenheit 
wert und stellt sich auch zum heutigen Tag verkehrt.  Dies ist unsere Lehrmeinung, 
wenn wir sie einschalten dürfen in die Lehren, die Jaakob ben Jizchak der Thamar 
erteilte.’ (V, 1555)  Furthermore, in ‘Vorspiel in Oberen Rängen’ (the prelude to 
Joseph der Ernährer) the narrator implies in passing that he himself is an angel, and 
speaks of God, Sammael etc. as entities personally known to him, and of whose 
existence he has not the least doubt.
 183
   
 
However, the prelude’s description of this supernatural world is phrased in terms so 
inappropriate and comic that one suspects that the whole scene is to be taken with a 
pinch of salt.  Cunningham, indeed, suggests that we ought to regard it as an 
allegorical myth: ‘The apparently deterministic theology of the work, far from 
contradicting its humanist content, actually re-expresses the same thing in symbolic 
                                                 
182
 (IV, 796)  Nolte advances the following ingenious argument to demonstrate that the supernatural 
perspective implied in such statements is employed to naturalistic ends: ‘If the narrator introduces the 
idea of divine intervention where the causality of the course of events is actually evident and quite 
natural, the reader is made to observe a process of mythologizing.  If then he gives a rational 
explanation where the course of events appears ‘unnatural’, he demythologizes the process.  The effect 
this must have on the reader is “aufklärerisch” without doubt, for in both cases the reader is shown the 
power of perspective and the relative ease of manipulation.  If his aim is to make the reader conscious 
of this, he succeeds.’ (Nolte 1996, 129)   This is to mistake one’s own beliefs and assumptions for 
those of the author: ‘Mann, like myself, does not take the supernatural seriously.  Therefore, whenever 
he has the narrator attribute an event to divine intervention, it is only in order to demonstrate 
mythopoeia in action!’ 
183
 ‘ “Die Engel[...]sind nach unserem Bilde geschaffen, jedoch nicht fruchtbar”[...]Wir waren nicht 
“fruchtbar”, allerdings nicht.  Wir waren Kämmerer des Lichtes.’ (V, 1280) 
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form – that is, as a myth’ (Cunningham 1985, 193) – and there is nothing in principle 
to gainsay such a possibility, in view of the fact that we have already come across one 
work, ‘Der Sandmann’, which includes within a fantastic framework an allegorical 
interlude.  It is not, however, necessary to accept Cunningham’s view that the material 
mythically transformed must be in origin secular and phenomenal.  When, for 
example, Plato gives a mythical account of the ancestry of love in Symposium, or of 
the tripartite soul in ‘Phaedrus’, he does not do so in the belief that love and the soul 
are phenomenal entities.  To the contrary.  He does so because he is persuaded that 
they are metaphysical entities, which, if they are to appeal to the imagination as well 
as the intellect, must be granted phenomenal garb: an appearance, a personality, a 
story.  But that such myths are a makeshift, and not to be taken at face value, is 
signalled by precisely the sort of comedy and absurdity that characterizes ‘Vorspiel’ 
in passages such as the following, which describes the sour pleasure taken by the 
heavenly host at the divine punishments reserved for mankind.  The foresight of the 
angels, we are told, is not unlimited, but 
 
es reichte hin, den englischen Mißmut über das ‘ähnlichste’ Geschöpf im allgemeinen zu einer 
Extra-Gereiztheit gegen den in der Heranbildung begriffenen Wahlstamm sich zuspitzen zu 
lassen – zu behutsamer Schadenfreude reichte es hin über die kleine Flut und den 
Schwefelregen, den Man zu Seinem Kummer über ein mit besonderen und weittragenden 
Absichten ausgestattetes Reis dieses Stammes zu verhängen genötigt gewesen war – in der 
schlecht verhehlten Absicht freilich, aus der Strafe ein Vehikel zu machen. (V, 1291) 
 
The satirical impression made by this exposure of the angels as creatures animated by 
pusillanimous ill-will towards mankind, and of God as hypocritical and calculating, is 
rendered all the sharper by the use of vocabulary (‘englischer Mißmut’, ‘Extra-
Gereiztheit’ etc.) ludicrously inappropriate to the heavenly context.  But it is just as 
probable – more probable in the light of Mann’s own religious professions – that the 
purpose of the absurdity is to remind us of the unworthiness of myth to its subject-
matter rather than the subject-matter’s unworthiness of myth.     
 
There are, then, good grounds to consider the ‘Vorspiel’ as formally distinct from the 
main story and as having an indirect and not easily calculable bearing on it.  There is 
even reason to doubt whether its narrator and the third person narrator (as we have 
until this point assumed him to be) of the main story are identical.  After all, the 
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narrator of ‘Vorspiel’ presumably shares the heavenly host’s contempt for the tribe of 
Abraham, whereas the narrator of the main story treats it sympathetically.  
Conversely, the narrator of the main story gives an unflattering portrait of the ‘Mann 
auf dem Felde’, whereas a fellow angel would, we might think, be at pains to show 
him in a favourable light.  However, though its relation to the main story is 
problematic, and though its testimony is undermined by irony, there can be no 
doubting the overall tendency of the ‘Vorspiel’ to strengthen the supernatural and to 
weaken the naturalistic perspective on Joseph’s adventures.  We might take it to be an 
allegorizing myth, but should we do so we might find at its core not a psychological 
but a metaphysical truth.  We might suspect that the narrator of the ‘Vorspiel’ and that 
of the main narrative are distinct entities – without, however, being in a position to 
definitely affirm this to be the case.
184
 And once the possibility of their identity: the 
possibility, that is, that the whole of the tetralogy is the recording of an angel, gains a 
hold on our consciousness, we will be ever less surprised by the consistency of the 
narrator’s point of view (which in the earlier parts of the novel seemed to be that of a 
twentieth century rationalist) with the religious point of view of the characters to 
whose sentiments he gives voice through free indirect speech.  When Jacob is 
reintroduced to us in the ‘Fünftes Hauptstück’ of Joseph der Ernährer, and we are 
told ‘Sobald einmal Gewöhnung Platz gegriffen, sein Hadern mit Gott sich erschöpft, 
die grausame Verfügung dieses Gottes Eingang gefunden hatte in seine anfangs 
krampfhaft dagegen versperrte Natur, war sie zu einer Bereicherung seines Lebens, 
einem Beitrag zu dessen Geschichtenschwere geworden’ (V, 1538) we no longer 
assume that these thoughts are to be attributed to Jacob alone, or even to Jacob at all: 
they might well be those of the narrator himself.  In short, although the ‘Vorspiel’ is 
insulated from the main story in the ways just described, it none the less induces us to 
view the last quarter of the tetralogy in a more supernatural light. 
 
The Fantastic 
 
Joseph und seine Brüder, then, goes to great lengths to maintain a balance between 
the natural and the supernatural: a balance of evidence so far as events are concerned, 
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 Alan Swensen certainly takes this notion seriously and devotes considerable space in his Gods, 
Angels and Narrators to a discussion of their possible identity without, however, coming to any firm 
conclusions. (Swensen 1994, 13-39) 
133 
 
and a balance of attitude so far as the narrator is concerned.  As in ‘Der Sandmann’185 
this balance oscillates dramatically, so that there are moments when one or other of 
the competing explanations seems on the verge of becoming altogether dominant, its 
counterpart unfeasible.  This, however, is never permitted to happen: each time that 
the tendency towards one or other of the two elements threatens to become 
overwhelming, Mann deploys countervailing evidence, along with a countervailing 
attitude on the part of the narrator, against it, and so restores equilibrium.  That this 
procedure was programmatic and no oversight is an idea which receives some support 
from ‘Freud und die Zukunft’.  Jung, he says in that address, discerned in eastern 
mysticism an acknowledgement that ‘der Geber aller Gegebenheiten in uns selber 
wohnt’,186 before adding, with becoming modesty: 
 
Ja, lassen Sie mich hier auf dieses mein eigenes Werk zu sprechen kommen – vielleicht hat es 
ein Recht, genannt zu werden in einer Stunde festlicher Begegnung zwischen dichtender 
Literatur und der psychoanalytischen Sphäre.  Merkwürdig genug – und vielleicht nicht nur für 
mich –, daß darin eben jene psychologische Theologie herrschend ist, die der Gelehrte der 
östlichen Eingeweihtheit zuschreibt: Dieser Abram ist gewissermaßen Gottes Vater.  Er hat ihn 
erschaut und hervorgedacht; die mächtigen Eigenschaften, die er ihm zuschreibt, sind wohl 
Gottes ursprüngliches Eigentum, Abram ist nicht ihr Erzeuger, aber in gewissem Sinn ist er es 
dennoch, da er sie erkennt und denkend verwirklicht.  Gottes gewaltige Eigenschaften – und 
damit Gott selbst – sind zwar etwas sachlich Gegebenes außer Abram, zugleich aber sind sie 
auch in ihm und von ihm; die Macht seiner eigenen Seele ist in gewissen Augenblicken kaum 
von ihnen zu unterscheiden, verschränkt sich und verschmilzt sich erkennend in eins mit ihnen, 
und das ist der Ursprung des Bundes, den der Herr dann mit Abram schließt und der nur die 
ausdrückliche Bestätigung einer inneren Tatsache ist.
187
 
 
Mann evidently wishes us to be in two minds about the objective reality of God, and 
all that God entails, and is careful to sustain both naturalistic and supernatural 
interpretations with evidence appropriate to each.  And this explains the special 
                                                 
185
 And unlike both ‘The Black Cat’ and Der Tod in Venedig, which take a synoptic approach whereby 
significant episodes support the naturalistic and supernatural hypotheses equally. 
186
 (IX, 489)  It should be noted that although Mann calls Jung’s view as stated here a ‘Schopenhauer-
Freud’sche Erkenntnis’ it is actually a form of idealism.  Freudian psychoanalysis, by contrast, in line 
with its scientific pretensions, takes human consciousness to be a product of the phenomenal world.  
Schopenhauer’s contribution to philosophy is the suggestion that human consciousness is only the 
expression – along with everything else in the phenomenal world – of a blind, unconscious and 
impulsive force, i.e. the ‘Wille’. 
187
 (IX, 490)  This passage appears almost word-for-word in Joseph (IV, 428) where it is natural to 
ascribe its double perspective to Joseph himself.  In the Freud address, however, Mann takes personal 
responsibility for it. 
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handling of an episode which we might expect to loom large in the retelling of the 
story of Joseph and his family, but which is not, unlike other events which took place 
immediately before and after it, related directly: the encounter between Jacob and a 
mysterious opponent at the ford of Jabbok.  The little we are allowed to learn is 
filtered through Jacob’s own feverish sensibility after a long interval of time, so that it 
is impossible to tell whether the night-long wrestling bout actually took place, or was 
no more than a dream: ‘Ein schwerer, schrecklicher und hochwollüstiger Traum von 
verzweifelter Süße, aber kein luftiger und vergehender, von dem nichts erübrigte, 
sondern ein Traum, so körperheiß und wirklichkeitsdicht, daß doppelte 
Lebenshinterlassenschaft von ihm liegengeblieben war, wie Meeresfrucht am Land 
bei der Ebbe.’ (IV, 95) The reason for this special treatment of an episode, which 
could just as easily have been narrated directly in the same way that Jacob’s flight 
from Laban was, is that in this way, and in this way only, fantastic ambiguity can be 
preserved.  In the case of ‘Der Mann auf dem Felde’ we only need suppose that one 
person – the ‘Mann’ himself – is deluded in order to shore up an admittedly 
improbable naturalistic interpretation of events.  But in the case of the wrestling bout 
at Jabbok, we would have to suppose that both Jacob and his opponent shared exactly 
the same delusion: that the one was a supernatural emissary of God, that the other was 
God’s favourite mortal son, and that the pair of them were to wrestle for a name of 
special significance.  That would be an untenable level of improbability.  Mann, if he 
had chosen direct narration, would have had to give the episode either an 
unambiguously supernatural treatment (Jacob does indeed meet an angel of the Lord 
and wrestle with him for a blessed name till daybreak) or an unambiguously 
naturalistic treatment (Jacob engages for whatever reason in a violent and protracted 
struggle at Jabbok with some man whom he encounters there, and goes on to 
embroider these quite mundane events with a religious significance later) but he could 
not have given it an ambiguous treatment. 
 
The case, then, for Joseph und seine Brüder as a fantastic work presenting on the one 
hand a naturalistic aspect and on the other hand a supernatural aspect is surely 
unanswerable.  But, given that Mann did not choose to dispense with the supernatural 
altogether, and given that this aspect of the story seems to gain in conviction as the 
narrative unfolds, what purpose does it serve?  As mentioned earlier in this chapter, its 
most obvious effect is to lend credence to Joseph’s own religious views and those of 
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other characters.  If there were no supernatural element at all – if, for example, Jacob 
only discovered his well after methodically testing the whole of Laban’s property for 
water, or if Joseph had never dreamed his apotheosis many years before it came to 
pass but was rather amazed that his eloquence had raised him almost as high as 
Pharaoh himself – then we would have no reason to suppose that the religious beliefs 
of Jacob and Joseph were anything other than delusions.  
 
The Essay on Schopenhauer 
 
I shall argue that the very particular religious beliefs of the two main protagonists of 
the tetralogy are indeed what Mann intends first surreptitiously then ever more openly 
to vindicate in Joseph, for the very good reason that their views and his own largely 
coincide.  But such a near-identity of Mann’s perspective and that of the two 
‘Gottesfürsten’ is inconsistent with a widely spread critical assumption regarding the 
philosophical underpinning of Joseph und seine Brüder: that it is a thoroughly 
Schopenhauerian novel.  That is true of Dierks (‘die Personen des Joseph sind in den 
Alten Orient versetze Schopenhauerianer’), (Dierks 1972, 99) Heimendahl (‘Hinter 
dem “Wesen des Mythus als zeitlose Immer-Gegenwart” verbirgt sich nichts anderes 
als Schopenhauers Ubiquität des Willens’),188 and Swensen (‘The Judeo Christian 
metaphysics first suggested by the presence of the angel behind the narrative, and then 
by the presence of God[…]begins to take on the pronounced appearance of a 
Schopenhauerian metaphysics’). (Swensen 1994, 98)  There are, however, two 
important objections to be made against the Schopenhauerian interpretation of Joseph.  
The first is that there is little unambiguous textual support for it, and the second is that 
Mann, during the course of writing the tetralogy, became ever more committed to a 
philosophical position quite at odds with the characteristic features of Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine.   
 
What evidence, then, can be adduced to support a Schopenhauerian reading of 
Joseph?  Of the authors mentioned above only Swensen, we would argue, avoids an 
insidious hermeneutical trap, which consists in attributing to Mann the policy of 
viewing events, phrases and attitudes from a Schopenhauerian perspective, when that 
                                                 
188
 (Heimendahl 1998, 281)  As noted in chapter I, Heimendahl tempers his Schopenhauerian 
interpretation by the addition of other intellectual ingredients. 
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policy is actually the critic’s own.  Swensen, by contrast, searches the text for traces 
of explicitly Schopenhauerian thinking, and finds them in the form of the ‘veils’ of 
one kind or another to be found throughout the novel – the most important, of course, 
being Joseph’s coat of many colours, Rachel’s dowry-dress, the Ketônet Passîm.189  
This garment, embroidered with colourful scenes from myth and fable, is pointedly 
referred to as a ‘Schleiergewirk’ which is bound to make us think of the ‘veil of 
maja’: (IV, 297) the shimmering phenomenal world which partially hides and 
partially reflects the dreadful reality of a ubiquitous and omnipotent ‘Wille’.  Earlier 
in the text however, story-telling has already been described as ‘des 
Lebensgeheimnisses Feierkleid’, (IV, 54) and Swensen suggests that these two facts 
taken together: that Joseph’s ‘Feierkleid’ is a ‘Schleiergewirk’ and that story-telling is 
a ‘Feierkleid’, bring us to the conclusion that story-telling must be a ‘Schleiergewirk’ 
too.  Consequently, could we (but we cannot) peel away the world’s phenomenal 
garments and the myths which have grown up to explain them, we would find the 
‘Wille’ itself lurking beneath! (Swensen 1994, 97-102)  As a confirmation of this 
interpretation Swensen points out the Schopenhauerian significance of a key passage 
in the ‘Höllenfahrt’ overture to the tetralogy: ‘die Geschichte des Menschen ist älter 
als die materielle Welt, die seines Willens Werk ist, älter als das Leben, das auf 
seinem Willen steht.’ (IV, 39)  
 
There can be no question but that when Mann employs terms like ‘Schleiergewirk’ 
and ‘Wille’ he does so in the full consciousness of their pedigree – and it is possible 
that, in the playful, speculative, uncommitted mood which characterizes the first 
chapters of Die Geschichten Jaakobs, Mann was prepared to associate 
Schopenhauerian elements with others (such as ‘Geist’) which Schopenhauer himself 
contemptuously dismissed.  But even if this were the case, it would not mark an 
unqualified support for the central tenets of Schopenhauer’s philosophy – tenets 
which he in fact came to regard with a somewhat jaundiced eye, if the 1938 essay 
which bears the philosopher’s name is anything to go by.  This enthuses at length 
about the richness of Schopenhauer’s achievement – his psychological acumen, his 
appreciation of art etc. – while remaining distinctly chary of subscribing to his world-
                                                 
189
 The fact that the Ketônet Passîm represents the legacy of Ishtar, as Eizabeth Galvan demonstrates in 
a treatise devoted to examining what the tetralogy owes to Bachofen, (Galvan 1996, 49-61) is no 
objection to Swensen’s interpretation.  ‘Die vertauschten Köpfe’ provides ample testimony that mother 
goddesses are an apt embodiment of the instinctive, violent, but ceaselessly creative ‘Wille’.  
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view.  Mann makes the remark that ‘Es bleibt viel übrig, wenn man von einem 
Philosophen seine Philosophie abzieht, und schlimm wäre es, wenn nichts 
übrigbliebe’, (IX, 535) which suggests that he values Schopenhauer more as a 
personality and representative of a certain state of mind than as a thinker, although he 
goes on to say that the ‘Dynamik’ of his truth will never be altogether exhausted.  
And the same note of scepticism is struck again a little later on when, having praised 
Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung for being so impressive in its scope and cogency 
that, as one reads it, the works of other authors seem by comparison ‘fremd, 
unbelehrt, unrichtig, willkürlich[…], undiszipliniert von der Wahrheit’, he adds, as 
though in a sudden access of doubt, ‘Der Wahrheit?  Ist es denn so wahr?  Ja, im 
Sinne höchster und zwingendster Aufrichtigkeit.  Aber das Adjektiv bedeutet ein 
Ausweichen.  Bringt und enthält es die Wahrheit?’190  The question receives no direct 
answer.  Instead, Mann points out that the truth of Schopenhauer is to be found not so 
much articulated in his doctrines as projected in the mood he evokes, the ‘geistige 
Lebensluft der zweiten Hälfte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, – Jugend- und 
Heimatluft für uns, die wir heute die Sechzig überschritten haben.’ (IX, 558) It seems 
clear that just as he had done in ‘Freud und die Zukunft’ and just as he would do in 
‘Nietzsches Philosophie im Lichte unserer Erfahrung’ Mann is exploiting an 
apparently adulatory address to occupy a position quite distinct from that of the ‘great 
man’ he comes to praise. 
 
This impression can only be strengthened by what Mann selects for particular 
emphasis and approval both in Schopenhauer’s doctrines and those of his 
philosophical forebears.  For example, he is much more interested in the Platonic 
ideas as Plato expounded them than in what Schopenhauer turned them into: 
metaphysical genotypes struggling to realize themselves in the world of the senses.  
We mentioned in chapter III that the Hermes of Der Tod in Venedig, who for so much 
of the narrative would seem to be a representative of the ‘Wille’, is revealed in the 
end to be an emissary of a Platonic noumenal realm, and we saw how Mann grants to 
Hermes the commutative and communicative role which Schiller attributes to art.  
Now, in the ‘Schopenhauer’ essay, he takes the opportunity to formulate his view of 
the matter as clearly as possible – and if it is agreed that Joseph is a Hermes figure, 
                                                 
190
 (IX, 557)  The adjective is evasive because ‘wahr’ can mean ‘genuine’ and ‘sincere’ as well as 
‘correct’.   
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then there can be little doubt as to the sort of noumenal realm to which he owes his 
first allegiance.   
 
Und so bietet diese vor-christliche, schon christliche Lehre in ihrer asketischen Weisheit auch 
wieder einen ungemein sinnlich-artistischen Reiz und Zauber; denn die Auffassung der Welt als 
einer bunten und bewegten Phantasmagorie von Bildern, die für das Ideelle, Geistige 
durchscheinend sind, hat etwas eminent Künstlerisches und schenkt den Künstler erst gleichsam 
sich selbst: Er ist derjenige, der sich zwar lustvoll-sinnlich und sündig der Welt der 
Erscheinungen, der Welt der Abbilder verhaftet fühlen darf, da er sich zugleich der Welt der 
Idee und des Geistes zugehörig weiß, als der Magier, der die Erscheinung für diese durchsichtig 
macht.  Die vermittelnde Aufgabe des Künstlers, seine hermetisch-zauberhafte Rolle als Mittler 
zwischen Idee und Erscheinung, Geist und Sinnlichkeit kommt hier zum Vorschein. (IX, 534) 
 
Putting all other evidence aside for the moment, we can see that the ‘Schleiergewirk’ 
and the ‘Festkleid’ are just as likely to be allusions to the ‘bunte und bewegte 
Phantasmagorie von Bildern’ in Plato’s phenomenal realm as to those in 
Schopenhauer’s.  Accordingly, the implied noumenal counterpart to the phenomenal 
realm Mann has in mind is just as likely to be Plato’s ideal empyrean as 
Schopenhauer’s ‘Wille’.  As for the phrase ‘die Geschichte des Menschen ist älter als 
die materielle Welt, die seines Willens Werk ist’, this too can be explained by 
reference to the ‘Schopenhauer’ essay.  In his discussion of the ‘Verneinung des 
Willens’, Mann asks ‘Wie war sie möglich?  Wie konnte aus dem Leben, das doch 
durch und durch Wille zum Leben war, die Verneinung des Willens kommen?  Es 
ermöglicht sich eben dadurch, daß die Welt das Produkt eines Willensaktes war und 
daß ein solcher durch einen negativen, einen Gegen-Willensakt rückgängig gemacht 
und aufgehoben werden kann.’191  This corresponds closely to what Schopenhauer 
himself says on the final page of the ‘Ergänzungen’ to Die Welt als Wille und 
Vorstellung:  
 
                                                 
191
 (IX, 547)  Mann puts the matter in this way to draw our attention to the difficulty of Schopenhauer’s 
position – which is that the purported freedom of human beings to deny the ‘Wille’ evidently proceeds 
from their intelligence (otherwise unintelligent phenomena: animals, trees and inorganic matter, could 
do the same), whereas Schopenhauer’s typical doctrine is that the intellect is a mere handmaid to the 
‘Wille’.  Mann had long been aware of the contradiction: ‘Wiederholt, zum Beispiel in der Antwort auf 
eine Rundfrage des dänischen Journals Literaturen im April 1919, bestreitet Thomas Mann die 
Schopenhauerische Entgegensetzung von Wille und Intellekt: “Nie war die Schopenhauerische 
Antithese von Wille und Intellekt weniger zeitgemäß als heute.  Der Intellekt ist Wille – und durchaus 
nicht ‘Vorstellung’.  Der Intellekt als Wille ist stimuliert.” ’ (Heimendahl 1998, 234)  
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Der Willensakt, aus welchem die Welt entspringt, ist unser eigener. Er ist frei: denn der Satz 
vom Grunde, von dem allein alle Notwendigkeit ihre Bedeutung hat, ist bloß die Form seiner 
Erscheinung. Eben darum ist diese, wenn ein Mal da, in ihrem Verlauf durchweg notwendig: in 
Folge hievon allein können wir aus ihr die Beschaffenheit jenes Willensaktes erkennen und 
demgemäß eventualiter anders wollen. (Schopenhauer II, 829)  
 
This, as we pointed out in the last chapter, is Schopenhauer at his least 
Schopenhauerian.  Given that he has identified the noumenon with the ‘Wille zum 
Leben’ he cannot consistently claim that the ‘Willensakt’ by which the world comes 
into being is free.  The ‘Wille’ is, it is true, free of the necessity which reigns in the 
phenomenal realm, but it is not free of its own blind and ceaseless striving towards 
life.  In fact the ‘Wille’ which Schopenhauer calls in aid to explain the otherwise 
inexplicable ‘Verneinung des Willens zum Leben’ is of Kantian and not of 
Schopenhauerian stamp, and it is to Kant’s autonomous subject subsisting beyond the 
space and time which it creates that the word ‘Wille’ in the phrase ‘die materielle 
Welt, die seines Willens Werk ist’ alludes.  Nor should it surprise anyone who has 
read the ‘Schopenhauer’ essay with attention that it is precisely this ill-fitting element 
commandeered from the metaphysical morality of Kant which is explicitly showcased 
in ‘Joseph.’  For in that essay Mann declares its subject to be an unfaithful student of 
Kant, and of Plato too, falling far short of his masters in terms of the ‘Geist’ they 
championed.  He makes a point of saying, for instance,  that the identification of 
Kant’s ‘Ding an sich’ with the ‘Wille’ is something ‘sehr Kühnes, fast Unerlaubtes’, 
(IX, 537) before adding ‘und doch war Schopenhauer, weil er von Kant das “Ding an 
sich” und von Platon die “Ideen” genommen hatte bei solcher Einschätzung der 
Vernunft überzeugt, Kantianer und Platoniker zu sein.’192  
 
Christianity and Platonism 
 
We are not, then, obliged to explain the putatively supernatural elements of the 
tetralogy in terms of the ‘Wille zum Leben’.  As we saw in chapter III there is much 
in Mann’s non-fictional writings to suggest that he had philosophical concerns at odds 
with Schopenhauer’s world-view, and the novel itself presents plenty of evidence that 
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 This should suffice to demonstrate the implausability of Frizen’s assertion that in this essay, 
‘Schopenhauers Plato- und Kantinterpretation gilt als authentisch: Kants Ding an sich und Platos Idee 
sind “sehr nah verwandt”, Platos Ideen mit denen Schopenhauers identisch.’ (Frizen 1980, 22) 
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such concerns were at the forefront of his mind when he wrote it.  For one of the chief 
purposes of Joseph und seine Brüder is the defence and promotion of ‘Geist’ against 
‘Natur’, just as one of the chief purposes of Betrachtungen is the defence and 
promotion of ‘Natur’ against ‘Geist’.  And if we consider how Mann characterizes 
these two opposita then much which might otherwise be puzzling about Joseph 
becomes readily intelligible. In the aborted ‘Literatur Essay’ of 1909 he writes: ‘Geist 
– Christentum, Platonismus. Sinnlichkeit, Plastik – Heidentum.’ (Mann 1967, 175)  
And though the tetralogy does not, of course, tell the tale of Christ or Plato, it does 
give an imagined prehistory of the spiritual and intellectual movements to which they 
were to lend their names.  That premonitions of Christianity abound throughout 
Joseph und seine Brüder is no secret – in addition to the already mentioned ‘Mann auf 
dem Felde’ and his prefiguring of the angel at Christ’s tomb, there is Joseph’s 
disquisition on Adonai (‘Er ist der Dulder und das Opfer.  Er steigt in den Abgrund, 
um daraus hervorzugehen und verherrlicht zu werden’), (IV, 449) there is his 
insistence, in the presence of Potiphar, that his own was a ‘jungfräuliche Geburt’, 
there is Jacob’s apparently prophetic belief in Shiloh, ‘der einst erweckt werden sollte 
aus erwähltem Samen, und dem der Stuhl seines Königreiches sollte bestätigt sein 
ewiglich,’ (V, 1557) and so on.193 
 
We can furnish either a natural or a supernatural explanation for all of this.  The 
natural explanation is that strange superstitions and delusions of prophecy among the 
characters of Joseph constitute an unwitting psychological preparation for the life of 
Christ which, when it comes to be lived and narrated, will take form and complexion 
from the by then deeply entrenched belief that a messiah must come, must have a 
certain ancestry, and must behave in a particular fashion.  The supernatural 
explanation is that Joseph and the others are guided in their actions and beliefs by a 
providence whose plans they can discern and promote.  But in any case, we must 
grasp the fact that Christianity for Mann, who was certainly no conventional church-
goer, is important chiefly as the religious counterpart and complement to that 
philosophical expression of ‘Geist’ known as Platonism.  The association of 
Christianity and Platonism is, of course, no innovation of his: the writers of the New 
Testament were conversant with Greek culture, and the opening verses of the Gospel 
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 A thorough treatment of the tetralogy’s allusions to the life and passion of Jesus can be found in 
chapter IV of Friedhelm Marx’s treatise on Mann’s Christology. (Marx 2002, 129-196) 
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according to St John present the story they introduce as significant not just in the light 
of Jewish messianic hopes but also in the light of Greek philosophical aspirations; and 
Saint Paul tells the Athenians that the αγνωστóς θεός, the ‘unknown god’ whom they 
have been worshipping so piously is none other than the God of Jesus. (Acts: 17, 23)  
But Mann goes much further than the fairly modest influence of Platonism on the 
genesis of the earliest Christian texts conceded by religious and intellectual historians.  
He suggests that Christianity and Platonism have common historical roots, and that, 
long before the birth of Plato or Christ, the thinking and beliefs that they would 
champion were developing side by side in the minds of certain select individuals – 
and in the case of Joseph, in the mind of the same individual. 
 
Many of Plato’s dialogues concern themselves with the existence of an ultimate 
instance of goodness, beauty, or nobility: το καλόν.  This is an entity to which the 
senses have no direct access, but whose reality is implied every time we make an 
unconditional value judgement.  It has nothing to do with the economic management 
of our phenomenal appetites and emotions in order to obtain the greatest satisfaction 
from them in aggregate.  As Socrates says in Phaedo:    
 
This is not the right kind of trade in virtue, trading pleasure for pleasure, pain for pain, and fear 
for fear – the greater for the lesser, like currencies.  I hope there is just the one true currency, 
namely wisdom, for which one should trade all the others, and that with this currency, wisdom, 
come true courage, self-control and justice – true goodness, in short, with or without pleasures, 
fears and everything else of that sort.
194
 
 
And Plato and the Platonists make of το καλόν not only the ultimate instance of 
valuation but also the chief of a host of lesser ideas – ideas to which the fleeting 
shadows of the phenomenal world can be found more or less to correspond but whose 
own value is determined only in relation to το καλόν itself, so that sometimes Plato 
seems to believe the latter to be the paragon of both the metaphysical and physical 
realms.
195
  This notion can be found scattered amongst various dialogues, but is 
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 (Plato (trans. Griffith) 1987, 149)  It will be seen that Plato, in anticipation of Kant, is here making a 
distinction between hypothetical imperatives and categorical imperatives. 
195
 The bundle of phenomena before us at this moment corresponds to the idea: ‘visual display unit’, 
but the worth of the idea ‘visual display unit’ can only be determined by its correspondence to the 
supreme idea: το καλόν.   To say that this is a good visual display unit is not to say that visual display 
units are good. 
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summed up well by Frederick Copleston when he writes: ‘The Good or Absolute 
Principle of Value has[…]the nature of a τέλος, but it is not an unrealized τέλος, a 
non-existent end-to-be-achieved; it is an existent τέλος, an ontological Principle, the 
Supremely Real, the perfect Exemplary Cause, the Absolute or One.’ (Copleston I, 
181)  
 
If we turn now to Joseph we will see that Abraham’s search for God turns precisely 
on the matter of valuation, of God as value.  The established religions of the world 
Abraham was born into are concerned to win the favour of the gods in order to 
maintain the material well-being of the worshipping community: deities like Khapi, 
who ensures the annual flooding of the Nile, or Baal, who ensures the ripening of the 
crops.  But Abraham breaks with the ‘do ut des’ mentality of his epoch, and instead of 
considering the petty well-being of the body reaches up to a God capable of ratifying 
a more essential worth: ‘ “Was bin und tauge ich weiter und in mir der Mensch!  Es 
genügt, daß ich irgendeinem Elchen oder Abgott und Untergott diene, es liegt nichts 
daran.”  So hätte er es bequemer gehabt.  Er aber sprach: “Ich, Abram, und in mir der 
Mensch, darf ausschließlich dem Höchsten dienen.” ’ (IV, 425)  As a consequence, he 
is not content to worship gods who personify terrestrial and astronomical forces, but 
seeks instead that which he considers must reign over them all.  However, although 
Abraham discovers God ‘aus Drang zum Höchsten’ (IV, 426) he has not yet 
discovered Him in His essence.  Abraham, after all, is only the first of a line of 
‘Gottesfürsten’, each of whom will inherit the duty to extricate God from the 
superstitious trappings in which He was brought to light by the first of their order.  
For Abraham discovers a God who is by no means just an evaluative principle outside 
of time and space (although the implication is that He is the quintessence of justice)
196
 
– but the most potent terrestrial deity of the contemporary pantheon, one capable, like 
His lesser brethren, of jealousy, partiality, anger: ‘Er war nicht das Gute, sondern das 
Ganze!  Und er war heilig!  Heilig nicht vor Güte sondern vor Lebendigkeit und 
Überlebendigkeit, heilig vor Majestät und Schrecklichkeit, unheimlich, gefährlich und 
tödlich.’ (IV, 430) The God of Abraham has a long way to go before He becomes the 
God of Joseph, but Joseph none the less understands his forefather’s achievement as 
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 It is against God’s inflexible justice which Abraham inveighs: ‘ “Höre, Herr”, hatte Abram damals 
gesagt, “so oder so, das eine oder das andere!  Willst du eine Welt haben, kannst du nicht Recht 
verlangen; ist es dir aber ums Recht zu tun, so ist es aus mit der Welt.” ’ (IV, 429) 
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the discovery of a deity who can impart value and significance to human life.  It will 
be remembered that Mann himself claimed, in Betrachtungen, that all that he had ever 
achieved ‘ausschliesslich darauf zurückzuführen ist, daß ich mich wichtig nahm’,197 
and that we pointed out the impossibility of valuing one’s own behaviour in any 
unconditional way without calling in aid a criterion of value.  Joseph sees that this is 
the key to Abraham’s achievement in his search for God, which he 
‘verstand[…]sogleich, und zwar vor allem nach der Seite des Wichtignehmens.  Um 
es vor Gott und Menschen zu irgendwelcher Ansehnlichkeit und Bedeutung zu 
bringen, war es nötig, daß man die Dinge – oder wenigstens ein Ding – wichtig 
nahm.’ (IV, 425)   
 
There are – as ever in this novel – two ways of interpreting the process by which the 
God of Abraham becomes the God of Joseph.  The first interpretation is naturalistic: 
God is just a figment of the tribe’s collective imagination refracted through the 
psychology of its particular members.  The various ‘Gottesfürsten’ inherit a notion of 
God from their predecessors but, consciously or unconsciously, alter it in the light of 
their own personalities and interests – so that God is subject to the same vagaries as 
the stories which are told and retold down the centuries.  By this reckoning God as 
Joseph conceives him is no true improvement on the God of Abraham, for in the 
absence of  that authentic criterion of value with which naturalism has no truck there 
can be no progress, only trends and changes.  The second interpretation is 
supernatural: Abraham perceives an actually existent God, but through a glass darkly, 
and attributes to Him qualities at odds with those most properly His.  Accordingly, the 
duty of the successive generations of ‘Gottesfürsten’ is to winnow away such earthly 
impurities and restore Him to Himself.  And we can usefully compare the two 
different ways of seeing the evolution of God with the two different ways Joseph und 
seine Brüder presents the evolution of story-telling.  On the one hand the narrator 
sometimes seems to suggest that the accumulated strata of inventions, 
reinterpretations, additions of every kind mark a wandering away from the facts 
which the story was supposed to account for.  In the chapter ‘Wer Jaakob war’, for 
example, he expresses his doubts as to whether persons whom the Bible considers to 
be identical were in fact one and the same, and not rather a succession of different 
                                                 
197
 See chapter 3, note 18.  
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individuals bearing a shared name.  And given this unreliability in the most important 
source for the tetralogy, one might easily conclude that Joseph und seine Brüder is 
just one more retelling – with its own biases and preferences – of a story always at the 
mercy of particular interests, and perhaps without any basis in truth at all.  As we 
know, however, the narrator has two aspects – a naturalist and a supernatural one – 
and he has not yet said his final word on the matter.  Later on, in a passage where the 
narrator’s role in relation to the story he tells and in which he is involved is compared 
to God’s role in relation to the world He creates and in which He is involved, we 
come across the following declaration regarding the story of Joseph:  
 
Bevor man sie erzählen konnte, geschah sie; sie quoll aus demselben Born, aus dem alles 
Geschehen quillt, und erzählte sich selbst.  Seitdem ist sie in der Welt; jeder kennt sie oder 
glaubt sie zu kennen, denn oft genug ist das nur ein unverbindliches und ohne viel Rechenschaft 
obenhin träumendes Ungefähr von Kenntnis.  Hundertmal ist sie erzählt worden und durch 
hundert Mittel der Erzählungen gegangen.  Hier nun und heute geht sie durch eines, worin sie 
gleichsam Selbstbesinnung gewinnt und sich erinnert, wie es denn eigentlich im Genauen und 
Wirklichen einst mit ihr gewesen, also, daß sie zugleich quillt und sich erörtert. (IV, 821) 
 
This implies a progressive conception of story-telling.  In the first instance the story 
tells itself and is not just a manifestation of the human psychology which, in order to 
take possession of it, must necessarily do it an injustice.  But the successive retellings 
do not take it further from its source but instead bring it back – by a haphazard route 
no doubt – to that source.  If we adopt for a moment the same supernatural 
perspective as does the narrator in this passage, we can see that Joseph has as much 
claim to restore God to His pristine character as the narrator does to restore Joseph’s 
story to its pristine character. 
 
The God of Joseph 
 
So what is the character of Joseph’s God?  In the chapter ‘Von Josephs Keuschheit’ it 
is made clear that, though He has stooped to manifest Himself as the most powerful of 
terrestrial gods to Abraham, what He once was and what He continuously strives with 
the assistance of His chosen people to become is an entity of an entirely different 
order. 
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Der Gott der Väter Josephs war ein geistiger Gott, zum mindesten nach seinem Werdenziel, um 
dessentwillen er seinen Bund mit den Menschen geschlossen; und nie hatte er, in der 
Vereinigung seines Heiligenwillens mit dem des Menschen, etwas zu schaffen gehabt mit dem 
Unteren und dem Tode, mit irgendwelcher im Fruchtbarkeitsdunkel hausenden Unvernunft. (V, 
1142) 
 
But what does the term ‘geistig’ mean, in this context?  We have argued in chapter III 
that when the mature Mann (more or less, from Betrachtungen onwards) uses ‘Geist’ 
in opposition to ‘Natur’ it implies (1) that element of humanity which is free from the 
necessity of the phenomenal world and (2) the evaluative principle implied by moral 
judgments.  ‘Geist’ does not mean to the later Mann what it meant to him during his 
period of heaviest engagement with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, for the former of 
whom it represents a welcome, for the latter a lamentable, vitiation of vitality.  And 
confirmation of the prevalence of the Platonic/Kantian – Schillerian – understanding 
of ‘Geist’ in Joseph can be found in ‘Höllenfahrt’, expressed so explicitly as to leave 
no room for doubt: ‘Ja, dies [the once and future union of the two opposita] erscheint 
um so denkbarer, als der Geist von sich aus und ganz wesentlich das Prinzip der 
Zukunft, das Es wird sein, es soll sein, darstellt, während die Frömmigkeit der 
formverbundenen Seele dem Vergangenen gilt und dem heiligen Es war.’198  It is 
precisely Joseph’s prior attachment to a ‘Geist’ of this kind which keeps him from 
yielding to the sexual advances of Mut-em-enet.  In his heart of hearts Joseph 
considers the Egypt which she represents, with its worship of dead bodies, its cult of 
fertility, and its childish abandonment to sensual pleasure, to be a society wholly 
infatuated with the secular world, and although he must to an extent collude with it if 
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 (IV, 48)  The text continues: ‘Wo hier das Leben ist und wo der Tod, bleibt strittig; denn beide 
Teile, die natur-verflochtene Seele und der außerweltliche Geist, das Prinzip der Vergangenheit und 
das der Zukunft, nehmen, jedes nach seinem Sinn, in Anspruch, das Wasser des Lebens zu sein, und 
jedes beschuldigt das andere, es mit dem Tode zu halten: keiner mit Unrecht, da Natur ohne Geist 
sowohl als Geist ohne Natur wohl schwerlich Leben genannt werden kann.’  We have already noted 
Mann’s confusing identification of ‘Geist’ sometimes with death, sometimes with life, and this passage 
can be considered as an apologia for such inconsistency.  It is also a recapitulation of Schiller’s main 
preoccupation in his theoretical writings: the proper accommodation between ‘Geist’ and ‘Natur’.  
Incidentally, various commentators (for example Bernd-Jürgen Fischer on page 40 of his Handbuch zu 
Thomas Manns ‘Josephromanen’)’have pointed out that Mann was indebted to Schaeder’s  Islamische 
Lehre vom vollkommenen Menschen for the ‘Roman der Seele’ – but we should not forget that Mann 
was already, through his reading of Phaedrus, acquainted with Plato’s mythical rendering of bipartite 
motivation in human beings: the chariot with two horses, one of which represents earthbound, 
phenomenal appetite, the other of which represents celestial, noumenal ambition, and each reigned in 
by a charioteer – a figure whom Schiller would no doubt have recognized as of the first importance – 
seeking to bring the two into some kind of progressive accord. 
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his ambitions, and God’s ambitions for him, are to be fulfilled, never will he allow 
collusion to become abdication.  
 
 Of the two elements mentioned above (1) is more important to Kant than to Plato and 
(2) more important to Plato than to Kant.
199
 And, in line with the tetralogy’s Platonic 
ambitions, it is God as criterion of value which receives most emphasis in Joseph.  He 
is described as presiding over an empyrean which is referred to as ‘Das Reich der 
Strenge’ – an ethereal empire inhabited by a heavenly host which feels and expresses 
nothing but contempt for the imperfect mundane ‘forms’ they are occasionally 
required to have truck with.  The novel’s heaven, then, is a religious rendering of 
Plato’s noumenal realm from where ideas – with το καλόν at their head – set 
standards which the things of the phenomenal realm can approximate but never 
satisfy.  And the comparison can be taken further.  For just as the subsidiary ideas 
acquire value in so far as they accord with το καλόν, so the angels of Joseph are only 
good in so far as they perform the task God prescribes for them, in so far as they are 
His faithful ‘Boten’.  These haughty first-born children of the Almighty would 
happily consign the whole terrestrial realm to destruction, but fortunately for mankind 
God enjoys an immediate as well as a mediated relationship with the lower world, and 
if His angels prove recalcitrant He has ways of compelling them to do His bidding.
200
 
At one point ‘Der Mann auf dem Felde’ is visibly prevented, against his own 
inclinations, by an unseen disciplinary force from further mockery of Jacob and his 
pretensions: ‘ “Übrigens,” sagte er plötzlich und vollführte eine höchst sonderbare 
Bewegung der Augen, die er nicht nur aufschlug, sondern schnell und gleichsam 
rundum schielend im Kreise herumrollte, “laß es gut sein und nenne deinen Vater nur 
Jisrael – bitte sehr.” ’ (IV, 539-540) 
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 Kant attempts to derive the criterion of value from the freedom of the noumenal self, Plato 
concludes (in Phaedo) that the authentic self must be a noumenon since it can communicate with the 
criterion of value, and this is definitionally not part of the phenomenal realm: ‘The soul is most like 
what is divine, immortal, the object of thought (νοητῷ: νοητόν = νοούμενον), of one single form, 
indestructible, and remaining ever constant and true to itself.’ (Plato (trans. Griffith) 1987, 164)  It is as 
though these two philosophers were attempting to define the relationship between subjectivity and 
valuation from opposite ends of the problem, Plato moving from deontology to ontology, Kant from 
ontology to deontology. 
200
 Just as the relationship of God to the terrestrial realm can be immediate or unmediated, so can the 
relationship of το καλόν to the phenomenal realm.  As David Melling puts it: ‘The Idea of the Good is 
itself knowable as well as being the source of the knowability of all that is knowable.’ (Melling 1987, 
102)  Incidentally, like the Moses of ‘Das Gesetz’ and the mature Aschenbach, the angels are 
‘Barbaren’ in the Schillerian sense: while professing an unyielding hostility to ‘Natur’ they secretly lust 
after its satisfactions – hence their sexual encounters with the daughters of Eve. 
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Nowhere, however, does the Platonic strain in Joseph’s religious thinking announce 
itself so clearly as it does in the transformation of Potiphar from a would-be virile 
head-of-household into something altogether less active and more exalted.  When we 
first make the acquaintance of Joseph’s new master (in the ‘Potiphar’ chapter of 
Joseph in Ägypten) he descends with an ‘unnötig unternehmenden Absprung’ from 
his chariot and, once Mont-Kaw’s eulogy of his  full-blooded equestrian skills has run 
its course, declares that he intends to spend the afternoon hunting the hippopotamus.
 
(IV, 807) And to the reproach that his wife will tremble with anxiety when news of 
his audacious pastime reaches her, he replies with evident relish: ‘Sie zittere’. (IV, 
808)  This show of masculine bravura, however, is as pitiable as it is embarrassing 
because Potiphar, as we soon learn if we have not already guessed as much from his 
description in this chapter, is a eunuch, castrated at his parents’ behest in a vain effort 
to keep up with evolving religious sentiment.  ‘Armer Potiphar!  Er war eine Null in 
aller Pracht seiner feurigen Wagenräder und all seiner Größe und den Großen 
Ägyptens.’ (IV, 876) However, Joseph’s first sardonic reaction on learning of 
Potiphar’s condition is soon joined by another: ‘Es mag kindisch zu sagen sein, aber 
Joseph fand eine zu ähnlichem Mitgefühl auffordende Verwandtschaft zwischen der 
einsamen Außerweltlichkeit des Vätergottes und der stolzen, mit Lobgold behangenen 
Außermenschlichkeit des verstümperten Rubenturms.’ (IV, 877) 
 
In the course of time we notice a change come over Potiphar.  Once his association 
with Joseph, who after their initial encounter in the garden becomes his valet and 
personal reader, begins in earnest, he occasionally allows us to share a newfound 
insight into the character of his domestic arrangements: that his power in the 
household is not that brought to bear by force and the threat of force, but rather the 
power exercised by a criterion of value.  When Mont Kaw presents the estate 
accounts, for example, Potiphar does not examine them with the beady eye of a 
potentate jealous of his rights, but comments: 
 
Stimmt das hier mit dem Weizen und Spelt?  Natürlich stimmt es, ich sehe schon.  Ich bin 
überzeugt, daß du treu bist wie Gold und mir ergeben mit Leib und Seele.  Könnte es auch 
anders sein?  Das könnte es gar nicht in Ansehung deiner Natur und in Ansehung der großen 
Abscheulichkeit, die es bedeutete, mir zu nahe zu treten.  Aus Liebe zu mir machst du meine 
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Angelegenheit zu der deinen – gut, ich lasse sie dir um deiner Liebe willen, du wirst dich nicht 
selbst verkürzen durch Nachlässigkeit oder Schlimmeres, in eigener Sache. (V, 928) 
 
Potiphar assumes, in other words, that the relationship obtaining between himself and 
Mont Kaw is motivated on the latter’s part by the need to cherish a touchstone 
imparting worth to his own actions and person.  And this, we remember, is exactly the 
same motivation which drove Abraham to find and serve God.  However, we have 
seen that the God of Abraham was by no means just a criterion of value – along with 
that attribute He possessed phenomenal might and worldly interests.  And the truth is 
that in respect of the balance between secular might and interests on the one hand and 
the disinterested power which accrues to the source of value itself on the other hand, 
Potiphar comes closer to satisfying Joseph’s notion of God than God Himself ever 
could so long as His partnership with the comparatively unenlightened Abraham 
endured. 
 
There is a naturalistic explanation for this, one adumbrated in the text. (IV, 877) 
Joseph sees his devotion to his new master as a repetition and extension of his 
devotion to God, and Potiphar, during years of daily intercourse with his new valet 
(later his major domo), learns to incarnate in his own person the God the young man 
wishes to serve.  The extent of the change which comes over him can be gauged from 
the following passage.  It is a description of Potiphar sitting in the ‘Westhalle’: 
 
Vollendet der Formgesinnung Ägyptens gemäß waren die bemalten Pfeiler seiner Halle, 
zwichen denen hindurch er in den Abend schaute.  Umgebender Besitz begünstigt die 
Unbeweglichkeit.  Man läßt ihn beharren in seiner Schönheit und beharrt, die Glieder geordnet, 
in seiner Mitte.  Auch kommt Beweglichkeit eher den zeugend gegen die Welt Geöffneten zu, 
die säen und ausgeben und sterbend sich in ihrem Samen zerlösen, – nicht einem gleich Peteprê 
Beschaffenen in der Geschlossenheit seines Daseins.  Ebenmäßig in sich versammelt saß er, 
ohne Ausgang zur Welt und unzugänglich dem Tode der Zeugung, ewig, ein Gott in seiner 
Kapelle.
201
  
 
However, the resemblance between Joseph’s conception of God and Potiphar’s 
conceit of himself is not due solely to the effect of the former on the latter.  We must 
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 (V, 1028) Note the play on the word ‘Gott’ permitted by the universal capitalization of nouns in 
German. 
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remember that the task of the ‘Gottesfürsten’ is to identify the true character of God, 
and it is clear that Joseph is on the lookout for clues as to what that character might 
be: clues to be found amongst God’s living analogues in the terrestrial realm. 202  It is 
likely that Potiphar takes Joseph’s conception of God as a model for his own spiritual 
regime, but it is certain that Joseph takes Potiphar as a model for his own conception 
of God.  When, at the eleventh hour, he defeats once and for all Mut-em-enet’s sexual 
challenge he is held back, yes, by a reluctance to compromise with an Egypt which is 
all ‘Natur’ and no ‘Geist’, all ‘Kultur’ and no ‘Zivilisation’, but he is also held back 
by a reluctance to cuckold Mut-em-enet’s husband – which appears to be a quite 
different order of motivation.  In fact, however, the two reasons for Joseph’s 
‘Keuschheit’ are one, because Joseph has come to identify his God, who is all ‘Geist’, 
with Potiphar.  That is, these apparently distinct forms of inhibition: a religious 
imperative against the world of the senses, a sentimental imperative against offending 
a much-loved friend and master, fuse in what Potiphar has come to represent: 
 
Es ist nicht anders, als daß die feiste, doch edle Person des Sonnenämtlings und Titelgatten der 
Mut in ihrer melancholischen Selbstsucht diesem träumerischen Kopf als die untere 
Entsprechung und fleischliche Wiederholung des weib- und kinderlosen, einsam-eifersüchtigen 
Gottes seiner Väter erschien, der schonende Menschentreue zu halten er, in verspieltem 
Zugleich und nicht ohne Einschlag verwandter Nützlichkeitsspekulation, aufs ernstlichste 
entschlossen war. (V, 1138) 
 
Once we grasp this: that Potiphar allows Joseph new insight into God’s character in a 
way which complements that in which Joseph imparts God’s character to Potiphar, we 
will once again feel the temptation to attribute their meeting to the hand of 
providence.  God – dependent on the offices of the ‘Gottesfürsten’ to bring about an 
accession to the ‘Geist’ which is truly His – ordains the association between Joseph 
and Potiphar in order to bring about not just the latter’s apotheosis, but His own too. 
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 ‘Ein dringlich sorgendes Bemühen um die Feststellung der Natur Gottes war ihm eingeboren; von 
Anbeginn in ihm lebendig war ein Keim der Einsicht in des Schöpfers Außerweltlichkeit, Allheit und 
Geistigkeit, also, daß er der Raum der Welt war, aber die Welt nicht sein Raum (ganz ähnlich wie der 
Erzähler der Raum der Geschichte ist, die Geschichte aber nicht seiner, was für ihn die Möglichkeit 
bedeutet, sie zu erörtern) –: ein entwicklungsfähiger Keim, der bestimmt war, sich mit der Zeit und 
unter großen Anstrengungen zur vollen Erkenntnis von Gottes wahrer Natur auszuwachsen.’ (V, 1290) 
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The ‘Geist’ of Pharaoh 
 
Joseph and the ‘Gottesfürsten’ are not, though, the only inhabitants of their world 
engaged in winnowing from the dross of religious superstition a ‘Geist’ free from all 
that is secular and terrestrial.  On various occasions throughout the novel Joseph is 
made aware that people whom Jacob would no doubt regard as incorrigible infidels 
are, in truth, kindred spirits.  That is true of the priests of On, for example, who 
maintain a highly intellectualized form of solar cult, and who have elaborated the 
‘doctrine of the triangle’.  At first glance, this teaches only that all the other religions 
of the world, though lacking the perfection of On’s own, can be understood to form a 
series of triangle-bases from which the convergent sides ascend to the true object of 
worship – with the result that the followers of other faiths can be welcomed as thus-
far unwitting adherents of the sun god.  But there is more to the doctrine of the 
triangle than this: it looks forward to a Platonic, or rather neo-Platonic way, of 
representing the noumenal realm.  ‘Neo-Platonic’ because although Plato himself 
does not organize his metaphysic into any definite system, his followers in the ancient 
and mediaeval world tended to envisage one, with το καλόν (or some even higher 
principle such as Plotinus’ ‘One’) at the very top and, depending from it, a broadening 
hierarchy of properties and ideas, each with subordinates of its own, comprising the 
whole intelligible world.  If the evocation of such metaphysics-to-come were not 
Mann’s design, it would be hard to account for the wording of the following 
description, and in particular for the phrase ‘Raum der Zusammenschau’.  Having 
described the bases of the triangle, the priests continue thus: 
 
Darüber aber erhöben sich die zusammenstrebenden Schenkelseiten der schönen Figur, und der 
so eigentümliche Raum, den sie begrenzten, mochte der “Raum der Zusammenschau” genannt 
sein, ausgezeichnet durch die Eigenschaft, daß er sich ständig verengere[...].  Denn die Schenkel 
träfen einander in einem Punkt, und dieser Schluß- und Schnittpunkt, unterhalb dessen alle 
Breiten des Sinnbildes gleichseitig bestehen blieben, sei der Herr ihres Tempels, sei Atum-Rê. 
(IV, 735) 
 
The full philosophical significance of these pregnant phrases is not appreciated even 
by the priests who utter them, just as the full religious significance of the Adonai-cult 
is not appreciated by the women who practise it.  Rather, what the priests’ words 
reveal is an intellectual tendency which will one day emerge as Platonism.  Their 
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conception of the supreme object of veneration is, from Joseph’s point of view, an 
important advance on the supposedly divine cadavers and animals which infatuate so 
many of his contemporaries, but it has a long way to go before achieving its 
perfection.  And indeed we witness a decisive step in the progress towards that 
perfection later during Joseph’s interview with Pharaoh, the most important episode in 
the novel from a Platonic point of view. 
 
It should come as no surprise that the conversation between these two dreamers 
proves to be of philosophical and religious significance for both of them.  Of Joseph’s 
own tendency to seek the noumenal and evaluative in God we should by this time 
need no convincing – but in a remarkable development it transpires that Pharaoh too 
wishes to re-establish religious belief on less worldly foundations.  And in point of 
fact he is rather more inclined than Joseph (who anyway enjoys no such liberty) to 
devote his life to the contemplation and veneration of the highest.   
 
Joseph wußte sehr wohl daß Jung-Pharaoh[…]den Angelegenheiten der bildenden 
Weltverzierung eine eifrige, ja eifernde Aufmerksamkeit widmete, –  nämlich in genauem 
Zusammenhang mit der Anstrengung, die er es sich kosten ließ, den Gott Atôn nach seiner 
Wahrheit und Reinheit hervorzudenken. (V, 1377) 
 
This attempt to conceive Atôn in his truth and purity involves the discovery – many 
hundreds of years ahead of schedule – of Platonic ideas.  Having considered the 
mystery of the Phoenix-egg which becomes none the heavier for being made to 
incorporate the body of the phoenix’s father, and in his enthusiasm for the paternal-
spiritual, as opposed to the maternal-material, Pharaoh goes so far as to envisage not 
just a Platonic empyrean, but a whole parallel world of ideas:
203
  
 
So hieß das, daß es unstoffliche Körper gab, – anders und besser gesagt: unkörperliche 
Wirklichkeiten, immaterielle wie das Sonnenlicht, – wieder anders und noch besser gesagt: es 
gab das Geistige; und dieses Geistige war ätherisch verkörpert in dem Bennu-Vater, den das 
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 Throughout Joseph Mann associates the pre-Platonism of Pharaoh and the pre-Christianity of 
Joseph with Bachofen’s masculine religious principle as discerned in ancient mythology.  ‘Das 
Mutterrecht stammt von unten, ist chthonisher Natur und chthonischen Ursprungs; das Vaterrecht 
dagegen kommt von oben, ist himmlischer Natur und himmlischen Ursprungs; es ist das Recht der 
Lichtmächte, wie jenes das Gesetz des dunkeln, mit Finsternis erfüllten Erdschoßes.  Es bedeutet also 
eine höhere Stufe der Religion und der menschlichen Entwicklung als das stofflliche Mutterrecht.’ 
(Bachofen 1975, 130-131) 
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Myrrhen-Ei aufnahm, indem es dadurch seinen Charakter als Ei in der aufregendsten und 
bedeutsamsten Weise veränderte.  Das Ei überhaupt war ein Ding entschieden weiblicher 
Spezifität, einzig die Weibchen unter den Vögeln legten Eier, und nichts konnte mütterlich-
weiblicher sein als das große Ei, aus dem einst die Welt hervorgegangen.  Bennu aber, der 
Sonnenvogel, mutterlos und sein eigener Vater, formte sein Ei selbst, ein Gegen-Weltei, ein 
männliches Ei, ein Vater-Ei, und legte es als seine Kundgebung vom Vatertum, Geist und Licht 
auf den Alabaster-Tisch der Sonnengottheit nieder. (V, 1388) 
 
His religious and philosophical quest puts us in mind of the philosopher kings of 
Republic: men who must first be educated to identify and appreciate the source of all 
goodness and beauty, before being permitted to discharge to the state their moral 
obligation of good governance.
204
  Except, of course, that long contemplation of what 
is most exalted has left Pharaoh wholly unversed in the pragmatism essential if new 
social and religious programmes – howsoever laudable and disinterested – are to stand 
a chance of realization.  As he himself becomes aware during their interview, he 
needs someone like Joseph, a Hermes at home in both the celestial and terrestrial 
realms, if the state is to be led by good practice to good effect. 
 
And this vague reminiscence of Republic is brought sharply into focus in the context 
of more evident references to, or – from the point of view of the novel’s imagined 
reality – startling premonitions of, Plato’s political masterpiece throughout Pharaoh’s 
religious disquisition.  He is a follower of the solar cult Joseph first became aware of 
in On, and waxes lyrical about all the wonderful attributes which have earned the sun 
its place as a perennial focus of religious awe: it brings warmth, life, joy etc.  But he 
begins his eulogy on a different note.  The sun is remarkable as a dispenser of 
enlightenment, a source of cognition: it allows the world to be made out and to make 
itself out.  That is, he commends the sun as the principle of intelligibility: ‘Selige 
Heiligkeit, die sich das Auge schuf, ihr zu begegnen, Blick und Erblicktes.  Zu-sich-
kommen der Welt, die nur durch dich von sich weiß, Licht, du liebende 
Unterscheidung!’ (V, 1456)  
 
                                                 
204
 The chapter which introduces Pharaoh is entitled ‘Das Kind der Höhle’.  This has been taken  – 
beyond its obvious relevance to both Hermes and Joseph – as a reference to Dionysos by Bernd-Jürgen 
Fischer. (Fischer 2002, 714)  We would suggest that so far as Pharaoh is concerned a more likely 
allusion is to the cave in Republic from which the guardian class must be led by degrees to true 
enlightenment before returning as philosopher kings to rule over their benighted fellows.  
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The rather odd notion that the sun begets the eye brings to mind a crucial passage of 
Republic in which Socrates, seeking to explain to Glaucon the relationship of the 
human intellect to το ἀγαθόν,205  takes the relationship of the eye to the sun for 
comparison and asks, ‘is not the faculty which the eye possesses dispensed to it from 
the sun, and held by it as something adventitious?’ And it turns out that Pharaoh’s 
whole train of thought in this passage parallels that of the sixth book of Republic so 
faithfully that there can be no question of the resemblance being accidental.  For just 
as Socrates persuades Glaucon that the solar deity is no more than a good analogy for 
the source of all value and intelligibility,
206
 so Pharaoh too, susceptible like Potiphar 
before him to Joseph’s guiding presence, comes to see that the sun is not the most 
proper object of reverence.
207
  He seizes on the difference between ‘Vater am 
Himmel’ and ‘Vater im Himmel’ as the key to an essential distinction: ‘Ja, ja, im 
Himmel und nicht am Himmel, ferner als fern, und näher als nah, das Sein des Seins, 
das nicht in den Tod blickt, das nicht wird und stirbt sondern ist, das stehende Licht, 
das nicht aufgeht noch untergeht, die unwandelbare Quelle, aus der all Leben, Licht, 
Schönheit und Wahrheit quillt – das ist der Vater, so offenbart er sich Pharaoh, 
Seinem Sohn.’ (V, 1468-9)  And a few lines later, in phrases which display his 
understanding of the sun’s value as analogon, he adds: ‘Goldener Geist ist das Licht, 
Vatergeist, und zu Ihm ringt die Kraft sich empor aus Muttertiefen, daß sie sich 
läutere in seiner Flamme und Geist werde im Vater.  Unstofflich ist Gott, wie Sein 
Sonnenschein, Geist ist Er, und der Pharaoh lehrt euch, Ihn im Geiste und in der 
Wahrheit anzubeten.’ 
 
This Platonic quality of Pharaoh’s conversion from a rarefied solar cult to the 
reverence of a ‘Geist’ which has an intimate but non-spatial relationship with the 
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 Strictly speaking this is ‘the good’ rather than το καλόν, ‘the beautiful’, but most commentators 
accept that the two terms are synonyms.  ‘It would seem that the Idea of the Good of the The Republic 
must be regarded as identical with the essential Beauty of Symposium.  Both are represented as the 
high-peak of an intellectual ascent, while the comparison of the Idea of the Good with the sun would 
appear to indicate that it is the source not only of the goodness of things, but also of their beauty.’ 
(Copleston I, 176) 
206
 ‘Well then, I continued, believe that I meant the sun when I spoke of the offspring of the chief good, 
begotten by it in a certain resemblance to itself – that is to say, bearing the same relation in the visible 
world to sight and its objects, which the chief good bears in the intellectual world to pure reason and its 
objects.’ (Plato (trans. Davies/Vaughan) 1997, 218-19) 
207
 Joseph, as Hermes, is ambassador for the very principle with which Pharaoh seeks an accord: ‘Und 
doch ist zu mir gesagt worden: “Nenne mich nicht den Atôn, denn es ist verbesserungsbedürftig.  
Nenne mich den Herrn des Atôn.”  Siehe jedoch, was tut der Vater seinem geliebten Sohn?  Er sendet 
ihm einen Boten und Traumdeuter[...], daß er in ihm erwecke, was er weiß, und ihm deute was ihm 
gesagt wurde.’ 
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world of the senses (‘ferner als fern, und näher als nah’)208 and from which life, light, 
beauty and truth all emanate, is underlined by the locality in which the interview 
between Joseph and his new master takes place: the ‘Kretische Laube’ – for Cretan in 
the context of the late second millennium BC means Minoan, and Minoan means 
Paleo-Hellenic.  As usual in Joseph, we can adopt the naturalistic perspective and 
write off as the product of blind chance this concordance of the novel’s fictional 
reality with a future not yet realized.  Just as the premonitory importance of Joseph’s 
spiritual growth, a spiritual growth which make of him a harbinger of Christianity, 
seems marked by circumstances (like the angel at the well) which, adjusted slightly, 
will feature in the Christian story, so the premonitory importance of Pharaoh’s 
spiritual growth, a spiritual growth which makes of him a harbinger of Platonism, 
seems marked by circumstances (like the Cretan bower) which, adjusted slightly, will 
witness the birth of Platonic philosophy.  But though we may be induced by such 
coincidences to consider the possibility of a noumenal intention which occasionally 
advertises its otherwise imperceptible activity by retrospective shadows of things to 
come – nothing obliges us to do so.  That is, nothing beyond our distrust of 
improbability and our yearning for meaning.  But whether we are prepared to see the 
supernatural at work in such coincidences or not, it should be apparent to all that the 
Platonism and the Christianity which Mann identified as the two chief vehicles for 
‘Geist’ in the ancient world merge in the meeting between Pharaoh, whose 
philosophical vision is animated by religious fervour, and Joseph, whose religious 
conviction is mellowed by philosophical insight. 
 
Mann’s Intentions for Joseph und seine Brüder 
 
This brings us up to the middle of the final volume of the tetralogy, and it might be 
well at this point to consider what Mann has so far achieved.  What were his 
ambitions for Joseph when he began writing it, and did they change much or at all 
during the long period of its composition?  Was it, for example, conceived in 
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 The intimate but non-spatial relationship between the metaphysical and the phenomenal realm was 
at least partially understood by Abraham, as related in ‘Wie Abraham Gott entdeckte’.  It is well 
explained by Copleston: ‘The χωρισμός or separation would thus seem to imply, in the case of the 
Platonic essence, a reality beyond the subjective reality of the abstract concept – a subsistent reality, 
but not a local separation.  It is therefore just as true to say that the essence is immanent, as that it is 
transcendent: the great point is that it is real and independent of particulars, unchanged and abiding.’ 
(Copleston I, 174-175) 
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accordance with the same Schillerian hypothesis which provides the intellectual 
foundation for Betrachtungen: that there is a perpetual struggle for dominance 
between ‘Geist’ and ‘Natur’, those two irreconcilable principles which despite their 
enmity yearn towards one another and must be brought into a fruitful balance and 
cohabitation?  As we have seen, they form an important theme in ‘Höllenfahrt’, and 
certain of Mann’s own declarations from the period when he began work on the novel 
strongly support the notion that he was first attracted to the story by its hero’s ability 
to move between the celestial and the terrestrial, the noumenal and the phenomenal.  
For example he tells Ernst Bertram in a letter dated 28
th
 December 1926 that so far as 
he is concerned the cornerstone of the biblical account ‘ist der Segen des sterbenden 
Jakob über Joseph: “Von dem Allmächtigen bist du gesegnet mit Segen oben vom 
Himmel herab, mit Segen von der Tiefe, die unten liegt.”  Damit man sich zu einem 
Werk entschließe, muß es, als Stoff, irgendwo einen Punkt haben, bei dessen 
Berührung einem regelmäßig das Herz aufgeht.  Dies ist dieser produktive Punkt.’ 
(Briefe I, 263) However, at this stage there is no sign in his correspondence of any 
sort of militancy in Mann’s attitude to the newly-begun work: Joseph is to be a 
‘mythische[r] Hochstapler’, the contrast between ‘Bedeuten und Sein’209 is presented 
as equivalent to that between ‘myth and reality’ – an equivalence which, if it were 
maintained consistently throughout the novel, would render invalid the distinction 
Joseph himself makes between the ‘geistiger’ religion of his fathers and the 
multifarious idolatrous beliefs of so many of his contemporaries.
210
 
 
But Joseph und seine Brüder, although enlivened by notes of comedy throughout, 
does not persist in the same essayistic, uncommitted tone which characterizes 
‘Höllenfahrt’ and the earlier chapters of Die Geschichten Jaakobs.  At some stage 
Mann decided to make of the novel a vehicle for the promotion of a certain 
philosophical perspective, one unduly neglected, as he saw it, in contemporary 
German society and politics.  It was a perspective which during the First World War 
he had, fearing that it might gain a universal monopoly, inveighed against, on the 
grounds that its emphasis on the ideal and universal threatened to suppress the 
historical and particular, that its emphasis on duty to humanity in general threatened 
to suppress the prerogatives of class and nation.  And it was a perspective whose 
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 This phrase no doubt inspired Nolte’s contrast between ‘Meaning’ and ‘Being’. 
210
 All this from a letter to Erika Mann dated 23
rd
 December 1926. (Briefe I, 261) 
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claims, during the first years of peace when far from celebrating an overwhelming 
triumph it struggled to make headway against the hostility of its eternal opponent, he 
had tentatively urged, on the grounds that it was indispensable to human dignity.  That 
perspective – we are referring to ‘Geist’, of course – was evidently in danger of being 
altogether routed in the Germany of the early 1930’s and just as Mann had thrown his 
literary and intellectual weight against it in Betrachtungen, so he now decided to 
throw his literary and intellectual weight behind it in Joseph und seine Brüder.  We 
can witness this evolution in his 1931 article ‘Fragment über das Religiöse.’211 In it 
Mann declares himself lacking all religious or irreligious conviction, and insists that 
he could never anyway recognize a God who was merely all-powerful – the maker of 
the physical universe – as worthy of reverence.  The material universe, he points out, 
is just a machine: ‘einen äußerst komplizierten und in sich ruhenden Mechanismus 
mit irrationalen Einschlägen.’ (XI, 424) He goes on to say that, despite his current 
reputation as an idealist, he is by no means unwilling to grant the religious character 
of ‘zeitgenössischer Strebungen, den Menschen neu ans Natürliche zu binden’, but 
then makes the following confession:  
 
Wenn ich aber eine Überzeugung, eine religio mein eigen nenne, so ist es die, daß es nie eine 
Stufe gegeben hat, auf der der Mensch noch nicht Geist, sondern nur Natur war.  Die modische 
Tendenz, ihn auf eine solche Stufe “zurückzuführen”, die Ideenverhöhnung der Zeit ist mir in 
tiefster Seele zuwider.  Der Mensch hat nie aufgehört, aus den Antinomien seines geistig-
fleischlichen Doppelwesens das Absolute, die Idee zu visieren, – das ist eine Schwäche von 
ihm, eine Mitgift, ich weiß nicht woher, seht sie ihm nach, sie gehört nun einmal zu seiner Natur 
und Wahrheit, und er belöge sich selbst, wenn er sie verleugnete, – den Aufblick verleugnete zu 
“Gott”, den Aufblick zu sich selbst. (XI, 425) 
 
It is this deeply unNietzschean, deeply unSchopenhauerian view of the importance of 
the ‘Absolute’ and the ‘Idee’, whose denial would entail the denial of both ‘God’ and 
mankind – it is this view, we believe, which underlies the supernatural and 
metaphysical perspective which alternates throughout the length of the tetralogy with 
that other which considers the world to be simply an ‘äusserst komplizierten und in 
sich ruhenden Mechanismus.’  And if in 1931 Mann was still willing to be 
conciliatory with regard to ‘Fleischesmystik’ – the idolization of ‘Natur’, the 
phenomenal realm – his tolerance for such superstition evaporated completely when, 
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 Written after the composition of Die Geschichten Jaakobs, but before its publication. 
157 
 
in the form of a National-Socialist tyranny, it became altogether dominant.  As he 
wrote to Karl Kerenyi: ‘Ich bin ein Mensch des Gleichgewichts.  Ich lehne mich 
instinktiv nach links, wenn der Kahn rechts zu kentern droht, –  und umgekehrt.’ (XI, 
632)  Considering that the German ship of state continued to list ever further to the 
right throughout the 1930’s, it is entirely to be expected that Mann himself – at home 
and in exile – leaned ever further to the left.  That is: away from ‘Natur’ and towards 
‘Geist’.  The presence of this tendency is, of course, indisputable in his essays and 
journalism, but it is detectable in the tetralogy too, which, as we have noted, becomes 
more ‘geistig’ from volume to volume.212    
 
Not that the novel at any stage lends credence to idolatry.  As we have seen, it goes 
out of its way to suggest that a divine providence shapes the life of its protagonist.  
That providence is never unequivocally present in the story: always we can attribute 
what looks like supernatural intervention to some accident of the phenomenal world.  
But there is no question which divinity is to be suspected of shaping the story’s ends – 
and it is the God of Joseph and the ‘Gottesfürsten’.  Certain putatively supernatural 
entities in the story, such as the dog-headed Anup (one and the same personage as the 
‘Mann auf dem Felde’, as we are given to understand) who appears to Jacob in a 
dream, or Ea-Oannes who indicates to him the whereabouts of the subterranean well, 
would have to be accounted agents of God, despite their pagan appearance, and even 
the ‘Hündin’ (admitting that she has some sort of objective existence and influence) 
invoked by Mut-em-enet to weaken Joseph’s chastity would actually be doing His 
work.
213
  For if Joseph were not tempted to a private encounter with Mut-em-enet, he 
would never be sent a prisoner to Zawi-Rê, never tell the Royal vintner his fortune, 
never be called to the Royal presence, never become ‘wie Pharaoh’.  As for the other 
idols of popular piety mentioned in Joseph, there is no suggestion that there is 
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 Harpprecht notes that ‘Aus den Tagebüchern[...]ergibt sich, daß die Religiosität, wenigstens für 
manche Augenblicke, entschiedener in das Dasein des Autors getreten war: “das Bewußtsein meines 
Kultur-Christentums,” schrieb er, “das freilich ansteht, ‘gläubig’ zu werden und sich der Offenbarung 
zu unterwerfen, ist in letzter Zeit sehr erstarkt.” ’ (Harpprecht 1995, 821) 
213
 It is an indication of the degree to which Schopenhauerian thinking has been marginalized in the 
later volumes of Joseph that the ‘Hündin’ – despite boasting all the obvious credentials – is not 
presented as an ambassadress of the ‘Wille’, but rather as the personified ideal of sluttishness, although 
whether this ideal is just an element of human psychology or has its place in the metaphysical realm 
remains unclear: ‘Solche Gottheiten gibt es und muß es geben, denn die Welt hat Seiten, welche, von 
Ekel und Blutschmutz starrend und zur Vergöttlichung scheinbar wenig geeignet, dennoch so gut wie 
die gewinnenderen der ewigen Repräsentation und Vorsteherschaft, der geistigen Verkörperung, 
sozusagen, oder der persönlichen Vergeistigung bedürfen.’ (V, 1228-9)    
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anything more to them than the stone, wood, gilt and sawdust out of which they are 
fabricated. 
 
But Joseph and the narrator (who, as we have seen, seems to adopt in the later parts of 
the tetralogy the assumptions of his main protagonist) become ever more severe in 
their devotion to ‘Geist’ as time passes.  The way in which the ‘junge’ Joseph exploits 
and manipulates the religious beliefs of his own father and clan is indistinguishable 
from the way he goes on, in his exile, to exploit and manipulate the religious beliefs 
of benighted but powerful contemporaries who worship idolatrous mythological 
figures, so that we might easily gain the impression that the God of the 
‘Gottesfürsten’ is no more to be revered, and enjoys no better a claim to reality, than 
Baal, Thoth and the rest.  Nor does Joseph’s decision to identify himself with Osiris – 
with its blasphemous implications for a son of Israel – cause him any anguish, so far 
as we can tell.  On the contrary, he evidently finds the performance of such a role to 
be as gratifying to his vanity as it is expedient for his social progress.  By contrast, 
‘Von Josephs Keuschheit’ makes clear that Joseph ‘in Ägypten’ is deeply dismayed 
by pagan superstition and the worldliness which underlies it.  It is on account of the 
repugnance he feels towards such misguided religiosity that he for so long refuses to 
yield ground to Mut-em-enet’s campaign of sexual aggression.  This is a dramatic 
change in his attitude, so striking that Mann felt the need to include in Joseph in 
Ägypten a chapter intended to explain it: ‘Urim und Tummim’.    
 
What does Mann mean by these two terms?  Tummim is that Hermetic reconciliation 
of Godliness and worldliness, the noumenal and the phenomenal which, as we have 
seen, is Joseph’s and, to a lesser extent, Jacob’s birthright.  By contrast ‘Urim’ is an 
exclusive orientation to Godliness and the noumenal: ‘Tummim ist das Helle und 
Finstere, das Oberweltliche und Unterweltliche zugleich und im Austausch – und 
Urim nur das Fröhliche, in Reinkultur davon abgesondert.’ (V, 1508) Urim, then, 
evidently denotes ‘Geist’ in its purity, and would be an admirable quality, no doubt, 
did it not suffer certain deficiencies extensively illustrated in Mann’s fiction. For in its 
negligence of the secular world’s limitations, it is either impotent to realize itself (the 
Pharaoh of the tetralogy, had Joseph not come to his assistance) or driven to realize 
itself by ignominious tyranny (the Moses of ‘Das Gesetz’).  Jacob, for example, could 
never have become a wealthy and successful man in Laban’s nether-world if he had 
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been all Urim, and as for Joseph, his ‘rasche Anpassung an die sonnige Unterwelt 
Ägyptenlandes [deutet] ebenfalls nicht auf eine bloße Urim-Natur.’ (V, 1509) But 
Jacob and Joseph are as much Urim as they are Tummim.  That is, theirs is a twice-
compounded perspective which, we are told, might be translated: ‘yes – yes/no’, and 
which we, reinstating Mann’s usual terminology, translate: ‘Geist – Geist/Natur’.   
Mann then adds that, in the light of the fact that ‘yes’ and ‘no’ cancel one another out, 
there remains only a ‘yes’ in force – and we, in parallel, point out that once the two 
elements of ‘Geist/Natur’ are allowed to nullify one another, then ‘Geist’ is what 
remains.  That is the purpose of this, for many readers baffling, but all the same 
crucial passage: to reassure us that though Jacob and Joseph seem equally at home in 
the phenomenal and noumenal, the terrestrial and celestial worlds, their ultimate 
loyalty – like the ‘Spieltrieb’, like Hermes himself – is to the latter.214  
 
Seen in the light of Mann’s increasing commitment to ‘Geist’ during the 1930s, then, 
Joseph und seine Brüder recounts a multitude of triumphs.  The first and most 
obvious is the ascent to the highest governmental office  of a representative of the 
celestial and noumenal who, however, is so much at home in the terrestrial and 
phenomenal realm that he knows how to flatter, cajole and deceive it into the paths of 
righteousness – rather than achieving the ends of ‘Geist’ by violence and terror.  The 
second is the guaranteed survival of the tribe of Israel – for although Pharaoh does 
indeed anticipate Platonism (and of course Christianity too, to an extent), we know 
that his is a false start, and many hundreds of years must past before the philosophical 
spirit which once inspired him will come to inspire Plato himself.  As Joseph confides 
to his brothers, although Pharaoh is ‘recht wohl auf dem Wege’ he is none the less 
‘der Rechte nicht für den Weg.’ (V, 1749)  Underlying the usual significance of the 
oft repeated phrase ‘nachkommen lassen’ – a thought inextricably linked for Joseph 
since he first recounted his dream of apotheosis to Benjamin with that of the 
acquisition of supreme power – is that of ‘Nachkommen’ in a genealogical and a 
spiritual sense.  Without Joseph’s political ascendancy the future of Israel would have 
looked bleak indeed, and without Israel there could be no Christianity.  Finally, there 
is Joseph’s intellectual and spiritual achievement in helping God slough off the last of 
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 Bernd-Jürgen Fischer notices that the fictional occasion for this disquisition, Joseph’s relocation to 
Memphis, seems the merest pretext, and adds: ‘Es entsteht der Eindruck, als wollte ThM. hier etwas 
unterbringen, was ihm zuvor noch nicht so deutlich war: die Beschreibung der Welt als “Ja – ja, nein”.’ 
(Fischer 2002, 733).  He then goes on to explain Urim and Tummim in terms of quantum physics. 
160 
 
his phenomenal attributes and interests so that he might assume the noumenal purity 
which is rightfully His.  The God whom Joseph sees in Potiphar, and of whom 
Potiphar, with Joseph’s encouragement, becomes a living reflection; the God whom 
Pharaoh, with Joseph’s guidance, comes to discern beyond a sun which is but His 
analogon – this God is not concerned to rule by might, and the influence He exerts is 
that of a criterion from which all that is valuable in the phenomenal realm proceeds.  
All that is valuable, all that is intelligible, all that is proper to the free and self-
determining subject. 
 
Hegel 
 
But we have not yet reached the end of our reckoning, for present throughout Joseph 
as an uneasy complement to the Platonic view of ‘Geist’ is another: one strongly 
resembling that of Hegel.  It is a similarity which has gone largely unnoticed, and 
given the Schopenhauerian perspective adopted by certain influential Mann scholars, 
and given that Schopenhauer detested Hegel and all he philosophically stood for, this 
is hardly surprising.
215
  Nor do we wish to imply that Mann devoted to the perusal of 
Hegel the time and attention he lavished on Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Plato and 
Schiller – and it is evident that the acquaintance was largely mediated through 
articles, reviews and, in particular, son Golo’s doctoral dissertation.216  None the less, 
that some of Hegel’s notions were familiar to Mann is confirmed by references to 
them in a number of works already cited in this thesis.  ‘Okkulte Erlebnisse’ mentions 
his ‘Geist’ (alongside Plato’s ideas) in the context of supernatural manifestations.217 
Betrachtungen pointedly refuses to endorse Schopenhauer’s derisive reaction to that 
same ‘Geist’.218 And when Mann enthuses about his own conception of ‘Geist’ in 
‘Versuch über das Religiöse’ he refers to it in Hegelian terms as ‘das Absolute, die 
Idee’.  At any rate it should be clear from the discussion which follows that certain 
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 We noted in chapter I that Kristiansen acknowledges a Hegelian element in Joseph.  But Hegel is 
not once mentioned in the almost 900 pages of the Handbuch zu Thomas Manns ‘Josephromanen’. 
216
 Diary entry for 23rd August 1934: ‘Golo gab mir seine Doktor-Arbeit über Hegel zu lesen.’ (TB III, 
148)  Diary entry for 28th August 1934: ‘Später in Golos Hegel-Schrift gelesen.’ (TB III, 151) 
217
 ‘Es war Hegel, der gesagt hat, daß die Idee, der Geist als letzte Quelle anzusehen sei, aus der alle 
Erscheinungen fließen.’ (See page 54) 
218
 ‘Wir sind weit entfernt, sie [Schopenhauer’s opinion of ‘Geist’] uns zu eigen zu machen’.  (See page 
82) 
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aspects of ‘Geist’ as it appears in Joseph would not take the form they do without the 
direct or indirect influence of Hegel.   
 
But before engaging in that discussion, we must first ask the question we posed in 
chapter III with regard to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer: when we say that certain 
aspects of Mann’s work are Hegelian, which Hegel are we talking about?  It is a 
question even harder to accost in his case than in theirs, because whereas most 
commentators accept that both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer are inconsistent in their 
thinking (the former much more than the latter), there is continuing controversy as to 
whether Hegel, who is often taken to be a thoroughgoing monist, could ever have 
been so untrue to his own principles as to really believe that ‘Geist’ could have any 
existence independent of the phenomenal world.  In his works on the philosophy of 
history – which have and had the widest currency amongst non-specialist readers – he 
definitely writes as though it does have such an independent existence.  But 
Copleston, for instance, believes that such passages should be regarded as ‘pictoral or 
figurative statements of truth’, (Copleston VII, 196) and not taken literally: ‘For 
Hegel the infinite exists in and through the finite; the universal lives and has its being, 
as it were, in and through the particulars.  Hence there is no room in his system for an 
efficient cause which transcends the world in the sense that it exists quite 
independently of it.’ (Copleston VII, 197) Copleston goes on to moderate this view of 
the matter somewhat, but other interpreters have no such qualms, and claim that 
Hegel was, to all intents and purposes, a naturalist.
219
  For example Joseph McCarey 
says of Hegel’s philosophy of history that ‘the entire scheme has, it appears, an 
ontological ground in the essence of individual human beings, and that essence is the 
ultimate source of all teleological energy in history.[…]The teleological energy in 
question may be understood as an energy that, so to speak, pushes history from behind 
and from within, rather than pulling it from the front and from outside.’ (McCarney 
2000, 132) By contrast commentators such as Charles Taylor take Hegel to be a 
dualist, and consider ‘Geist’ to be both a metaphysical reality and the phenomenal 
realization of that reality.  In a sense, however, this whole debate – though it cannot 
be quite ignored – is by-the-by because, irrespective of whether Hegel was actually a 
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 ‘I do not think that we can exclude metaphysics from Hegelianism or eliminate altogether a certain 
element of transcendence.  The attempt to do this seems to me to make nonsense of Hegel’s doctrine of 
the infinite Absolute.’ (Copleston VII, 198) 
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dualist or a monist who occasionally wrote as though he were a dualist, there is little 
doubt that Mann was a dualist, and that he employs Hegel’s theory of history in that 
spirit.  We shall proceed on the assumption that Hegel is sincere in his dualism 
(though it was perhaps meant only metaphorically) because Mann proceeded on 
exactly the same assumption. 
 
So what characterizes Hegel’s conception of ‘Geist’?  Firstly, he is adamant that 
‘Geist’ (for which he employs a number of synonyms) does not wrong itself by 
restricting its existence to a metaphysical realm accessible only to certain exalted 
intellects: ‘die Vernunft [ist] nicht so ohnmächtig, um es nur bis zum Ideal, bis zum 
Sollen zu bringen und nur außerhalb der Wirklichkeit, wer weiß wo, wohl nur als 
etwas besonderes in den Köpfen einiger Menschen vorhanden zu sein.’ (Hegel 1970, 
21) However, this realization of itself – the move from ‘Geist an sich’ to ‘Geist für 
sich’ – is not to be regarded as fulfilled by the mere bringing into existence of the 
material world.  That is but a first step on the way to the ‘Endzweck’: effectively, the 
emancipation of ‘Geist’ from all the passion and partiality which a phenomenal career 
entails and a return, in secular rather than other-worldly terms, to that perfect freedom 
which it had to forego in order to be realized at all.  The concern of historical 
philosophy is thus to recognize ‘den Entwicklungsgang der verwirklichenden Idee[...], 
und zwar der Idee der Freiheit, welche nur ist als Bewußtsein der Freiheit.’ (Hegel 
1970, 540)   The relevance of this to the tetralogy is evident.  In ‘Der junge Joseph’ 
Abraham’s God is described in the following terms: 
 
Am Ende der Tage würde Gott König sein, König der Könige, König über Menschen und 
Götter.  War er das nicht schon heute?  Allerdings, in der Stille und in Abrahams Erkenntnis.  
Aber nicht anerkannter- und eingesehenermaßen, nicht ganz verwirklichterweise also. (IV, 433)  
 
Abraham, of course, has not the sort of insight into God’s once and future character 
which Joseph has, and is preoccupied instead with the recognition due to His imperial 
might, but already we see an important distinction between God as a noumenal entity 
(‘in der Stille und in Abrahams Erkenntnis’) and God as a phenomenal entity who will 
one day achieve full realization.  As a creature of the world He is at the mercy of its 
events while as the creator of the world He retains the power to direct them (like the 
narrator of the novel who is both within and outside of the story he tells).  The idea of 
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a God who allows Himself to be enchained in ‘Banden’ is further developed in 
‘Vorspiel in oberen Rängen’, in which He becomes guilty of a ‘Sündenfall’ when 
Samael infects Him with an ambition similar to that attributed by Hegel to ‘Geist’: 
‘denn im Obersten Falle, wo jeder Ehrgeiz nach oben undenkbar ist, bleibt nur ein 
solcher nach unten übrig.’ (V, 1289)  What the tempter proposes is that God should 
forego His ‘Jenseitig-Allgültig-Geistige’ character and become the God of a rather 
undistinguished tribe which, however, will be the main vehicle of His apotheosis. 
 
Den Gottesleib dieses eigentümlichen Stammes abzugeben, war einerseits kein sonderliches 
Vergnügen; unter den anderen Volksgöttern war ihm, wie man zu sagen pflegt, nicht viel Staat 
zu machen.  Man geriet unvermeidlich dabei ins Hintertreffen.  Andererseits aber und im 
Zusammenhang damit hob sich die allgemeine Eigenschaft des Menschengeschöpfes, ein 
Instrument zur Selbsterkenntnis Gottes zu sein, bei diesem Stamm in besonderer Zuspitzung 
hervor. (V, 1290)   
 
One of the tetralogy’s chief concerns is to focus our attention on the progressive in all 
its aspects.  We witness it at work in the novel’s great story-defining dynamics: 
Joseph’s worldly career, Pharaoh’s philosophical and theological investigations, the 
transformation of God from a semi-phenomenal worldly deity to a purely noumenal 
essence.  And we witness it at work in the novel’s incidental and ancillary elements.  
For example, in the mutation of an entity which eventually reveals itself to be an 
angelic messenger but which firstly appears as the jackal running ahead of the fugitive 
Jacob, which secondly appears as the dog-headed Anup in one of his dreams, and 
which – despite a still unmistakeably doglike profile – finally appears in fully human 
form when it encounters Joseph ‘auf dem Felde’.  Progress, however, is always 
progress towards an end.  That end may, of course, be purely phenomenal, the 
realization of one of the hypothetical imperatives which from the naturalistic 
perspective are the only ones to be observed.  Pharaoh, a naturalist would say, may 
believe that the intellectual struggle to identify his ‘Vater im Himmel’ is an absolute 
obligation, but in truth he is merely yielding to an urge originating in the phenomenal 
world: social conditioning, psychological predisposition etc.  But if such phenomenal 
ends are not themselves progressive: that is, if they do not help realize some ulterior, 
in the last instance non-phenomenal, end – then it follows that the progress they 
evince is illusory.  In the absence of an ultimate end capable of lending retrospective 
value to the deeds which help bring it about (each deed accomplishing a purpose 
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which contributes in turn to the realization of its superior), there can be, properly 
speaking, no progress.  Only change.  It is precisely because Plato’s το καλόν serves 
this function that Copleston affirms that ‘The Good or Absolute Principle of Value 
has[…]the nature of a τέλος’.  To that extent, then, the tetralogy’s progressivism – if 
we relinquish the naturalist point of view, with which it is incompatible – is strongly 
supported by its Platonism. 
 
Progress in Plato’s own writing, however, is generally conceived in terms of the 
individual’s insights, duties and spiritual growth: as a matter of finding one’s own 
way to the ‘Absolute Principle of Value’.  By contrast, the notion that the whole 
world is ceaselessly advancing towards the realization of ‘Geist’, a ‘Geist’ whose 
dictates in the present, and which are valid for the present, demand to be recognized – 
such a notion is Hegelian.
220
 It is in a Hegelian spirit that Joseph speaks when he says 
of Laban (who sacrificed his own son in order to propitiate the supernatural powers-
that-be) that he ‘handelte nach überständigem Brauch und beging schweren Fehler 
damit.  Denn es ekelt den Herrn das Überständige, worüber er mit uns hinaus will und 
schon hinaus ist, und er verwirft’s und verflucht’s.’221  It is likewise in a Hegelian 
spirit that Joseph, even as he disparages the mistaken efforts of Huij and Tuij to 
anticipate the dictates of a ‘Geist’ which is always itself progressing, broods on the 
difficulty of identifying its changing imperatives: 
 
Nicht Jaakob allein sorgte sich in der Welt.  Das geschah überall unter den Menschen, und 
überall gab es den Gram, ob man sich denn auch noch auf den Herrn verstehe und auf die 
Zeiten, – mochte er auch zu den linkischsten Auskünften führen da und dort, und mochte 
freilich Jaakobs Erbgedanke des Herrn ihm die feinsten und angreifendsten Prüfungsmittel 
bieten für die sorgende Frage nach dem Abstand, in den etwa Brauch und Sitte vom Willen und 
Wachstum ebendieses Herrn geraten sein mochten. (IV, 874)  
 
Jacob too is capable of Hegelian thinking.  When he foresees the advent of ‘Shiloh’ in 
Joseph der Ernährer from a religious perspective he anticipates the coming of a 
Messiah ‘Friedreich geheißen, den Träger und Bringer des Friedens’ who will one day 
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 For example, he says of world-historical individuals that: ‘Ihre Sache war es, dies Allgemeine, die 
notwendige, nächste Stufe ihrer Welt zu wissen.’ (Hegel 1970, 46)  
221
 (IV, 474)  A few lines later he declares, having heard Jacob’s suggestion that the lamb to be 
consumed at the passover of ‘Jahu’ is a contemporary substitute for human flesh: ‘Brauch und Braten 
sind wohlschmeckend, und sind sie eine Lösung, so lösen auch wir uns fröhlich damit vom Unflat, 
indem wir uns auf den Herrn verstehen und auf die Zeiten!’ 
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rule from sea to sea and ‘vom Fluß bis zum Ende der Welt.’ (V, 1557)  But when he 
foresees Shiloh from a less rigorously religious perspective he anticipates, or seems 
to, the establishment of a universal earthly state which will, after millennia of 
struggle, reveal itself to be the ‘end of history’ – i.e. the fulfilled purpose of history.  
Such is the implication of the following statement, at first glance no more than an 
exposition of the name’s derivation, at second glance a hint that the triumph of ‘Geist’ 
can be achieved in other than conventionally religious terms: ‘Er hieß aber Ruhe- und 
Rastplatz, denn das meint “Shiloh”; Frieden meint es und frohes Eratmen nach 
blutiger Fehde und ist ein Segenslaut, tauglich als Eigenname so gut wie als Name des 
Platzes.’ (V, 1556)  Conversely ‘Friedreich’ is an epithet as appropriate to an empire 
of peace as it is to the son of man who will dispense that peace abundantly. 
 
Does the addition of this Hegelian element greatly alter our interpretation of the 
novel?  It is certainly not in conflict with the notion that Joseph und seine Brüder is a 
work of the fantastic, because Hegel himself, in his writings on the philosophy of 
history, apparently adopts a fantastic perspective.  On the one hand he says that 
history should be studied as a science: ‘Die Geschichte aber haben wir zu nehmen, 
wie sie ist; wir haben historisch, empirisch zu verfahren.’ (Hegel 1970, 22)  On the 
other hand he says that: ‘Die Philosophie[…]lehrt uns, daß alle Eigenschaften des 
Geistes nur durch die Freiheit erstehen, alle nur Mittel für die Freiheit sind, alle nur 
diese suchen und hervorbringen; es ist dies eine Erkenntnis der spekulativen 
Philosophie, daß die Freiheit das einzige Wahrhafte des Geistes sei.’ (Hegel 1970, 30)  
And these are, surely, incompatible principles.  If the historian proceeds in a spirit of 
empiricism, then he will be quite unable to detect the presence or development of a 
quintessentially free ‘Geist’, for empiricism is limited to the phenomenal realm with 
its mandatory association of cause and effect.  Conversely, if the philosopher wishes 
to gain insight into the development of ‘Geist’, or even to take cognizance of it, then 
he must not look for it in the phenomenal world which leaves no room for its 
freedom.  In order, then, to be a philosopher of history in the Hegelian sense, one has 
to see the world in two ways at once: as both strictly phenomenal and at the same time 
as acting at the behest of a ‘Geist’ independent of all phenomena. 
 
What this means in effect is that Hegel, while advancing the principle that ‘die 
Vernunft die Welt regiere’, and seeing in the ‘providence’ of the religious-minded an 
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allied concept,
222
 does not dispute the usual scientific analysis of historical events 
whereby every event is but the effect of a phenomenal cause.  ‘Geist’ may guide the 
course of history but it is never caught doing so red-handed.  ‘World-historical’ 
individuals, for example, although they have a sharp sense of what ‘Geist’ in the 
contemporary stage of its development might allow them to accomplish, are not 
concerned with its final end, and are frequently driven by quite selfish motives.  In 
compensation, however, their ‘eigene partikülare Zwecke [enthalten] das 
Substantielle[...], welches Wille des Weltgeistes ist.’ (Hegel 1970, 45)  ‘Geist’, in 
fact, realizes itself in history not by supernatural manifestations, nor through the 
abstract contemplation (followed by judicious intervention) of Platonic philosopher-
kings, but rather through the struggle of competing interests and passions, which, in a 
dialogical conflict, bring forth a state of affairs each time a little closer to the τέλος, 
thus furnishing a sound basis for yet another round of progressive struggle: ‘Das ist 
die List der Vernunft zu nennen, daß sie die Leidenschaften für sich wirken läßt, 
wobei, das, durch was sie sich in Existenz setzt, einbüßt und Schaden leidet.’223 
 
Hegel’s understanding of the oblique role played by ‘Geist’ in history is, then, 
compatible with a divine providence which seems to superintend the accession of 
Joseph to the highest governmental office but which, although we may believe we 
have good grounds – in the form of highly improbable coincidences and characters 
whose knowledge and behaviour is difficult to account for naturalistically – to suspect 
its agency, can evade the charge of improper interference in the secular world and 
also the danger of falling prey to that world’s contingency.  Taylor interprets Hegel’s 
reasoning thus:  
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 ‘Das Weitere ist, daß diese Erscheinung des Gedankens, daß die Vernunft die Welt regiere, mit 
einer weiteren Anwendung zusammenhängt, die uns wohl bekannt ist – in der Form der Religiösen 
Wahrheit nämlich, daß die Welt nicht dem Zufall und äußerlichen, zufälligen Ursachen preisgegeben 
sei, sondern eine Vorsehung die Welt regiere.’ (Hegel 1970, 25) 
223
 (Hegel 1970, 49)  The ‘Geist’ which uses disparate interests and passions – some of them apparently 
contrary to ‘Geist’ in character – evidently has something in common with God as He occasionally 
appears in Joseph: ‘Ja, dies mochte die List Gottes gewesen sein, der in Abiram sich zu verherrlichen 
und sich durch ihn einen Namen zu machen gedachte, daß er durch seine Mondliebe ersten 
Widerspruch und Unruhe in ihm erregt, sie zu eigenen Zwecken benutzt und sie zum heimlichen 
Ausgangspunkt seiner Laufbahn gemacht hatte.’ (IV, 426)  Compare this with Taylor’s gloss of Hegel: 
‘But Hegel’s image of the cunning of Reason is also, and especially, related to history.  In this sense 
God’s providence is the absolute cunning because he lets men follow their own passions and interests, 
but what happens is nevertheless the fulfilment of his intentions.’ (Taylor 1975, 326) 
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Rather than working directly on the object, the higher purpose slips another object between 
itself and what it wants to transform.  If it were to enter directly into the interaction of things, it 
would be a particular thing itself and would go under like all such things.  But it cunningly saves 
itself from this fate by having its work done for it by the mechanical interaction of things in the 
world. (Taylor 1975, 398) 
 
If we bear in mind the notion of a ‘Geist’ which is both ‘an sich’ and ‘für sich’ we can 
make sense of something which has baffled a number of critics with respect to Joseph 
und seine Brüder, and has led some of them to conclude that, despite the presence of 
duplicitous support for a supernatural explanation of its events, we should interpret 
the entire work from the naturalistic perspective: the dependence of a supposedly all-
powerful God on mere mortals for His own apotheosis.  But, like Hegel’s ‘Geist’, 
Mann’s God (who is a ‘geistiger Gott[…]nach seinem Werdenziel’) (V, 142) is both 
beyond the world – beyond space, time and nature – and equally, having created the 
universe and thrown Himself on its mercy, within the world and in need of allies.  He 
is both a naturalistically explicable complex of beliefs and customs amongst a modest 
pastoral tribe – a bundle of phenomena.  And He is also the metaphysical end to 
which that bundle of phenomena will, guided through the vicissitudes of history by 
the Gottesfürsten, ceaselessly approximate itself.
224
   
 
But if the Hegelian ingredient of Joseph is not incompatible with its fantastic 
character, it does cast a new and more probing light on its protagonist.
225
  For Hegel’s 
‘Geist’ realizes itself through unremitting struggle and suffering, while the Hermetic 
Joseph, ambassador in the terrestrial realm as he is for a God utterly beyond it, tricks, 
cajoles and flatters his way to the power he wishes to exercise on his master’s behalf, 
and never – not when he is lying at the bottom of a well and in danger of death by 
inanition, not when he is condemned to penal servitude in Zawi-Rê – does he seem to 
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 Copleston explains the matter thus: ‘The world, as we know it in perception, consists of particulars, 
perishable objects, contingent beings; this is the outside of the world, the Idea, or God, in its otherness, 
gone over into particularity.  In its inner thought-structure the world is identical with God, but in its 
outward and contingent aspect it is not identical with God, so that, in religious language, God may be 
said to be both transcendent and immanent. (Copleston 1946, 11) 
225
 Over and above any theoretical considerations, there is a good compositional reason for ending the 
novel in a minor key, one well explained by Henry Hatfield in his study of Mann’s later fiction: ‘The 
tale of Joseph is an amazing success story, on an American scale; the danger lay in writing a success 
story and nothing else.  This danger Mann avoided by various stratagems.  There are deeply moving 
scenes, like the recognition between Joseph and his brother, and the section “Of Withholding Love.”  
We encounter a second element that modifies Joseph’s success: not only is he an exile; he is not to 
receive the blessing of Israel after all.’ (Hatfield 1979, 86) 
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suffer in anything more than a physical sense: he is always sure that he is doing right 
by God and that God will do right by him.  In this he is poles apart from Jacob, whose 
whole life is dominated by movements of avarice, cowardice, romantic love, grief, 
paternal affection, and doubt – doubt even in providence, when he learns that his best 
beloved son has been killed.
226
  Joseph is not like that, and despite the brilliant way he 
schemes and improvises for worldly success, his commitment to the promotion of 
God-in-the-world has none of the passion of his father’s, not to mention Abraham’s.  
This latter, whose religious ‘Wichtignehmen’ allows him ‘es vor Gott und Menschen 
zu[…]Ansehnlichkeit und Bedeutung zu bringen’ perfectly matches Hegel’s 
understanding (according to Taylor) of those movers and shakers to be identified as 
world-historical individuals:  
 
It is not just a question of men’s individual ambition being used for a foreign purpose.  Rather it 
is that those men whose individual ambitions coincide with the interests of Spirit are filled with 
a sense of mission.  They instinctively sense the importance of what they are doing, and so do 
the men around them, who flock to their banner; even though both the great man and his 
followers would be incapable of articulating it correctly. (Taylor 1975, 392)    
 
It is because of his quite distinct unworldliness, then, that Joseph is capable of 
stealing a march on history, of apprehending the once and future character of God 
and implementing His will – with the triumphant results that we have already noted.  
Like Hans Castorp in his snow-induced delirium, Joseph has been granted privileged 
access to the truth (God in His perfection, ‘Geist an sich’), and although he effects far 
more of that truth than did his fictional forerunner (who simply forgets it, before 
going on to participate in a dreadful but perhaps spiritually productive world-conflict), 
his achievement is presented as dubious because founded on a special insight rather 
than on an experienced struggle.    And just as Hegel’s ‘Geist’ cannot be perfected in 
history through mere intellectual contemplation, so God cannot be perfected in history 
through mere spiritual apprehension.  Joseph’s career – which he had reason at first to 
imagine might have been that of the Messiah – turns out to be an anticipation, not the 
ultimate realization of God’s apotheosis.  For Jacob’s blessing will fall on Juda, a 
passionate and guilt-stricken slave to Astaroth who conceives the God of his fathers to 
be a primitive supernatural potentate ‘von dessen Nase, wenn er zornig war, Dampf 
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 As Joseph’s watchword is ‘spielen’, so Jacob’s is ‘ringen’. 
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ging und verzehrend Feuer von seinem Munde, daß es davon blitzte’. (V, 1547) And 
though Israel has been saved it must sink very low (how low is made clear by ‘Das 
Gesetz’) and engage in a millennium of struggle before it can bring forth Christianity.  
‘Geist’, that is, will emerge in Hegelian, and not in Platonic, fashion.  Hence 
Thamar’s reaction as Joseph is introduced to the tribe: ‘Hoch und dunkel schritt 
Thamar vorbei, an jeder Hand einen Sohn, und neigte sich stolz vor dem 
Schattenspender, denn sie dachte in ihrem Herzen: “Ich bin auf der Bahn, du aber 
nicht, so sehr du glitzerst.” ’227  Hence, too, Jacob’s heartbroken explanation as to 
why Juda and not Joseph will receive the first-born’s blessing forfeited by Ruben: 
‘Siehe, dein teueres Leben liegt vor des Sterbenden Blick in seiner Wahrheit.  Spiel 
und Anspiel war es, vertraulich, freundliche Lieblingsschaft, anklingend ans Heil, 
doch nicht ganz im Ernste berufen und zugelassen.’  
 
To a certain extent, then, the complex situation which obtained in Der Tod in 
Venedig, whereby Platonic and Schopenhauerian philosophical systems seemed to be 
competing for possession of the metaphysical realm, is repeated in Joseph und seine 
Brüder, and produces a comparable hesitancy in our final judgment of its protagonist.  
Comparable in kind – but not in urgency.  For the Hegelian and Platonic conceptions 
of ‘Geist’ are by no means so incompatible with one another as either of them is with 
Schopenhauer’s ‘Wille’.  Plato, although he regards το καλόν, and all that is 
intelligible, as subsisting beyond the phenomenal realm, does not propose that it can 
have no significance for the lives of human beings who are at least in part creatures of 
flesh and blood.  On the contrary, he considers it their proper business to pursue it by 
ever closer earthly approximations until the day comes when they can seize it in its 
essence.  And that this can have political consequences, and bring about historical 
change, is the unmistakeable implication of Republic.  Once we admit that the 
individual’s search for the paragon of value can deposit cultural capital accumulating 
from age to age, then the ultimate phenomenal realisation of the τέλος in human 
society becomes a possibility at least.  And Hegel, for his part, while insisting on the 
central role played by passion in historical progress, does not suggest that mere 
dialogical struggle in the absence of the free human intellect can bring about the 
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 (V, 1747-8) Contra Frizen, Thamar should be understood in a Hegelian, not a Schopenhauerian, 
light: ‘Thamar hatte über die Welt und ihre Zielstrebigkeit nur belehrt zu werden brauchen, um zu dem 
unbedingten Entschluß zu gelangen , ihr Weibtum mit dieser Zielstrebigkeit zu verbinden und 
weltgeschichtlich zu werden .’ (V, 1558) 
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perfection of ‘Geist’, for if that were the case antagonism between purely natural 
forces would be sufficient to the task – a proposition which he expressly denies: ‘Nur 
in den Veränderungen, die auf dem geistigen Boden vorgehen, kommt Neues hervor.  
Diese Erscheinung am Geistigen ließ in dem Menschen eine andere Bestimmung 
überhaupt sehen als in den bloß natürlichen Dingen – in welchen sich immer ein und 
derselbe stabile Charakter kundgibt, in den alle Veränderung zurückgeht –, nämlich 
eine wirkliche Veränderungsfähigkeit, und zwar zum Besseren – ein Trieb zur 
Perfektibilität.’ (Hegel 1970, 74)  
 
If we take the Platonic view, then there is no reason to cast doubt on Joseph’s 
historical contribution, for the fact that this is the consequence of a more direct 
relationship to the source of value than the vast majority of humankind enjoys 
strengthens rather than weakens its claim to validity.  If we take the Hegelian view we 
can grant some justification for Thamar’s haughtiness and for Jacob’s reluctance to 
bestow the blessing so long reserved for his best-beloved son on another.  But, always 
in accordance with Hegel’s own views, it is evident that Joseph’s special connection 
to God has permitted him to make a real contribution to His worldly realization.  
Thamar can sneer and Jacob wring his hands as much as they please: without Joseph’s 
special intervention and intercession the historical campaign to bring about 
Christianity, which Mann identified, along with Platonism, as the chief standard-
bearer of ‘Geist’, cannot even be undertaken.  Their prospective victories are 
dependent on his own actual triumph – a triumph to be celebrated in a more 
thoughtful mood than we might have anticipated, but to be celebrated none the less.   
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Conclusion: Fantastic ‘Spieltrieb’ 
 
What purpose does Schiller’s ‘Spieltrieb’ serve?  At a theoretical level, its function is 
to bridge the gap between the noumenal realm of ‘Geist’ and the phenomenal realm of 
‘Natur’.  Philosophical systems which incorporate an evaluative metaphysic, such as 
Plato’s or Kant’s, have this advantage: they underwrite various assumptions human 
beings are by and large incapable of doing without – for example, that men and 
women are free subjects susceptible to legitimate moral adjudication and capable of 
leading authentically meaningful lives.  Their disadvantage is that the noumenal and 
the phenomenal (each by definition what the other is not) are conceived in such a way 
that is difficult to suppose them in any kind of relationship with one another.  Kant’s 
solution to the problem as explained in Kritik der Urteilskraft seems to have 
something in common with Schiller’s in that both invoke an aesthetic solution to the 
problem, and what Kant says about the ‘Urteilskraft’ is at least vaguely consistent 
with what Schiller says about the ‘Spieltrieb’: ‘Allein in der Familie der oberen 
Erkenntnisvermögen gibt es doch noch ein Mittelglied zwischen dem Verstande und 
der Vernunft.  Dieses ist die Urteilskraft.’ (Kant V 1998, 249) However, Kant 
includes in the term ‘Urteilskraft’ more than is generally understood by the ‘aesthetic’ 
(for example: the apprehension of teleology in nature) and his arguments with regard 
to this area of philosophical investigation are not easy to follow.   
 
That need not concern us, however, because superficial similarities to Kant 
notwithstanding, Schiller’s ‘Spieltrieb’ is Platonic in character, and (as we have seen) 
can easily be assimilated to the Eros of Diotima’s myth: like Eros it leads men 
through an appreciation of beautiful things to the source of value itself.  And though 
the ‘Spieltrieb’ may lack the theoretical substance of Kant’s ‘Urteilskraft’, it appeals 
with far greater force to the imagination.  When we hear of its mission to reconcile the 
noumenal and the phenomenal, of its capacity to playfully educate individuals and 
communities to their own advantage and that of ‘Geist’ – the temptation to lend this 
force a personal identity (for example, that of a supernatural entity like Hermes or a 
mortal artist like Joseph) is strong indeed.
228
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 There is little sign that critics have grasped the importance of the ‘Spieltrieb’ for the development of 
Hermes in Mann’s fiction.  Wysling makes no mention of Schiller at all in this regard, contenting 
himself with the indictment of all of the usual suspects: ‘Die Gegensätze in seinem Denken zu 
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Which brings us to the second, more personal, purpose of the ‘Spieltrieb’: the 
justification of art and artists.  For Schiller declares that political and social progress 
cannot be left wholly to those who lack the true artistic temperament.  And though he 
admits as artists all those – including politicians – who practise upon the sensibilities 
of human beings for the advantage of ‘Geist’, he insists that only those inspired by the 
‘Spieltrieb’ will be able to synthesize ‘Geist’ and ‘Natur’ to the right degree and in the 
right fashion.  If this doctrine is accepted, then the activity of those generally regarded 
as artists (painters, poets, novelists) far from seeming a dispensable social adornment, 
is revealed as paradigmatic.  The artist need no longer regard his ambitions and 
travails as nobody’s business but his own and his indulgent public’s.  Rather, he can 
see them as a microcosm, sometimes even as an anticipation, of the ambitions and 
travails of the social and political world around him.  Is it any wonder that Thomas 
Mann, a writer for whom a condition for creative success was the sense of his own 
importance and the importance of anything he might undertake, was enthused by the 
idea?
229
 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that the ‘Spieltrieb’ as concept or character plays an 
important role in Mann’s fiction – and indeed, as Betrachtungen makes clear, in his 
non-fiction too.  Der Tod in Venedig and Joseph are dominated by its agents and 
personifications: the Hermes figures in the novella whose task it is to bring 
Aschenbach to ‘Geist’ but only through a proper accommodation with ‘Natur’, the 
Joseph of the tetralogy whose playful, flattering, cajoling efforts on behalf of a God 
who is all ‘Geist’ are rewarded with political triumph and the salvation of Israel.  But 
if the ‘Spieltrieb’ accords a special dignity to art and artists, it can do so only through 
the fulfilment of its theoretical purpose.  That is to say, the ‘Spieltrieb’ only makes 
sense in the context of an evaluative dualist philosophy.  Without it, the Hermes 
figures in Der Tod in Venedig have no other context but Aschenbach’s imagination: 
                                                                                                                                            
überbrücken hatte Thomas Mann schon früh angesetzt, und gerade beim Joseph hatte das Grundthema 
des “doppelten Segens” schon von Anfang an festgestanden, galt es doch, den seit der ersten Nietzsche-
Lektüre bewußt durchlittenen Gegensatz von Geist und Leben unter Goethes vorwaltenden Führung in 
das Zusammenspiel von Geist und Natur zu verwandeln – oder, in Bachofens Bildern geredet, das 
Solare und das Tellurische im Lunaren aufzuheben.’ (Wysling 1990, 246) 
229
 As Reed notes, even in the pre-war period Mann ‘was occupied not only with the human or social 
problem of the artist, but also with the more specific one of the nature of literary art and its function (as 
distinct from the writer’s position) in society.’ (Reed 1966, 57) It will be seen that Schiller’s 
conception of the ‘Spieltrieb’ represents a positive answer to all of these problems (the nature of 
literary art, the role of art in society as well as the human/social problem of the artist) simultaneously. 
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what looked like Hermes was just a series of coincidences worked up by an old man’s 
passions into a psychodrama.  Without it, Joseph is just a narcissistic young man who 
deludes himself and a lot of other people into thinking that he has a special destiny – 
to the point where he becomes ‘as Pharaoh’.230  The importance of these figures and 
the importance of their story depends on there being two realms: noumenal and 
phenomenal, celestial and terrestrial, for them to negotiate between.  
 
But how is this duality, and in particular its noumenal constituent, to be fictionally 
realized?  A writer is at liberty, of course, to introduce it under the guise of the 
supernatural, and we noted in chapter II that there is a long-standing connection 
between ghosts, demons, destiny and a metaphysic of some kind, and that this 
metaphysic has traditionally been evaluative in character.  As Le Fanu has Captain 
Barton, the protagonist of ‘The Watcher’, exclaim:  
 
Whatever may be my uncertainty as to the authenticity of what we are taught to call revelation, 
of one fact I am deeply and horribly convinced: that there does exist beyond this a spiritual 
world – a system whose workings are generally in mercy hidden from us – a system which may 
be, and which is sometimes partially and terribly revealed.  I am sure, I know[…]there is a God 
– a dreadful God – and that retribution follows guilt. (Le Fanu 1973, 90) 
 
But this notion: that the metaphysical expresses itself as the supernatural, means that 
the latter is a problematic enterprise.  If the supernatural is not to be written off as a 
not-yet-explained element of the natural world, if it is to retain the awe and terror 
which derive from the fact that something categorically distinct from the phenomenal 
realm has somehow intruded into that realm,
231
 then its existence cannot be baldly 
affirmed – and it is for this reason that its appearances are kept to a minimum of 
duration and clarity, or (the fantastic technique) not allowed to appear at all without 
ambiguity.  We have discussed the matter with regard to ghosts etc. before, but in the 
light of our analysis of Joseph, in which ‘Geist’ is so strongly associated with God, 
we might profitably revisit the matter now in the context of Mann’s religious beliefs.  
                                                 
230
 Felix Krull differs from Joseph, in that the Schopenhauerian  metaphysical force of which he 
(apparently) believes himself an emissary is not a meaningful one, and it is therefore a matter of moral 
indifference whether he actually is a special envoy of the ‘Wille’ or not.  It does a ‘Schelmenroman’ no 
harm to allude to an amoral metaphysical substrate – but on the other hand, given that the phenomenal 
world-view is anyway an amoral one, such a substrate is hardly indispensable.    
231
 ‘Noch einmal möchte ich, gereckten Halses, die Magen-nerven angerührt von Absurdität, das 
Unmögliche sehen, das dennoch geschieht.’ (15.1, 652) 
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Hermann Kurzke, in a short meditation on the topic, says of Mann that ‘Er war kein 
Kirchgänger, und er war trotzdem der größte christliche Autor des 20. Jahrhunderts.’ 
(Kurzke 2009, 4) One does not have to agree with that statement, however, to find 
what Kurzke writes in this context enlightening.  He notes, as we have, that Mann 
often reduces God to an aspect of human psychology, but also that this is only one 
side of the ledger: 
 
Es ist kein Zweifel, der Mensch hat Gott gemacht.  Gott ist eine Projektionsfigur menschlicher 
Sehnsüchte, da hat Feuerbach ganz recht.  Das ist jedenfalls die Seite des Mondes, die wir 
kulturell sehen können.  Die Existenz einer anderen, der dunklen, nicht von Menschen 
geschaffenen Seite wird damit nicht bestritten, aber über sie machen wir besser keine Aussagen, 
sie verehren wir schweigend. (Kurzke 2009, 6) 
 
But of course, as a novelist Mann could not honour God (the God who is ‘Geist’) in 
silence.  If he had, then Joseph would be a naturalistic novel, a debunking of religion 
– and its protagonist’s pretensions all vanity.  But nor could he introduce God as an 
unambiguous presence in the world of the senses and thus compel Him to forfeit his 
noumenal character.  Again, Kurzke gets to the heart of the problem: ‘ “Einen Gott, 
den es gibt, gibt es nicht,” schrieb Dietrich Bonhoeffer.  Er meinte damit, dass Gott 
nicht unter unsere Begriffe fällt.  Schon die Wendung “Es gibt” geht zu weit.  Unser 
Reden erreicht ihn nicht.’ (Kurzke 2009, 2)  
 
Fortunately, between honouring God in silence and including Him as a definite 
presence, there is a third way: a third way which has a long fictional pedigree and 
which Mann had already explored in Der Tod in Venedig.  It allows him to steer a 
course between two alternatives, both of which threaten to annihilate the metaphysical 
significance of the novel.  On the one hand, undiluted naturalism would present us 
with a concatenation of cause and effect which would allow no purchase for a 
meaningful interpretation.  On the other hand, a straightforwardly supernatural 
approach: definitely present angels, definitely accomplished miracles etc., would 
degrade the spiritual to an object of the senses.  As with the ghosts and demons of 
traditional supernatural fiction: the longer and more blatant the exposure of the 
supernatural, the more banal it becomes.  The course between these twin dangers is 
the fantastic, which ‘manifestiert in flüchtigen Erscheinungen unaufhörlich seine 
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Existenz, um diese zugleich zu leugnen, indem es sich den Bemühungen der 
Erkenntnis stets von neuem entzieht.’ (Vax 1998, 37-38)  Its apparent scepticism with 
regard to the supernatural (‘Was it an Illusion?’ ‘Was it Reality or Delusion?’ etc.) is 
actually the best way of keeping the supernatural in play, and it is to this effect that it 
is employed in Joseph und seine Brüder.  Just as the apparitions in Venice exude a far 
more alarming supernatural aura for not being evidently supernatural entities (for 
example: Hermes hovering in mid-air with winged sandals) so the presence of the 
God of the tetralogy and his ministers is disturbing because it is suggested but can 
never be unambiguously detected. 
 
It is the fantastic, then, which lends to both Der Tod in Venedig and Joseph their 
moral stature, their meaning.  And it is the fantastic which permits the ‘Spieltrieb’ to 
play the crucial role it does in Aschenbach’s Venetian adventures and in the 
realization of Joseph’s ambitions.  But the fantastic does more than assure the validity 
of the ‘Spieltrieb’: in so far as it establishes the just accommodation of the noumenal 
and phenomenal realms, it is a manifestation of the ‘Spieltrieb’.  The accommodation 
of the noumenal and phenomenal has proved an intractable problem for philosophers: 
it is Mann’s remarkable achievement that, by an expert employment of the fantastic 
technique, he manages to solve it aesthetically. 
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